Board Independence and CEO Pay Disparity

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chia-Feng Yu
2019 ◽  
Vol 64 ◽  
pp. 271-289 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guan-Ying Huang ◽  
Henry H. Huang ◽  
Chun I Lee
Keyword(s):  

2019 ◽  
Vol 54 ◽  
pp. 168-190 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thi Thanh Nha Vo ◽  
Jean Milva Canil

2021 ◽  
pp. 234094442110517
Author(s):  
Carlos Fernández Méndez ◽  
Rubén Arrondo García ◽  
Shams Pathan

We study the effects of family control on CEO pay from the perspective of behavioral agency model (BAM), with particular focus on family firm’s generational stage and CEO family ties. Using a panel of Australian listed firms, we find that family firms present lower total and variable CEO pay, showing also less pay disparity between the CEO and other top executives. We also find that multi-generational family firms and those run by non-family CEOs offer higher total and variable CEO pay and present high pay disparity. The BAM and family’s aversion to socioemotional wealth loss can explain the effects of family control based on the pursuing of non-financial family goals. The decline of these goals derived from the aging of the firm and the hiring of external CEOs shape family control and should be considered in the design of executive compensation policies and by external parties when assessing their suitability. JEL CLASSIFICATION: G30; G32; G34; G38


Author(s):  
João Teodósio

This study provides a literature review of the research on the corporate governance mechanisms of Portuguese firms. Based on a sample of 47 articles published, between 2004 and 2019, it is documented that research is predominantly focused on corporate governance mechanisms as determinants of the performance on non-financial listed firms. Literature reports, in its majority, that board size decreases firm performance while CEO (Chief Executive Officer) non-duality promotes it; board size, board independence, and CEO non-duality improve the level of firms' information disclosure; CEO age is positively associated with an increase of CEO pay but CEO duality has an opposite effect; board independence increases firm risk-taking. These results should be of interest to national authorities in the development of future regulation related to firms' corporate governance and to national and international investors that intend to invest in Portuguese companies.


2005 ◽  
Vol 88 (2) ◽  
pp. 260-265 ◽  
Author(s):  
Saltuk Ozerturk
Keyword(s):  

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