Cost compensation mechanism for high wind power integration considering demand respond

Author(s):  
Xuechun Wang ◽  
Hongkun Chen ◽  
Xin Jiang
2013 ◽  
Vol 19 ◽  
pp. 692-703 ◽  
Author(s):  
A.M. Foley ◽  
B.P. Ó Gallachóir ◽  
E.J. McKeogh ◽  
D. Milborrow ◽  
P.G. Leahy

Author(s):  
Ana Fernández-Guillamón ◽  
José Ignacio Sarasúa ◽  
Manuel Chazarra ◽  
Antonio Vigueras-Rodríguez ◽  
Daniel Fernández-Muñoz ◽  
...  

Energies ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (17) ◽  
pp. 3299
Author(s):  
Tianliang Wang ◽  
Xin Jiang ◽  
Yang Jin ◽  
Dawei Song ◽  
Meng Yang ◽  
...  

As the installed capacity of wind power increases rapidly, how to promote wind power curtailment (WPC) integration has become a concern. The surface and underlying causes of wind power curtailment are insufficient peaking capability of the power system and imperfect peaking compensation mechanisms, respectively. Therefore, this paper proposes a peaking compensation mechanism uniting supply side and demand side to enhance system peaking capability. Firstly, through incentive and fairness analysis, the interest relationship of peaking subjects is researched based on game theory, and the peaking contribution on supply/demand side is quantified by Pearson correlation coefficients. Secondly, based on clustering analysis, the potential of system peaking providers are explored adequately, supply-side thermal units are divided into deep peaking clusters, and demand-side demand response (DR) resources are integrated into virtual peaking plants (VPP). Accordingly, a two-stage wind-thermal-VPP coordination optimization model is built to dispatch peaking providers. Furtherly, a two-layer peaking compensation allocation method considering peaking contribution and peaking enthusiasm is proposed to encourage peaking providers and mitigate “combination explosion”. Simulation results indicate that the proposed mechanism effectively promotes the enthusiasm of union peaking and the integration of WPC.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document