Institutional Theory of Endless Redistribution

2005 ◽  
pp. 4-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
K. Sonin
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Institutional Theory ◽  
Growth Rates ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Economic Institutions ◽  
Wide Spread ◽  
Grass Roots ◽  
Protection Systems ◽  
Private Protection ◽  
The Rich

In unequal societies, the rich may benefit from shaping economic institutions in their favor. This paper analyzes the dynamics of institutional subversion by focusing on public protection of property rights. If this institution functions imperfectly, agents have incentives to invest in private protection of property rights. The ability to maintain private protection systems makes the rich natural opponents of public protection of property rights and precludes grass-roots demand to drive the development of the market-friendly institution. The economy becomes stuck in a bad equilibrium with low growth rates, high inequality of income, and wide-spread rent-seeking. The Russian oligarchs of the 1990s, who controlled large stakes of newly privatized property, provide motivation for this paper.

Konsep Distribusi Pendapatan Dalam Islam

2016 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 85-97
Author(s):  
Moh. Ah. Subhan ZA
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Social Life ◽  
Private Property ◽  
Wealth Distribution ◽  
The State ◽  
Private Property Rights ◽  
Job Opportunities ◽  
The Rich ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Distribution Of Income

The main problem of social life in the community is about how to make the allocation and distribution of income well. Inequality and poverty basically arise not because of the difference of anyone’s strength and weakness in getting livelihood, but because of inappropriate distribution mechanism. With the result that wealth treasure just turns on the rich wealthy, which is in turn, results in the rich get richer and the poor get poorer.Therefore, a discussion on distribution becomes main focus of theory of Islamic economics. Moreover, the discussion of the distribution is not only related to economic issues, but also social and political aspects. On the other side, the economic vision of Islam gives priority to the guarantee of the fulfillment of a better life. Islam emphasizes distributive justice and encloses, in its system, a program for the redistribution of wealth and prosperity, so that each individual is guaranteed with a respectable and friendly standard of living. Islam recognizes private property rights, but the private property rights must be properly distributed. The personal property is used for self and family livelihood, for investment of the working capital, so that it can provide job opportunities for others, for help of the others through zakat, infaq, and shodaqoh. In this way, the wealth not only rotates on the rich, bringing on gap in social life.The problem of wealth distribution is closely related to the welfare of society. Therefore, the state has a duty to regulate the distribution of income in order that the distribution can be fair and reaches appropriate target. The state could at least attempt it by optimizing the role of BAZ (Badan Amil Zakat) and LAZ (Lembaga Amil Zakat) which has all this time been slack. If BAZ and LAZ can be optimized, author believes that inequality and poverty over time will vanish. This is because the majority of Indonesia's population is Muslim.

Intergenerational Wealth Transfer and the Need to Revive and Metamorphose the Israeli Estate Tax

2014 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-101 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daphna Hacker
Keyword(s):  
Social Justice ◽  
Property Rights ◽  
Wealth Transfer ◽  
Estate Tax ◽  
Inheritance Tax ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Rich ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Needy

Abstract This article suggests enacting an accession tax instead of the estate duty – which was repealed in Israel in 1981. This suggestion evolves from historical and normative explorations of the tension between perceptions of familial intergenerational property rights and justifications for the “death tax,” as termed by its opponents, i.e., estate and inheritance tax. First, the Article explores this tension as expressed in the history of the Israeli Estate Duty Law. This chronological survey reveals a move from the State’s taken-for-granted interest in revenue justifying the Law’s enactment in 1949; moving on to the “needy widow” and “poor orphan” in whose name the tax was attacked during the years 1959–1964, continuing to the abolition of the tax in 1981 in the name of efficiency and the right of the testator to transfer his wealth to his family, and finally cumulating with the targeting of tycoon dynasties that characterizes the recent calls for reintroducing the tax. Next, based on the rich literature on the subject, the Article maps the arguments for and against intergenerational wealth transfer taxation, placing the Israeli case in larger philosophical, political, and pragmatic contexts. Lastly, it associates the ideas of accession tax and “social inheritance” with inspirational sources for rethinking a realistic wealth transfer taxation to bridge the gap between notions of intergenerational familial rights and intergenerational social justice.

Innovation and Intellectual Property Rights

Biotechnology ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 1944-1965
Author(s):  
Mercedes Campi
Keyword(s):  
Intellectual Property ◽  
Property Rights ◽  
Plant Breeding ◽  
Intellectual Property Rights ◽  
Growth Rates ◽  
Intellectual Property Protection ◽  
Necessary Condition ◽  
Adoption Rate ◽  
The Us ◽  
Open Debate

As a contribution to the open debate regarding the effect of Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) on innovation, this chapter postulates that the adoption of strong IPRs is not a necessary condition to foster innovation in the plant breeding industry. The chapter studies the evolution of the soybean breeding industry in the US and Argentina and shows that regardless the level of intellectual property protection, if there is an attractive and profitable market, firms may search for different appropriability strategies rather than changing their innovative behavior. The chapter finds that the growth rates of new soybean varieties are similar in both countries and the adoption rate is faster in Argentina where the IPRs system is weaker.

The tragedy of the cocoa pod: rent-seeking, land and ethnic conflict in Ivory Coast

2003 ◽  
Vol 41 (4) ◽  
pp. 641-655 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dwayne Woods
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Property Rights ◽  
Ethnic Conflict ◽  
Ivory Coast ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Ethnic Violence ◽  
Easy Access ◽  
Economic Decline ◽  
Labour Costs ◽  
Forest Rent

Many people have been surprised by the eruption of ethnic conflict and civil war in Ivory Coast. The country had gained a reputation as a relatively stable and economically prosperous agricultural republic in a region known for ethnic conflict, economic decline and civil war. The underlying factors that have led to the ethnic violence, the flight of immigrants from neighbouring countries, and the division of the country into a predominantly Muslim north and largely Christian south have been known for some time. The country's property rights regime that encouraged easy access to a forest rent – as long as cheap migrant labour and virgin forested land were available – was a recipe for future conflict. As available land declined and labour costs increased, a cycle of sharpening conflicts over these assets contributed to the current situation of ethno-regional division and civil war.

scholarly journals Coasian and modern property rights economics

2014 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 391-411 ◽  
Author(s):  
KIRSTEN FOSS ◽  
NICOLAI FOSS
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Research Program ◽  
Real Life ◽  
Institutional Research ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Rich ◽  
1960S And 1970S ◽  
The 1960S ◽  
Ownership Rights ◽  
Governance Arrangements

Abstract:Laying the foundations of property rights economics stands out among Ronald Coase's many seminal contributions. This approach had an impact on a number of fields in economics in, particularly, the 1960s and 1970s. The modern body of property rights economics mainly originates in the work Oliver Hart and is quite different in style, scope, and implications from the original property rights economics of Coase, Demsetz, Alchian, Cheung, Umbeck, Barzel, etc. Based on our earlier work on the subject (Foss and Foss, 2001), we argue that the change from Mark I to Mark II property rights economics led to a substantial narrowing of the scope of property rights economics, somewhat akin to a Kuhnian loss of content. In particular, Mark II property rights economics make strong assumptions concerning the definition and enforcement of ownership rights made which lead to many real life institutions and governance arrangements being excluded from consideration, and a much more narrow focus than that of the rich institutional research program initiated by Coase and his followers.

The Fiscal Contract: States, Taxes, and Public Services

2005 ◽  
Vol 57 (4) ◽  
pp. 530-567 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey F. Timmons
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Public Services ◽  
State Autonomy ◽  
The Poor ◽  
State Capture ◽  
The Rich ◽  
State Taxes ◽  
Using Data ◽  
Fiscal Contract

Using data from approximately ninety countries, the author shows that the more a state taxes the rich as a percentage of GDP, the more it protects property rights; and the more it taxes the poor, the more it provides basic public services. There is no evidence that states gouge the rich to benefit the poor or vice versa, contrary to state-capture theories. Nor is there any evidence that taxes and spending are unrelated, contrary to state-autonomy models. Instead, states operate much like fiscal contracts, with groups getting what they pay for.

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