CEO pay disparity, takeover premiums and bidder performance in Australia: efficient contracting or managerial power?

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hoa Luong ◽  
Lien Duong ◽  
John Evans
Keyword(s):  
Pay Disparity ◽  
Managerial Power ◽  
Ceo Pay

CEO pay disparity: Efficient contracting or managerial power?

2019 ◽  
Vol 54 ◽  
pp. 168-190 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thi Thanh Nha Vo ◽  
Jean Milva Canil
Keyword(s):  
Pay Disparity ◽  
Managerial Power ◽  
Ceo Pay

Board Independence and CEO Pay Disparity

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chia-Feng Yu
Keyword(s):  
Board Independence ◽  
Pay Disparity ◽  
Ceo Pay

Compensation Committees and CEO Compensation Incentives in U.S. Entrepreneurial Firms

2004 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 35-56 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin J. Conyon ◽  
Lerong He
Keyword(s):  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Theoretical Models ◽  
Power Model ◽  
Entrepreneurial Firms ◽  
Compensation Committee ◽  
Ceo Incentives ◽  
Optimal Contracting ◽  
Managerial Power ◽  
Ceo Pay ◽  
Contracting Model

This study uses a sample of IPO firms to investigate the relation between the compensation committee, CEO compensation, and CEO incentives. We investigate two theoretical models: the three-tier optimal contracting model and the managerial power model. We find support for the three-tier agency model. The presence of significant shareholders on the compensation committee (i.e., those with share stakes in excess of 5 percent) is associated with lower CEO pay and higher CEO equity incentives. Firms with higher paid compensation committee members are associated with greater CEO compensation and lower incentives. The managerial power model receives little support. We find no evidence that insiders or CEOs of other firms serving on the compensation committee raise the level of CEO pay or lower CEO incentives.

Is CEO pay disparity relevant to seasoned bondholders?

2019 ◽  
Vol 64 ◽  
pp. 271-289 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guan-Ying Huang ◽  
Henry H. Huang ◽  
Chun I Lee
Keyword(s):  
Pay Disparity ◽  
Ceo Pay

The CEO pay slice: Managerial power or efficient contracting? Some indirect evidence

2017 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-87 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Bugeja ◽  
Zoltan Matolcsy ◽  
Helen Spiropoulos
Keyword(s):  
Indirect Evidence ◽  
Managerial Power ◽  
Ceo Pay

CEO Pay, Managerial Power, and SFAS 123(R)

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Terrance R. Skantz
Keyword(s):  
Managerial Power ◽  
Ceo Pay

CEO Pay for Performance: The Solution to Managerial Power

2005 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ira T. Kay
Keyword(s):  
Pay For Performance ◽  
Managerial Power ◽  
Ceo Pay

On the relation between managerial power and CEO pay

2020 ◽  
Vol 69 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 101300
Author(s):  
Robert F. Göx ◽  
Thomas Hemmer
Keyword(s):  
Managerial Power ◽  
Ceo Pay

CEO pay and family firm heterogeneity: A behavioral agency model perspective

2021 ◽  
pp. 234094442110517
Author(s):  
Carlos Fernández Méndez ◽  
Rubén Arrondo García ◽  
Shams Pathan
Keyword(s):  
Family Firms ◽  
Firm Heterogeneity ◽  
Jel Classification ◽  
Agency Model ◽  
Family Control ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Top Executives ◽  
Pay Disparity ◽  
Ceo Pay ◽  
Behavioral Agency

We study the effects of family control on CEO pay from the perspective of behavioral agency model (BAM), with particular focus on family firm’s generational stage and CEO family ties. Using a panel of Australian listed firms, we find that family firms present lower total and variable CEO pay, showing also less pay disparity between the CEO and other top executives. We also find that multi-generational family firms and those run by non-family CEOs offer higher total and variable CEO pay and present high pay disparity. The BAM and family’s aversion to socioemotional wealth loss can explain the effects of family control based on the pursuing of non-financial family goals. The decline of these goals derived from the aging of the firm and the hiring of external CEOs shape family control and should be considered in the design of executive compensation policies and by external parties when assessing their suitability. JEL CLASSIFICATION: G30; G32; G34; G38

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