Feedback Nash Equilibrium of N Agents Fishery Problem
Keyword(s):
This paper is built on the fundamental of Jorgensen and Sorge considering a differential game about fishery problem. In reality, the exploiters can be many because of the non-excludability of common resource. Thus, we expand the former two players model to N players model and we find more different equilibriums in N players scenario. Through this, we want to find some guidance for the changing of common resource stock. Further to control overexploitation.
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1991 ◽
Vol 9
(2)
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pp. 195-213
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Keyword(s):
1994 ◽
pp. 289-300
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2010 ◽
Vol 271
(S1)
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pp. 28-40
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2016 ◽
Vol 7
(4)
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pp. 635-656
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2016 ◽
Vol 48
(4)
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pp. 729-737
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