Evolution of strategies for the collective-risk social dilemma relating to climate change

2011 ◽  
Vol 95 (4) ◽  
pp. 40006 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. Greenwood
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gianluca Grimalda ◽  
Alexis Belianin ◽  
Heike Hennig-Schmidt ◽  
Till Requate ◽  
Marina Ryzhkova

Abstract Imposing sanctions on noncompliant parties to international agreements is often advocated as a remedy for international cooperation failure, notably in climate agreements. We provide an experimental test of this conjecture in a collective-risk social dilemma simulating the effort to avoid catastrophic climate change. We involve groups of participants from two cultural areas that were shown to achieve different levels of cooperation nationally when peer-level sanctions were available. Here we show that, while this result still holds nationally, international interaction backed by sanctions is overall beneficial. Cooperation by low cooperator groups increases significantly in comparison with national cooperation and converges to the cooperation levels of high cooperation groups. While the increase is only marginally significant without sanctions, it becomes sizable when sanctions are imposed. When sanctions are available, individuals are willing to cooperate above the level that would maximize expected payoffs. Revealing or hiding counterparts’ nationality does not affect results.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gianluca Grimalda ◽  
Alexis Belianin ◽  
Heike Hennig-Schmidt ◽  
Till Requate ◽  
Marina Ryzhkova

Abstract Imposing sanctions on noncompliant parties to international agreements is often advocated as a remedy for international cooperation failure, notably in climate agreements. We provide an experimental test of this conjecture in a collective-risk social dilemma simulating the effort to avoid catastrophic climate change. We involve groups of participants from two cultural areas that were shown to achieve different levels of cooperation nationally when peer-level sanctions were available. Here we show that, while this result still holds nationally, international interaction backed by sanctions is overall beneficial. Cooperation by low cooperator groups increases in comparison with national cooperation and converges to the cooperation levels of high cooperation groups. While such an increase is small without sanctions, it becomes sizable when sanctions are imposed. Revealing or hiding counterparts’ nationality does not affect results. Our study supports the proposal to use sanctions to support international cooperation to avert collective risk such as climate change.


2008 ◽  
Vol 105 (7) ◽  
pp. 2291-2294 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. Milinski ◽  
R. D. Sommerfeld ◽  
H.-J. Krambeck ◽  
F. A. Reed ◽  
J. Marotzke

2021 ◽  
pp. 002200272110273
Author(s):  
Aseem Mahajan ◽  
Reuben Kline ◽  
Dustin Tingley

International climate negotiations occur against the backdrop of increasing collective risk: the likelihood of catastrophic economic loss due to climate change will continue to increase unless and until global mitigation efforts are sufficient to prevent it. We introduce a novel alternating-offers bargaining model that incorporates this characteristic feature of climate change. We test the model using an incentivized experiment. We manipulate two important distributional equity principles: capacity to pay for mitigation of climate change and vulnerability to its potentially catastrophic effects. Our results show that less vulnerable parties do not exploit the greater vulnerability of their bargaining partners. They are, rather, more generous. Conversely, parties with greater capacity are less generous in their offers. Both collective risk itself and its importance in light of the recent Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report make it all the more urgent to better understand this crucial strategic feature of climate change bargaining.


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (9) ◽  
pp. 3757
Author(s):  
Anna Laura Huckelba ◽  
Paul A. M. Van Lange

There is strong scientific consensus that the climate is drastically changing due to increasing levels of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, and that these changes are largely due to human behavior. Scientific estimates posit that by 2050, we will begin to experience some of the most damaging consequences of climate change, which will only worsen as the world becomes more populated and resources become scarcer. Considerable progress has been made to explore technological solutions, yet useful insights from a psychological perspective are still lacking. Understanding whether and how individuals and groups cope with environmental dilemmas is the first step to combatting climate change. The key challenge is how can we reduce a tendency to inaction and to understand the psychological obstacles for behavioral change that reduce climate change. We provide a social dilemma analysis of climate change, emphasizing three important ingredients: people need to recognize their own impact on the climate, there is conflict between self-interest and collective interests, and there is a temporal dilemma involving a conflict between short-term and longer-term interest. Acknowledging these features, we provide a comprehensive overview of psychological mechanisms that support inaction, and close by discussing potential solutions. In particular, we offer recommendations at the level of individuals, communities, and governments.


2013 ◽  
Vol 5 (8) ◽  
pp. 3484-3501 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stuart Capstick

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