Dual receiver encryption (DRE), being originally conceived at CCS 2004 as a proof technique, enables a ciphertext to be decrypted to the same plaintext by two different but dual receivers and becomes popular recently due to itself useful application potentials such secure outsourcing, trusted third party supervising, client puzzling, etc. Identity-based DRE (IB-DRE) further combines the bilateral advantages/facilities of DRE and identity-based encryption (IBE). Most previous constructions of IB-DRE are based on bilinear pairings, and thus suffers from known quantum algorithmic attacks. It is interesting to build IB-DRE schemes based on the well-known post quantum platforms, such as lattices. At ACISP 2018, Zhang et al. gave the first lattice-based construction of IB-DRE, and the main part of the public parameter in this scheme consists of 2 n + 2 matrices where n is the bit-length of arbitrary identity. In this paper, by introducing an injective map and a homomorphic computation technique due to Yamada at EUROCRYPT 2016, we propose another lattice-based construction of IB-DRE in an even efficient manner: The main part of the public parameters consists only of 2 p n 1 p + 2 matrices of the same dimensions, where p ( ≥ 2 ) is a flexible constant. The larger the p and n, the more observable of our proposal. Typically, when p = 2 and n = 284 according to the suggestion given by Peikert et al., the size of public parameters in our proposal is reduced to merely 12% of Zhang et al.’s method. In addition, to lighten the pressure of key generation center, we extend our lattice-based IB-DRE scheme to hierarchical scenario. Finally, both the IB-DRE scheme and the HIB-DRE scheme are proved to be indistinguishable against adaptively chosen identity and plaintext attacks (IND-ID-CPA).
Two Efficient Constructions for Biometric-Based Signature in Identity-Based Setting Using Bilinear Pairings
