scholarly journals SALARIES OR PIECE RATES: ON THE ENDOGENOUS MATCHING OF HARVEST WORKERS AND CROPS

2015 ◽  
Vol 54 (1) ◽  
pp. 76-99 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ivan Kandilov ◽  
Tomislav Vukina
Keyword(s):  
Endogenous Matching ◽  
Piece Rates

scholarly journals Anatomy of a Contract Change

2016 ◽  
Vol 106 (2) ◽  
pp. 316-358 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rajshri Jayaraman ◽  
Debraj Ray ◽  
Francis de Véricourt
Keyword(s):  
Standard Model ◽  
Extended Period ◽  
Behavioral Models ◽  
The Standard Model ◽  
Piece Rates

We study a contract change for tea pluckers on an Indian plantation, with a higher government-stipulated baseline wage. Incentive piece rates were lowered or kept unchanged. Yet, in the following month, output increased by 20 to 80 percent. This response contradicts the standard model and several variants, is only partly explicable by greater supervision, and appears to be “behavioral.” But in subsequent months, the increase is comprehensively reversed. Though not an unequivocal indictment of “behavioral” models, these findings suggest that nonstandard responses may be ephemeral, and should ideally be tracked over an extended period of time. (JEL D82, D86, J33, J41, J43, O13, Q12)

scholarly journals Incentive provision to farm workers in post-socialist settings: evidence from East Germany and North Kazakhstan

2017 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 239-256 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Petrick
Keyword(s):  
Reference Group ◽  
East Germany ◽  
Primary Data ◽  
Time Rate ◽  
Rate System ◽  
Cross Sectional ◽  
Piece Rate ◽  
East German ◽  
Wage Premia ◽  
Piece Rates

This article explores the current practice of motivating agricultural workers in post-socialist settings. In addition, it attempts to evaluate the different wage systems observed in reality and better understand under which conditions they are reformed. It does so by contrasting the experience of two extreme cases representing fast and slow reform advance, East Germany and North Kazakhstan. The primary data for the analysis comes from cross-sectional farm surveys conducted by various researchers in both countries. East German farmers quickly replaced the inherited Soviet-style piece rate payment system by simple time rate schemes, augmented by wage premia for certain performance parameters, especially in livestock. To the contrary, the piece rate approach persists in many farms in North Kazakhstan. Moreover, the latter rarely use non-wage incentives to motivate their workers. In Kazakhstan, farms using either mixed systems or pure piece rates were more productive than the reference group using pure time rates. Labour cost per worker were lowest for pure time rate systems in both countries, followed by mixed bonus systems, whereas pure piece rate systems implied the highest cost in Kazakhstan. Kazakhstani managers tend to move away from the Soviet piece rate system if external investors become engaged in farming operations.

Endogenous Matching and Money with Random Consumption Preferences

2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas L. Hogan ◽  
William J. Luther
Keyword(s):  
Random Matching ◽  
Matching Model ◽  
Endogenous Matching ◽  
Economic Interactions ◽  
Matching Models

Abstract Current money matching models employ either random matching or endogenous matching processes, both of which oversimplify the problem. We maintain that, although most economic interactions are intentional, some randomness remains. We offer an endogenous matching model of money with random consumption preferences. Our model preserves the intentionality of economic interactions while leaving scope for chance. We identify the conditions for potential monetary and nonmonetary equilibria and compare them to those of other endogenous matching and random matching models.

scholarly journals Contractual structure in agriculture with endogenous matching

2014 ◽  
Vol 110 ◽  
pp. 239-249 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maitreesh Ghatak ◽  
Alexander Karaivanov
Keyword(s):  
Endogenous Matching
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