Coordination on networks with farsighted and myopic agents

We study a coordination game on a fixed connected network where players have to choose between two projects. Some players are moderate (i.e. they are ex-ante indifferent between both projects) while others are stubborn (i.e. they always choose the same project). Benefits for moderate players are increasing in the number of neighbors who choose the same project. In addition, players are either farsighted or myopic. Farsighted players anticipate the reactions of others while myopic players do not. We show that, when all players are farsighted, full coordination among the moderate players is reached except if there are stubborn players for both projects. When the population is mixed, the set of stable strategy profiles is a refinement of the set of Nash equilibrium strategy profiles. In fact, turning myopic players into farsighted ones eliminates gradually the inefficient Nash equilibria. Finally, we consider a social planner who can improve coordination by means of two policy instruments: adding links to the network (socialization) and/or turning myopic players into farsighted ones (education).

Exploring the cooperation-cooperation mode between scenic spots and tourism enterprises under the dual-channel tourism supply chain

As the two most important nodes in the tourism supply chain, the competition, as well as the cooperation relationship between scenic spots and tourism enterprises, has a profound impact on the healthy development of the tourism industry. In this paper, we establish a dual-channel tourism supply chain model by making many assumptions about the operations of scenic spots and tourism enterprises. According to repeated game theory, we find that there is a certain trigger strategy for equilibrium strategy between scenic spots and tourism enterprises, and the cooperation-cooperation strategy is the optimal choice for scenic spots and tourism enterprises at this time.

A Tripartite Game-Theory-Based Cooperation Mechanism for the Electronic Warehouse Receipt Pledge Financing Mode

To explore the electronic warehouse receipt pledge financing cooperation mechanism in the alliance formed between loan enterprises, commercial banks, e-commerce platforms, and logistics enterprises, by constructing a tripartite evolutionary game model, the game equilibrium strategy is then obtained, and the influencing factors of the cooperation mechanism are further simulated. It was found that in this tripartite evolutionary game, the stable strategy combination occurs when the loan enterprise chooses to repay on time, the platform alliance chooses to provide services, and the commercial bank chooses to continue to cooperate. However, heterogeneity exists in the influencing factors for the three-party selection strategy in the game, which is manifested in the fact that the higher the realization rate of the pledge, the more evolution is required in the selection strategy for loan enterprises to continue cooperating. The higher the information service fee, the higher the enthusiasm of the platform alliance in choosing to provide services. Credit levels, loan interest rates, and pledge realization rates are all important factors that affect the choice strategy of commercial banks.

Equilibrium reinsurance-investment strategy with a common shock under two kinds of premium principles

This paper investigates the optimal mean-variance reinsurance-investment problem for an insurer with a common shock dependence under two kinds of popular premium principles: the variance premium principle and the expected value premium principle. We formulate the optimization problem within a game theoretic framework and derive the closed-form expressions of the equilibrium reinsurance-investment strategy and equilibrium value function under the two different premium principles by solving the extended Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman system of equations. We find that under the variance premium principle, the proportional reinsurance is the optimal reinsurance strategy for the optimal reinsurance-investment problem with a common shock, while under the expected value premium principle, the excess-of-loss reinsurance is the optimal reinsurance strategy. In addition, we illustrate the equilibrium reinsurance-investment strategy by numerical examples and discuss the impacts of model parameters on the equilibrium strategy.

Network Security Defense Decision-Making Method Based on Stochastic Game and Deep Reinforcement Learning

Aiming at the existing network attack and defense stochastic game models, most of them are based on the assumption of complete information, which causes the problem of poor applicability of the model. Based on the actual modeling requirements of the network attack and defense process, a network defense decision-making model combining incomplete information stochastic game and deep reinforcement learning is proposed. This model regards the incomplete information of the attacker and the defender as the defender’s uncertainty about the attacker’s type and uses the Double Deep Q-Network algorithm to solve the problem of the difficulty of determining the network state transition probability, so that the network system can dynamically adjust the defense strategy. Finally, a simulation experiment was performed on the proposed model. The results show that, under the same experimental conditions, the proposed method in this paper has a better convergence speed than other methods in solving the defense equilibrium strategy. This model is a fusion of traditional methods and artificial intelligence technology and provides new research ideas for the application of artificial intelligence in the field of cyberspace security.

An Interactive Self-Learning Game and Evolutionary Approach Based on Non-Cooperative Equilibrium

Most current studies on multi-agent evolution based on deep learning take a cooperative equilibrium strategy, while interactive self-learning is not always considered. An interactive self-learning game and evolution method based on non-cooperative equilibrium (ISGE-NCE) is proposed to take the benefits of both game theory and interactive learning for multi-agent confrontation evolution. A generative adversarial network (GAN) is designed combining with multi-agent interactive self-learning, and the non-cooperative equilibrium strategy is well adopted within the framework of interactive self-learning, aiming for high evolution efficiency and interest. For assessment, three typical multi-agent confrontation experiments are designed and conducted. The results show that, first, in terms of training speed, the ISGE-NCE produces a training convergence rate of at least 46.3% higher than that of the method without considering interactive self-learning. Second, the evolution rate of the interference and detection agents reaches 60% and 80%, respectively, after training by using our method. In the three different experiment scenarios, compared with the DDPG, our ISGE-NCE method improves the multi-agent evolution effectiveness by 43.4%, 50%, and 20%, respectively, with low training costs. The performances demonstrate the significant superiority of our ISGE-NCE method in swarm intelligence.

The Effect of a Service Experience Cost on a Queueing System

In this work, the authors consider the effect of a service experience cost (SE cost) on customer behaviour in the M/M/1 queueing system. Based on customer individual equilibrium strategy, social welfare is also analyzed in unobservable and observable cases. The SE cost decreases the equilibrium joining probability and social welfare in an unobservable case. However, there might exist multiple individual equilibrium thresholds in an observable case. Furthermore, numerical results show that the SE cost can be used as a feasible policy to make an incentive for customers and regulate the system for improved social welfare in some scenarios.

Voting behavior under outside pressure: promoting true majorities with sequential voting?

When including outside pressure on voters as individual costs, sequential voting (as in roll call votes) is theoretically preferable to simultaneous voting (as in recorded ballots). Under complete information, sequential voting has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium with a simple equilibrium strategy guaranteeing true majority results. Simultaneous voting suffers from a plethora of equilibria, often contradicting true majorities. Experimental results, however, show severe deviations from the equilibrium strategy in sequential voting with not significantly more true majority results than in simultaneous voting. Social considerations under sequential voting—based on emotional reactions toward the behaviors of the previous players—seem to distort subgame perfect equilibria.

Inter-Port Competition and Cooperation Under Different Market Environments

Aiming at the competition and cooperation decision-making problem between two ports in the same regional port group, this paper studies four kinds of dynamic game scenarios of two adjacent ports—namely, independent strategy–independent strategy (i.e., DD combinations), independent strategy–integrated strategy (i.e., DT combinations), integrated strategy–independent strategy (i.e., TD combinations), and integrated strategy–integrated strategy (i.e., TT combinations). By introducing port demand models and using the dynamic game method, the paper performs a comparative study of port service pricing, port demand, and port profit in different combinations of competition and cooperation. The results show that taking port profit as payment function, the equilibrium strategy of the leader port is the independent strategy, which is also the dominant strategy, while the independent strategy or integrated strategy of the follower port depends on the degree of service substitution provided by the two competing ports. When the degree of service substitution is low (0 < γ < 0.53), the equilibrium strategies of two competing ports are the DD combinations, but the equilibrium strategies can be improved by Pareto, and further analysis shows that TT combinations are the Pareto equilibrium strategies at this time. By contrast, when the degree of service substitution provided by the two competing ports is high (0.53 ≤γ < 1), the DT combinations are the equilibrium strategies of the two competing ports, which are also the Pareto equilibrium strategies at this time. The research shows that when the degree of service substitution of the two ports is low, to encourage the two ports to carry out differentiated development of service functions, it is conducive to promote the two ports to adopt the integrated cooperation strategies.