CEO Pay for Performance: The Solution to Managerial Power

2005 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ira T. Kay
Keyword(s):  
Pay For Performance ◽  
Managerial Power ◽  
Ceo Pay

Pay-performance sensitivity and corporate governance mechanisms: evidence from Tunisia

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Meriem Ghrab ◽  
Marjène Gana ◽  
Mejda Dakhlaoui
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Performance ◽  
Pay For Performance ◽  
Simultaneous Equation ◽  
Executive Pay ◽  
Estimation Model ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Explanatory Variables ◽  
Performance Sensitivity ◽  
Ceo Pay

Purpose The purpose of this study is to analyze the CEO compensation sensitivity to firm performance, termed as the pay-for-performance sensitivity (PPS) in the Tunisian context and to test the robustness of this relationship when corporate governance (CG) mechanisms are considered. Design/methodology/approach The consideration of past executive pay as one of the explanatory variables makes this estimation model a dynamic one. Furthermore, to avoid the problem of endogeneity, this study uses the system-GMM estimator developed by Blundell and Bond (1998). For robustness check, this study aims to use a simultaneous equation approach (three-stage least squares [3SLS]) to estimate the link between performance and CEO pay with a set of CG mechanisms to control for possible simultaneous interdependencies. Findings Using a sample of 336 firm-years from Tunisia over the 2009–2015 periods, this study finds strong evidence that the pay-performance relationship is insignificant and negative, and it becomes more negative or remains insignificant after introducing CG mechanisms consistently with the managerial power approach. The findings are robust to the use of alternative performance measures. This study provides new empirical evidence that CEOs of Tunisian firms abuse extracting rents independently of firm performance. Originality/value This study contributes to the unexamined research on PPS in a frontier market. This study also shows the ineffectiveness of the Tunisian CG structure and thus recommends for the legislator to impose a mandatory CG guide.

Compensation Committees and CEO Compensation Incentives in U.S. Entrepreneurial Firms

2004 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 35-56 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin J. Conyon ◽  
Lerong He
Keyword(s):  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Theoretical Models ◽  
Power Model ◽  
Entrepreneurial Firms ◽  
Compensation Committee ◽  
Ceo Incentives ◽  
Optimal Contracting ◽  
Managerial Power ◽  
Ceo Pay ◽  
Contracting Model

This study uses a sample of IPO firms to investigate the relation between the compensation committee, CEO compensation, and CEO incentives. We investigate two theoretical models: the three-tier optimal contracting model and the managerial power model. We find support for the three-tier agency model. The presence of significant shareholders on the compensation committee (i.e., those with share stakes in excess of 5 percent) is associated with lower CEO pay and higher CEO equity incentives. Firms with higher paid compensation committee members are associated with greater CEO compensation and lower incentives. The managerial power model receives little support. We find no evidence that insiders or CEOs of other firms serving on the compensation committee raise the level of CEO pay or lower CEO incentives.

Placing their bets: The influence of strategic investment on CEO pay‐for‐performance

2019 ◽  
Vol 40 (12) ◽  
pp. 2047-2077 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wei Shi ◽  
Brian L. Connelly ◽  
Jeremy D. Mackey ◽  
Abhinav Gupta
Keyword(s):  
Pay For Performance ◽  
Strategic Investment ◽  
Ceo Pay

The CEO pay slice: Managerial power or efficient contracting? Some indirect evidence

2017 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-87 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Bugeja ◽  
Zoltan Matolcsy ◽  
Helen Spiropoulos
Keyword(s):  
Indirect Evidence ◽  
Managerial Power ◽  
Ceo Pay

Effectiveness of CEO pay-for-performance

2000 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chandra S Mishra ◽  
Daniel L McConaughy ◽  
David H Gobeli
Keyword(s):  
Pay For Performance ◽  
Ceo Pay

CEO Pay, Managerial Power, and SFAS 123(R)

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Terrance R. Skantz
Keyword(s):  
Managerial Power ◽  
Ceo Pay

Pay for Performance: Is CEO Pay Aligned with Performance in Singapore?

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lay Hong Tan ◽  
Tan Chong Huat ◽  
Ch'ng Li Ling
Keyword(s):  
Pay For Performance ◽  
Ceo Pay

scholarly journals CEO Pay-For-Performance Heterogeneity Using Quantile Regression

2010 ◽  
Vol 45 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kevin F. Hallock ◽  
Regina Madalozzo ◽  
Clayton G. Reck
Keyword(s):  
Quantile Regression ◽  
Pay For Performance ◽  
Ceo Pay ◽  
Performance Heterogeneity

On the relation between managerial power and CEO pay

2020 ◽  
Vol 69 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 101300
Author(s):  
Robert F. Göx ◽  
Thomas Hemmer
Keyword(s):  
Managerial Power ◽  
Ceo Pay

CEO pay disparity: Efficient contracting or managerial power?

2019 ◽  
Vol 54 ◽  
pp. 168-190 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thi Thanh Nha Vo ◽  
Jean Milva Canil
Keyword(s):  
Pay Disparity ◽  
Managerial Power ◽  
Ceo Pay
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