Characterization of robust feedback Nash equilibrium for multi-channel systems

Author(s):  
Getachew K. Befekadu ◽  
Vijay Gupta ◽  
Panos J. Antsaklis
2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (5) ◽  
pp. 78
Author(s):  
Letian Jiao ◽  
Haitao Chen

This paper is built on the fundamental of Jorgensen and Sorge considering a differential game about fishery problem. In reality, the exploiters can be many because of the non-excludability of common resource. Thus, we expand the former two players model to N players model and we find more different equilibriums in N players scenario. Through this, we want to find some guidance for the changing of common resource stock. Further to control overexploitation.


2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 34-85 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ying-Ju Chen ◽  
Yves Zenou, ◽  
Junjie Zhou

We consider a network model where individuals exert efforts in two types of activities that are interdependent. These activities can be either substitutes or complements. We provide a full characterization of the Nash equilibrium of this game for any network structure. We show, in particular, that quadratic games with linear best-reply functions aggregate nicely to multiple activities because equilibrium efforts obey similar formulas to that of the one-activity case. We then derive some comparative-statics results showing how own productivity affects equilibrium efforts and how network density impacts equilibrium outcomes. (JEL C72, D11, D85, Z13)


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document