scholarly journals Optimal software release policy based on cost and reliability with testing efficiency

Author(s):  
Chin-Yu Huang ◽  
Sy-Yen Luo ◽  
M.R. Lyu
Author(s):  
Yasuhiro Saito ◽  
Tadashi Dohi

A software release game was formulated by Zeephongsekul and Chiera [Zeephongsekul, P. & Chiera, C. (1995). Optimal software release policy based on a two-person game of timing. Journal of Applied Probability 32: 470–481] and was reconsidered by Dohi et al. [Dohi, T., Teraoka, Y., & Osaki, S. (2000). Software release games. Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications 105(2): 325–346] in a framework of two-person nonzero-sum games. In this paper, we further point out the faults in the above literature and revisit the Nash equilibrium strategies in the software release games from the viewpoints of both silent and noisy type of games. It is shown that the Nash equilibrium strategies in the silent and noisy of software release games exist under some parametric conditions.


1990 ◽  
Vol 39 (2) ◽  
pp. 167-170 ◽  
Author(s):  
W.Y. Yun ◽  
D.S. Bai

2012 ◽  
Vol 23 (3-part-1) ◽  
pp. 635-657 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhengrui Jiang ◽  
Sumit Sarkar ◽  
Varghese S. Jacob

1993 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 81-86 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guolin Xia ◽  
Panlop Zeephongsekul ◽  
Santosh Kumar

1995 ◽  
Vol 32 (02) ◽  
pp. 470-481 ◽  
Author(s):  
P. Zeephongsekul ◽  
C. Chiera

This paper presents a software release policy based on a two-person game of timing. Existing release policies depend solely on cost factors and ignore the element of competition between rival producers, whereas in our policy both of these factors are taken into consideration. Through a series of preliminary results, it is shown that an optimal release policy exists as a Nash equilibrium point in the space of mixed strategies. We also present numerical examples of this optimal policy applied to software reliability growth models which are based on the non-homogeneous Poisson process.


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