Understanding Decisions in Collective Risk Social Dilemma Games Using Reinforcement Learning

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 824-840
Author(s):  
Medha Kumar ◽  
Varun Dutt
Keyword(s):  
Reinforcement Learning ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Collective Risk ◽  
Social Dilemma Games

Automata Simulation of N-Person Social Dilemma Games

1994 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 138-148 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vladimir Akimov ◽  
Michail Soutchanski
Keyword(s):  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Social Dilemma Games

scholarly journals Autocratic strategies for infinitely iterated multiplayer social dilemma games

2020 ◽  
Vol 53 (2) ◽  
pp. 2838-2843
Author(s):  
E. Martirosyan ◽  
A. Govaert ◽  
M. Cao
Keyword(s):  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Social Dilemma Games

scholarly journals Alleviation and Sanctions in Social Dilemma Games

Games ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 368-380
Author(s):  
Michalis Drouvelis
Keyword(s):  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Social Dilemma Games

REDUCED ENTANGLEMENT FOR QUANTUM GAMES

2003 ◽  
Vol 01 (03) ◽  
pp. 321-335 ◽  
Author(s):  
LI ZHANG ◽  
TAD HOGG
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Entangled States ◽  
Improve Performance ◽  
Quantum Games ◽  
Public Goods Games ◽  
Social Dilemma Games ◽  
Unique Nash Equilibrium

Quantum generalizations of conventional games exploit entangled states to improve performance. With many players, quantum games can require entangling many states. Such entanglement is difficult to implement, especially if the states must be communicated over some distance. To simplify possible implementations, we examine some quantum versions of social dilemma games and show their use of entanglement can be substantially reduced by randomly replacing some of the entangled states by unentangled ones. For the example of public goods games, we identify a unique Nash equilibrium invariant with respect to the amount of this replacement. We also show players obtain no advantage from adding more entanglement to states which they control. With many players, a fairly small number of entangled states can give nearly as good performance as using the full number of such states.

Rewards and cooperation in social dilemma games

2018 ◽  
Vol 88 ◽  
pp. 300-310 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan Stoop ◽  
Daan van Soest ◽  
Jana Vyrastekova
Keyword(s):  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Social Dilemma Games
Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document