Entrepreneurs’ Exit Strategy Intentions and Their Final Exit Paths

This paper explores entrepreneurs’ initially intended exit strategies and compares them to their final exit paths using an inductive approach that builds on the grounded theory methodology. Our data shows that initially intended and final exit strategies differ among entrepreneurs. Two groups of entrepreneurs emerged from our data. The first group comprises entrepreneurs who financed their firms through equity investors. The second group is made up of entrepreneurs who financed their businesses solely with their own equities. Our data shows that the first group originally intended a financial harvest exit strategy and settled with this harvest exit strategy. The second group initially intended a stewardship exit strategy but did not succeed. We used the theory of planned behavior and the behavioral agency model to analyze our data. By examining our results from these two theoretical perspectives, our study explains how entrepreneurs’ exit intentions lead to their actual exit strategies.

The Behavioral Agency Model and Innovation Investment: Examining the Combined Effects of CEO and Board Ownership

The Behavioral Agency Model (BAM) offers a behavioral account of executive incentives, according to which the perceived threats to CEO wealth, that is, CEO risk bearing, influence a CEO’s propensity to undertake innovation investments. While examining stock options extensively, the extant BAM research devotes relatively scant attention to other forms of incentives, such as stock ownership, that are conducive to one source of risk bearing, that is, employment risk. Furthermore, with an emphasis placed on the CEO, much BAM research neglects the interactive risk preferences of the CEO and the board. This study refines the BAM and empirically explores the countervailing forces exerted by the CEO and board ownership. It elucidates that while CEO ownership exhibits an inverted U-shaped relationship with innovation investment, board ownership weakens that relationship. An exploratory test on a sample of 108 Italian manufacturing firms provides support for the hypothesized effects. The refined BAM sheds further light on executive incentives through a behavioral lens, by elucidating the role of stock ownership and the interactive risk preferences of the CEO and the board.

CEO pay and family firm heterogeneity: A behavioral agency model perspective

We study the effects of family control on CEO pay from the perspective of behavioral agency model (BAM), with particular focus on family firm’s generational stage and CEO family ties. Using a panel of Australian listed firms, we find that family firms present lower total and variable CEO pay, showing also less pay disparity between the CEO and other top executives. We also find that multi-generational family firms and those run by non-family CEOs offer higher total and variable CEO pay and present high pay disparity. The BAM and family’s aversion to socioemotional wealth loss can explain the effects of family control based on the pursuing of non-financial family goals. The decline of these goals derived from the aging of the firm and the hiring of external CEOs shape family control and should be considered in the design of executive compensation policies and by external parties when assessing their suitability. JEL CLASSIFICATION: G30; G32; G34; G38

Multiple performance pressure inconsistency, resource slack, and the firm’s R&D investment: A behavioral agency theory perspective

In the process of operation, firms will face different types of performance pressure. The inconsistency among multiple performance pressure signals has an important impact on resource allocation and R&D investment. However, at present, studies on the impact of multiple performance pressures on the firm’s resource allocation and R&D investment are very limited, and few studies have analyzed the impact of inconsistencies among multiple performance pressure signals on the firm’s R&D investment. Given this research gap, this article empirically tested a model from the perspective of behavioral agency theory, in which inconsistency in long- and short-term performance pressure facilitates the accumulation of organizational slack. We further test the impact of an increase in organizational slack on the firms’ R&D investment intensity and find that this effect is stronger when the level of managerial ownership is comparatively low. These results together indicate that high inconsistency in performance pressure and low managerial ownership jointly facilitate the accumulation of organizational slack, enabling firms to go beyond local search and have more slack searches in the face of multiple performance pressure, which is conducive to an increase in R&D investment. JEL CLASSIFICATION: M10.

Pesquisa e teoria da agência comportamental: uma revisão e agenda de pesquisa

The behavioral agency theory verifies the relationship between company executives, CEOs, and managers, and their decision-making within the firm. The mechanisms of governance and the forms of remuneration are instruments that monitor internal members avoiding risks that potentially harm the organization’s valuation. This article highlights the importance of the behavioral agency theory both for firms that trust their decision-making process to an agent and for the behavior of this agent. Both aspects are subject to concerns that usually lead to recommendations to establish or improve the executives’ compensation plans. Through bibliometric research analyzing 107 articles, it was possible to verify that executives’ performance compensation, according to agency theory, is the most used mechanism to stimulate executives to make decisions toward the company’s growth and best performance. This study’s theoretical and empirical contribution point to the need for future research on this topic since understanding the agent’s behavior is strategic for companies to help the agent to act on its benefit while reducing the possibilities of inadequate and harmful behavior.