The Internal World

Just as some Buddhists deny that the external world is ultimately real, so other Buddhists deny the ultimate reality of consciousness. This chapter examines the debate among different Buddhist schools over the status of cognition. This grows out of a debate over the problem of meta-cognition: if there is no self, then what is it that cognizes cognition? Momentariness and the irreflexivity principle pose obstacles to a satisfactory account. This leads the Yogācāra-Sautrāntika philosophers Dignāga and Dharmakīrti to develop the theory that every cognition is self-cognizing, but that irreflexivity is not violated since noetic and noematic poles of a cognition are non-distinct. Their reflexivity account is challenged by a higher-order thought account developed in the Madhyamaka school. According to this account, cognition is posited as a useful way of explaining bodily and verbal behavior, and so is not to be thought of as ultimately real. There is also some discussion of the difficulty for the reflexivist of explaining the existence of other minds.

Collective Epistemic Luck

A platitude in epistemology is that an individual’s belief does not qualify as knowledge if it is true by luck. Individuals, however, are not the only bearers of knowledge. Many epistemologists agree that groups can also possess knowledge in a way that is genuinely collective. If groups can know, it is natural to think that, just as true individual beliefs fall short of knowledge due to individual epistemic luck, true collective beliefs may fall short of knowledge because of collective epistemic luck. This paper argues, first, that the dominant view of epistemic luck in the literature, the modal view, does not yield a satisfactory account of lucky collective beliefs. Second, it argues that collective epistemic luck is better explained in terms of groups lacking (suitably defined) forms of control over collective belief formation that are specific to the different procedures for forming collective beliefs. One of the main implications of this, we will argue, is that groups whose beliefs are formed via internal deliberation are more vulnerable to knowledge-undermining collective luck than groups that form their beliefs via non-deliberative methods, such as non-deliberative anonymous voting. The bottom line is that the greater exposure to knowledge-undermining luck that deliberation gives rise to provides a reason (not a conclusive one) for thinking that non-deliberative methods of group belief formation have greater epistemic value.

Hierarchical clustering optimizes the tradeoff between compositionality and expressivity of task structures in reinforcement learning

A hallmark of human intelligence is our ability to compositionally generalise: that is, to recompose familiar knowledge components in novel ways to solve new problems. For instance, a talented musician can conceivably transfer her knowledge of flute fingerings and guitar songs to play guitar music on a piccolo for the first time. Yet there are also instances where it can be helpful to learn and transfer not just individual task components, but entire structures or substructures, particularly whenever these recur in natural tasks (e.g., in bluegrass music one might transfer the joint structure of finger movements and musical scales from one stringed instrument to another). Prior theoretical work has explored how agents can learn and generalize task components or entire latent structures, but a satisfactory account for how a single agent can simultaneously satisfy the two competing demands is still lacking. Here, we propose a hierarchical model-based agent that learns and transfers individual task components as well as entire structures by inferring both through a non-parametric Bayesian model of the task. It maintains a factorised representation of task components through a hierarchical Dirichlet process, but it also represents different possible covariances between these components through a standard Dirichlet process. We validate our approach on a variety of navigation tasks covering a wide range of statistical correlations between task components and show that this hierarchical framework can also be applied to improve generalisation and transfer in hierarchical tasks with goal/subgoal structures.

Translating the principles of good governance: in search of accountability in Spanish and German

Good governance is a key factor in underpinning the integrity and efficiency of an institution, whether it is a private company or a national or international organisation. The core principles of good governance are now often defined as fairness, accountability, responsibility and transparency. Although these terms are familiar to all those involved in corporate social responsibility/sustainability and business ethics, and are frequently discussed in the European Parliament and European directives, they often pose a challenge to the translator, since obvious equivalents for all of them do not exist in all EU languages. In this paper, I take the example of accountability, and examine the way that it is represented in both Spanish and German in the EUROPARL7 parallel corpus of European Parliament Proceedings, available in the Sketch Engine corpus platform. Accountability in English can be defined as an assurance that individuals or organizations will be evaluated on their performance or behaviour related to something for which they are responsible, or more simply, as being responsible for explaining what you do and able to give a satisfactory account of it to those whom your actions affect. The English term accountability thus differs from responsibility and transparency, although it overlaps with both. However, not all languages allow us to distinguish easily between the concepts they designate. In fact, the majority of Spanish translations of accountability found in EUROPARL7 simply use responsabilidad, while others make reference to rendir cuentas or rendición de cuentas, and a few actually use transparencia. In German, the picture is less confused, with the closer term Rechenschaftspflicht employed as the usual translation, but an abundance of alternatives such as Verantwortlichkeit and Auskunftspflicht also appear. In my conclusions, I discuss the rationale that may underlie the different choices, point to problems that might arise from poor translations, and suggest reasons we should strive to maintain clear definitions of these key concepts.

Respect and the Dynamics of Finitude

Carla Bagnoli argues that Kant’s conception of respect as a moral feeling is crucial to any constructivist theory of practical reason because it provides the only satisfactory account of how moral commands carry subjective authority—how they are experienced as binding by finite agents endowed with rationality. Without positing a moral feeling of respect, a constructivist theory can account for objective moral obligations, but it cannot explain why finite agents can take an interest in action. This account centered on the moral feeling of respect is defended in contrast to the mechanisms of the “reflective endorsement” of moral ends or actions, which has been proposed by prominent Kantian constructivists. The theory of respect as a moral feeling is an integral and eliminable element of Kantian constructivism, whose absence compromises the constructivist account of practical reason and undermines its objectivist aspirations.

“Presence” in the Broad Present. Gumbrecht, H. U. (2020). Production of Presence. What Meaning Cannot Convey. Kharkiv: IST Publishing

This review of the Ukrainian translation of H. U. Gumbrecht’s best-known work brings out the strengths and weaknesses of the translation and the peculiar reception of Gumbrecht’s key ideas (“presence” and “the broad present”) in Ukraine. It also critically assesses Gumbrecht’s own original and often contradictory points. I question the relevance of Gumrecht’s meaning / presence distinction for reconstructing the history of the philosophical tradition, as well as for analysing our complex relation to the world. I also demonstrate the weakness of his biased attempts to paint his opponents as relativists. Besides, I contrast Gumbrecht’s meaning / presence dualism with John Dewey’s theory of experience. The latter conceives experience as a dialectical relation between “doing” and “undergoing”. This juxtaposition shows that Gumbrecht’s theory cannot give a satisfactory account of the mechanisms of everyday or aesthetic experience due to its lack of consistent “everyday” epistemology. Moreover, his vague concept of “presence” and its unequivocal appraisal conflict with his own concept of the chronotope of “broad” or “complex” present, as presented in the selected essays of The Time Is Out of Joint. Eventually, I conclude that Gumbrecht’s eclectic terminological apparatus, as well as uncritical and biased reconstruction of the tradition preclude any serious philosophical engagement. However, it does not undermine the significance of his particular insights and theoretical instruments (such as “the broad present”) for cultural analysis.

'It’s not something you can take in your hands'. Swiss experts’ perspectives on health data ownership: an interview-based study

ObjectivesThe evolution of healthcare and biomedical research into data-rich fields has raised several questions concerning data ownership. In this paper, we aimed to analyse the perspectives of Swiss experts on the topic of health data ownership and control.DesignIn our qualitative study, we selected participants through purposive and snowball sampling. Interviews were recorded, transcribed verbatim and then analysed thematically.SettingSemi-structured interviews were conducted in person, via phone or online.ParticipantsWe interviewed 48 experts (researchers, policy makers and other stakeholders) of the Swiss health-data framework.ResultsWe identified different themes linked to data ownership. These include: (1) the data owner: data-subjects versus data-processors; (2) uncertainty about data ownership; (3) labour as a justification for data ownership and (4) the market value of data. Our results suggest that experts from Switzerland are still divided about who should be the data owner and also about what ownership would exactly mean. There is ambivalence between the willingness to acknowledge patients as the data owners and the fact that the effort made by data-processors (eg, researchers) to collect and manage the data entitles them to assert ownership claims towards the data themselves. Altogether, a tendency to speak about data in market terms also emerged.ConclusionsThe development of a satisfactory account of data ownership as a concept to organise the relationship between data-subjects, data-processors and data themselves is an important endeavour for Switzerland and other countries who are developing data governance in the healthcare and research domains. Setting clearer rules on who owns data and on what ownership exactly entails would be important. If this proves unfeasible, the idea that health data cannot truly belong to anyone could be promoted. However, this will not be easy, as data are seen as an asset to control and profit from.

Homeostatic Property Cluster Theory without Homeostatic Mechanisms: Two Recent Attempts and their Costs

The homeostatic property cluster theory (HPC) is widely influential for its ability to account for many natural-kind terms in the life sciences. However, the notion of homeostatic mechanism has never been fully explicated. In 2009, Carl Craver interpreted the notion in the sense articulated in discussions on mechanistic explanation and pointed out that the HPC account equipped with such notion invites interest-relativity. In this paper, we analyze two recent refinements on HPC: one that avoids any reference to the causes of the clustering of properties and one that replaces homeostatic mechanisms with causal networks represented by causal graphs. We argue that the former is too slender to account for some inductive inference in science and the latter, thicker account invites interest-relativity, as the original HPC does. This suggests that human interest will be an un-eliminative part of a satisfactory account of natural kindness. We conclude by discussing the implication of interest-relativity to the naturalness, reality, or objectivity of kinds and indicating an overlooked aspect of natural kinds that requires further studies.

Prominence Semantics for Modality

This chapter develops a formal model of context-sensitivity of modal discourse. Much like demonstrative pronouns, modals are prominence-sensitive, selecting the most prominent candidate interpretation. The prominence ranking of candidate interpretations is recorded in the conversational record, and is maintained through the effects of discourse conventions represented in the logical form of a discourse. In this way arguments are individuated as structured discourses that underwrite a particular propositional pattern. It is shown that such account provably preserves classical logic. Further, this chapter argues that its model offers a more satisfactory account of the individuation of argument patterns in natural language discourse then the competing alternatives. Any adequate account, it is here argued, will have to take into account not just the contribution of individual sentences, but also of discourse conventions. Indeed, the contribution of discourse conventions is crucial for determining the contribution of individual sentences in the first place.

COVID-19 as a Global Risk: Confronting the Ambivalences of a Socionatural Threat

On the face of it, the COVID-19 pandemic seems to fit into the risk society framework as a danger that is produced by the modernization process in its global stage. However, coronaviruses are a very particular kind of risk which risk theory does not properly explain. In fact, there is no single perspective on risk that offers a fully satisfactory account of the SARS-CoV-2, despite all of them having something valuable to contribute to the task. This paper attempts to categorize the COVID-19 pandemic as a particular kind of risk that is not adequately explained with reference to the risk society or the new epoch of the Anthropocene. On the contrary, it combines premodern and modern features: it takes place in the Anthropocene but is not of the Anthropocene, while its effects are a manifestation of the long globalization process that begins in antiquity with the early representations of the planet as a sphere. If the particular identity of the disease is considered, COVID-19 emerges as the first truly global illness and thus points to a new understanding of the vulnerability of the human species qua species.