scholarly journals Wittgensteinian content‐externalism

2019 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 110-125
Author(s):  
Ben Sorgiovanni
Keyword(s):  
Content Externalism

Mental Content: Externalism vs. Internalism

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brie Gertler
Keyword(s):  
Mental Content ◽  
Content Externalism

Reference-Securing Belief and Content Externalism

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Huiming Ren
Keyword(s):  
Content Externalism

A Defense of Presentist Externalism

2016 ◽  
Vol 93 (2) ◽  
pp. 259-274
Author(s):  
Roberto Horácio de Sá Pereira
Keyword(s):  
Mental State ◽  
Content Externalism ◽  
The Past ◽  
Present Context ◽  
Memory Contents ◽  
Slow Switching

This article presents a defense of “presentist externalism,” that is, the claim that memory contents are fixed by the environment and by the time at which a recollection takes place rather than by those at which the original mental state occurred. Its case is an instance of an argument to the best explanation. The author argues, firstly, that “presentist externalism” is the only version of content externalism that can stand up to both Boghossian’s memory and fallacy arguments. In slow switching cases, inferences containing memory thoughts as premises are unsound or unsafe, but valid. The author contends, secondly, that the externalist must recognize the existence of wide mismemories besides wide forgetting and that only the presentist externalist can account for their existence. The author maintains, finally, that if the validity of an inference requires that all its premises and conclusion be evaluated in the same context, that in which the inference is made, then it is the present context that fixes the content and the concepts of memory rather than the past.

Dretske on Naturalizing Experience

Dialogue ◽  
1999 ◽  
Vol 38 (3) ◽  
pp. 561-566
Author(s):  
Irene Sonia Switankowsky
Keyword(s):  
Mental Content ◽  
External World ◽  
Perceptual Content ◽  
States Of Affairs ◽  
Conceptual Content ◽  
Content Externalism ◽  
Secondary Qualities ◽  
Physical Conditions ◽  
The Subject

Many theorists in epistemology and mind accept externalism with respect to content–namely, the claim that the conditions that individuate mental content are external to the occurrence of that content as a mental fact. Whatever it is that distinguishes a pain in the knee from a pain in the toe—or, alternatively, whatever it is that makes it possible for the subject to discriminate this pain as a pain in the knee from that pain as a pain in the toe—are factors and conditions located in the physical and external world. This much externalism seems to be required even if one is a thoroughly entrenched mentalist. This “content externalism” is captured, fairly effectively, by the more traditional distinction between concepts and percepts. What is then asserted by the mentalist is that concepts have their source or origin in the external world, but the perceptual content does not. Perceptual content can be identified in different ways which are: (1) the view that identifies the distinguishing feature of the perceptual with qualia, a position not far removed from the Lockean distinction between Primary and Secondary qualities; or, (2) the perceptual might also be characterized in terms of representationalism, where qualia are an essential part of the representational medium, but where the representational medium contains conceptual content as well. In either case, the perceptual is Type and/or Token distinct from whatever is the external physical conditions or states of affairs causally responsible for the occurrence of either the conceptual content or the perceptual content. An argument for the claim that percepts (colours, sounds, smells, touches, and so on) are essential and necessary is that, without such percepts, there can be no experience.

What we talk about when we talk about content externalism

Synthese ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 193 (1) ◽  
pp. 125-143
Author(s):  
Jeff Engelhardt
Keyword(s):  
Content Externalism

Reconciling justificatory internalism and content externalism

Synthese ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 187 (2) ◽  
pp. 419-440 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chris Tillman
Keyword(s):  
Content Externalism

CONTENT EXTERNALISM AND THE EPISTEMIC CONCEPTION OF THE SELF*

2007 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-56 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brie Gertler
Keyword(s):  
The Self ◽  
Content Externalism ◽  
Epistemic Conception

scholarly journals Why Privileged Self-Knowledge and Content Externalism are Compatible

2015 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 197
Author(s):  
Sergio Armando Gallegos
Keyword(s):  
Partial Response ◽  
Content Externalism ◽  
Satisfactory Account ◽  
Self Knowledge ◽  
Paul Boghossian ◽  
Slow Switching

http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2015v19n2p197In the last twenty-five years, several authors have raised problems to the thesis that privileged self-knowledge is compatible with content externalism. In particular, the ‘slow-switching’ argument, which was originally put forth by Paul Boghossian (1989), aims to show that there is no satisfactory account of how we can have privileged knowledge about our own thoughts given content externalism. Though many philosophers have found ways to block the argument, no one has worried to address a major worry that Boghossian had when he presented the argument, which is to understand under which conditions privileged self-knowledge is possible given content externalism. In this paper, I offer a diagnosis of why the ‘slow-switching’ argument fails and I show how the diagnosis enables us to provide a partial response to Boghossian’s worry.

Content Externalism, Skepticism, and the Recognitional Conception of Self-Knowledge

2004 ◽  
pp. 147-187
Author(s):  
Dorit Bar-On
Keyword(s):  
Content Externalism ◽  
Self Knowledge
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