Coupling property rights with responsibilities to improve conservation outcomes across land and seascapes

Batik artwork is one of the treasures of the nation's cultural heritage. Batik artwork is currently experiencing rapid growth. The amount of interest and market demand for this art resulted batik artwork became one of the commodities in the country and abroad. Thus, if the batik artwork is not protected then the future can be assured of a new conflict arises in the realm of intellectual property law. Act No. 28 of 2014 on Copyright has accommodated artwork batik as one of the creations that are protected by law. So that this work of art than as a cultural heritage also have economic value for its creator. Then how the legal protection of the batik artwork yaang not registered? Does this also can be protected? While in the registration of intellectual property rights is a necessity so that it has the force of law to the work produced

Еnforcement of Property Rights and Conractual Obligations

Voprosy Ekonomiki ◽

10.32609/0042-8736-2003-5-83-100 ◽

2003 ◽

pp. 83-100 ◽

Cited By ~ 3

Author(s):

A. Radygin ◽

R. Entov

Keyword(s):

Property Rights ◽

Legal Framework ◽

Economic Consequences ◽

Theoretical Approaches ◽

Contractual Obligations ◽

Regional Authorities ◽

Practical Recommendations

The paper deals with theoretical approaches to the problems of property rights and contractual obligations and with analysis of economic consequences of the imperfect enforcement system. In particular, the authors consider Russian experience in the sphere of corporate conflicts. Legal and practical recommendations related to the improvement of legal framework, judiciary reform, executory process and different federal and regional authorities are also presented.

Institutional Theory of Endless Redistribution

Voprosy Ekonomiki ◽

10.32609/0042-8736-2005-7-4-18 ◽

2005 ◽

pp. 4-18 ◽

Cited By ~ 5

Author(s):

K. Sonin

Keyword(s):

Property Rights ◽

Institutional Theory ◽

Growth Rates ◽

Rent Seeking ◽

Economic Institutions ◽

Wide Spread ◽

Grass Roots ◽

Protection Systems ◽

Private Protection ◽

The Rich

In unequal societies, the rich may benefit from shaping economic institutions in their favor. This paper analyzes the dynamics of institutional subversion by focusing on public protection of property rights. If this institution functions imperfectly, agents have incentives to invest in private protection of property rights. The ability to maintain private protection systems makes the rich natural opponents of public protection of property rights and precludes grass-roots demand to drive the development of the market-friendly institution. The economy becomes stuck in a bad equilibrium with low growth rates, high inequality of income, and wide-spread rent-seeking. The Russian oligarchs of the 1990s, who controlled large stakes of newly privatized property, provide motivation for this paper.