Yet Another Efficient and Provably-Secure Certificateless Public Key Signature Scheme without Pairing

Author(s):  
Liangliang Wang ◽  
Mingxing He ◽  
Yanyan Zhang
2013 ◽  
Vol 380-384 ◽  
pp. 2435-2438 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shu Rong Feng ◽  
Jiao Mo ◽  
Hua Zhang ◽  
Zheng Ping Jin

Certificateless short signature schemes can not only have the advantage of certificateless signature, but also provide a short signature size in communication. However, all existing certificateless short signature schemes only proven secure against a normal adversary which can only obtain the valid signature for the original public key rather than a super adversary which can obtain the valid signature for the replaced public key. Recently, Fan et al. proposed a certificateless short signature scheme which is very efficient, but we found it is still cannot against super adversary. In this paper, we first analysis their scheme, and then present an improved scheme which can against super adversaries. Furthermore, our scheme can provide both the strongest security level and the shortest signature size compared the existed provably secure certificateless short signature scheme.


2011 ◽  
Vol 63-64 ◽  
pp. 785-788
Author(s):  
Fan Yu Kong ◽  
Lei Wu ◽  
Jia Yu

In 2009, R. Tso et al. proposed an efficient pairing-based short signature scheme which is provably secure in the Random Oracle Model. In this paper, we propose a new key substitution attack on Raylin Tso et al.’s short signature scheme. For a given message and the corresponding valid signature, the malicious attacker can generate a substituted public key. Everyone verifies the signature successfully with the malicious attacker’s substituted public key. Therefore, Raylin Tso et al.’s short signature scheme has a security flaw in the multi-user setting.


2019 ◽  
Vol 63 (8) ◽  
pp. 1139-1147
Author(s):  
Wenjie Yang ◽  
Jian Weng ◽  
Xinyi Huang ◽  
Anjia Yang

Abstract In certificateless proxy signature (CLPS), the key generation center is responsible for initializing the system parameters and can obtain the opportunity to adaptively set some trapdoors in them when wanting to launch some attacks. Until now, how to withstand the malicious-but-passive key generation center (MKGC) attacks in CLPS is still an interesting problem. In this paper, we focus on the challenging issue and introduce a CLPS scheme provably secure in the standard model. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to demonstrate its security under MKGC attacks by adopting the technology of embedding the classic difficulty problems into the target entity public key rather than the system parameters during the security proof process.


2013 ◽  
Vol 756-759 ◽  
pp. 1339-1343
Author(s):  
Yu Lian Shang ◽  
Xiu Juan Wang ◽  
Yu Juan Li ◽  
Yu Fei Zhang

Based on Elliptic Curve cryptosystem, a threshold signature scheme characterized by (k,l) joint verification for (t,n) signature is put forward. After being signed by a signer company employing (t, n) threshold signature scheme, the informationmis transmitted to a particular verifier company, and then the signature is verified through the cooperation ofkones from the verifier company withlmembers, so as to realize a directional transmission between different companies. Finally, the application examples of the company encryption communication system, the generating polynomial of company private key and public key were given. The security of this scheme is based on Shamir threshold scheme and Elliptic Curve system, and due to the advantages of Elliptic Curve, the scheme enjoys wider application in practice.


Author(s):  
Quanxing Zhang ◽  
Chwan-Hwa Wu ◽  
J. David Irwin

A scheme is proposed in this chapter to apply a secure digital signature scheme in a mobile-IP environment and treats the three entities in a dynamic path as either foreign agents (FA), home agents (HA) or mobile agents (MA), such that a coalition is formed containing each of the individual agents. Each agent has a pair of keys: one private and one public. The private key is evolving with time, and the public key is signed by a certification authority (CA). All the private keys of the three agents in the coalition are needed to sign a signature. Furthermore, all the messages are signed and verified. The signature is verified against a public key, computed as the product of the public keys of all three agents, and readily generated when a new dynamic path is formed. In addition, the key-evolving scheme prevents an adversary from forging past signatures under any circumstances. As a result of the schemes’ proactive refresh capability, an adversary must simultaneously compromise each MA, FA and HA in order to forge future signatures. When a new dynamic path is formed or private keys evolve to new states, an interactive, proactive synchronization scheme is employed among the agents. Thus, the loss of a mobile device, or its information, will cause minimal information damage.


2011 ◽  
Vol 6 (7) ◽  
pp. 294-302
Author(s):  
Jianhong Zhang ◽  
Yuanbo Cui ◽  
Min Xu ◽  
Jiancheng Zou

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