REDUCED ENTANGLEMENT FOR QUANTUM GAMES

Quantum generalizations of conventional games exploit entangled states to improve performance. With many players, quantum games can require entangling many states. Such entanglement is difficult to implement, especially if the states must be communicated over some distance. To simplify possible implementations, we examine some quantum versions of social dilemma games and show their use of entanglement can be substantially reduced by randomly replacing some of the entangled states by unentangled ones. For the example of public goods games, we identify a unique Nash equilibrium invariant with respect to the amount of this replacement. We also show players obtain no advantage from adding more entanglement to states which they control. With many players, a fairly small number of entangled states can give nearly as good performance as using the full number of such states.

Download Full-text

Group Formation and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: a Survey and Meta-Analytic Evidence

10.31234/osf.io/sdu59 ◽

2018 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Andrea Guido ◽

Andrea Robbett ◽

Rustam Romaniuc

Keyword(s):

Public Goods ◽

Meta Analysis ◽

Group Formation ◽

Social Dilemma ◽

Common Pool Resources ◽

Sorting Method ◽

Free Riders ◽

Public Goods Games ◽

Highly Sensitive ◽

Social Dilemma Games

We survey the growing literature on group formation in the context of three types of social dilemma games: public goods games, common pool resources, and the prisoner’s dilemma. The 62 surveyed papers study the effect of different sorting mechanisms – endogenous, endogenous with the option to play the game, and exogenous – on cooperation rates. Our survey shows that cooperators are highly sensitive to the presence of free-riders, independently of the sorting mechanism. We complement the survey with a meta-analysis showing no difference in terms of cooperation between studies implementing an endogenous and exogenous sorting. What is more, we find that it is no more likely for a cooperator to be matched with like-minded partners in endogenously formed groups than in exogenously formed groups. These observations are related. As we show in the survey, the success of a sorting method in matching like-minded individuals and the levels of cooperation are closely interlinked.

Download Full-text

Gossip and Reputation in Social Dilemmas

The Oxford Handbook of Gossip and Reputation ◽

10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190494087.013.11 ◽

2019 ◽

pp. 192-213

Author(s):

Manfred Milinski

Keyword(s):

Public Goods ◽

Social Dilemmas ◽

Social Dilemma ◽

Interaction Partner ◽

Indirect Reciprocity ◽

Free Riders ◽

Public Goods Games ◽

Trust Games ◽

The Individual

In a social dilemma the interest of the individual is in conflict with that of the group. However, individuals will help their group, if they gain in reputation that pays off later. Future partners can observe cooperative or defective behavior or, more likely, hear about it through gossip. In Indirect Reciprocity games, Public Goods games, and Trust games gossip may be the only information a participant can use to decide whether she can trust her interaction partner and give away her holdings hoping for reciprocation. Even the mere potential for gossip can increase trust and trustworthiness thus promoting cooperation. Gossip is a cheap mechanism for disciplining free riders, potentially even extortioners. The temptation for manipulative gossip defines the gossiper’s dilemma. Psychological adaptations for assessing gossip veracity help to avoid being manipulated. The danger of false gossip is reduced when multiple gossips exist.

Download Full-text

The persistence and transition of multiple public goods games resolves the social dilemma

Applied Mathematics and Computation ◽

10.1016/j.amc.2021.126858 ◽

2022 ◽

Vol 418 ◽

pp. 126858

Author(s):

Jialu He ◽

Jianwei Wang ◽

Fengyuan Yu ◽

Wei Chen ◽

Wenshu Xu

Keyword(s):

Public Goods ◽

Social Dilemma ◽

Public Goods Games ◽

The Social

Download Full-text

Individuele verschillen in sociale dilemma’s : Het effect van vertrouwen op straffen in een publiekgoedspel

Mens en maatschappij ◽

10.5117/mem2020.1.003.bosm ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 95 (1) ◽

pp. 29-53

Author(s):

Esmee Bosma ◽

Vincent Buskens

Keyword(s):

Individual Differences ◽

Public Goods ◽

Research Question ◽

Real Life ◽

Social Dilemma ◽

Individual Characteristics ◽

Future Research ◽

Public Goods Game ◽

Multilevel Regression ◽

Public Goods Games

Summary Individual differences in social dilemmas: the effect of trust on costly punishment in a public goods gameThe establishment of cooperation in public goods dilemmas is important to real life problems such as improving the environment. Cooperation is facilitated when people are able to punish uncooperative behavior. Individual characteristics of persons, however, can affect cooperation and punishment behaviour. This study focuses on individual differences in trust and investigates the effect of trust on cooperation and punishment behaviour in a linear public goods game with peer punishment opportunities. The research question is: ‘What is the effect of individual differences in trust on cooperation and on the likelihood of punishing non-cooperative behaviour of fellow players in public goods games with punishing possibilities?’ Experimental data of 148 participants is used to research their cooperation and punishment behaviour. Multilevel regression is used to analyse the data. The results demonstrate a positive effect of trust on cooperation. We do not find an effect of trust on punishment. Further suggestions are provided for future research on how individual motivations still might affect behaviour in a social dilemma with punishment opportunities.

Download Full-text

Belief Heterogeneity and the Restart Effect in a Public Goods Game

Games ◽

10.3390/g9040096 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 9 (4) ◽

pp. 96 ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Author(s):

Ananish Chaudhuri

Keyword(s):

Public Goods ◽

Social Dilemma ◽

Heterogeneous Beliefs ◽

Public Goods Game ◽

Prior Beliefs ◽

The Public ◽

Before And After ◽

Belief Heterogeneity ◽

Social Dilemma Games ◽

Partner Matching

We explore how subjects with heterogeneous beliefs respond to a surprise restart in a linear public goods game played for 20 rounds using either a “partners” or a “strangers” protocol. There are two restarts: one prior to Round 11 and another prior to Round 16. We elicit subject beliefs at the outset and classify subjects into three groups—Top, Middle, and Bottom—depending on their prior beliefs about their peers’ contributions to the public good. Then, we look at how these three groups respond, in terms of their beliefs and contributions, before and after the restart. We replicate the restart effect, but find that (i) it is much more pronounced for partner matching than for stranger matching and (ii) it is less pronounced in treatments with belief elicitation compared to control treatments where beliefs are not elicited. We also find that the restart has the effect of regenerating a sense of optimism among the subjects, which is reflected in increased contributions subsequently. This increase in contribution is driven mostly by those subjects who started the game with relatively more optimistic beliefs. Our results have implications for sustaining cooperation in social dilemma games.

Download Full-text

Institution Formation in Public Goods Games

The American Economic Review ◽

10.1257/aer.99.4.1335 ◽

2009 ◽

Vol 99 (4) ◽

pp. 1335-1355 ◽

Cited By ~ 194

Author(s):

Michael Kosfeld ◽

Akira Okada ◽

Arno Riedl

Keyword(s):

Theoretical Analysis ◽

Public Goods ◽

Formation Process ◽

Social Dilemma ◽

Public Goods Provision ◽

Public Goods Games ◽

Institution Formation ◽

Group Welfare ◽

Endogenous Formation

Sanctioning institutions are of utmost importance for overcoming free-riding tendencies and enforcing outcomes that maximize group welfare in social dilemma situations. We investigate, theoretically and experimentally, the endogenous formation of institutions in public goods provision. Our theoretical analysis shows that players may form sanctioning institutions in equilibrium, including those governing only a subset of players. The experiment confirms that institutions are formed and that it positively affects cooperation and group welfare. However, the data also shows that success is not guaranteed. Players are unwilling to implement equilibrium institutions in which some players have the opportunity to free ride. Our results emphasize the role of fairness in the institution formation process. (JEL C72, D02, H41)

Download Full-text

Computing Equilibria in Binary Networked Public Goods Games

Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence ◽

10.1609/aaai.v34i02.5609 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 34 (02) ◽

pp. 2310-2317

Author(s):

Sixie Yu ◽

Kai Zhou ◽

Jeffrey Brantingham ◽

Yevgeniy Vorobeychik

Keyword(s):

Nash Equilibrium ◽

Public Goods ◽

Public Good ◽

Pure Strategy ◽

Public Goods Game ◽

Public Goods Games ◽

Space Limitation ◽

Np Complete ◽

Graphical Structure ◽

Strategy Nash Equilibrium

Public goods games study the incentives of individuals to contribute to a public good and their behaviors in equilibria. In this paper, we examine a specific type of public goods game where players are networked and each has binary actions, and focus on the algorithmic aspects of such games. First, we show that checking the existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium is NP-complete. We then identify tractable instances based on restrictions of either utility functions or of the underlying graphical structure. In certain cases, we also show that we can efficiently compute a socially optimal Nash equilibrium. Finally, we propose a heuristic approach for computing approximate equilibria in general binary networked public goods games, and experimentally demonstrate its effectiveness. Due to space limitation, some proofs are deferred to the extended version1.

Download Full-text