Climbing Which Mountain? A Critical Study of Derek Parfit On What Matters (OUP 2011)

2012 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 167-181
Author(s):  
Timothy Chappell
Keyword(s):  
Critical Study ◽  
Derek Parfit ◽  
What Matters

On What Matters: Volume One and On What Matters: Volume Two, by Derek Parfit

2013 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 239-244
Author(s):  
T. J. Mawson ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Derek Parfit ◽  
What Matters

Parfit on Love and Partiality

2021 ◽  
pp. 151-166
Author(s):  
Roger Crisp
Keyword(s):  
Personal Identity ◽  
Derek Parfit ◽  
Concern For Others ◽  
Instrumental Reasons ◽  
What Matters

It is generally held that in his 1984 book Reasons and Persons Derek Parfit was advocating greater impartiality in ethics. In his later work, On What Matters, he seems more inclined to accept that we have partial reasons, for example, to give priority to those we love. This chapter raises some questions concerning Parfit’s arguments for partiality, including whether affection is too contingent to be valuable in itself, and whether partial concern for others, shared histories, or commitments can plausibly be said to ground non-instrumental reasons or value. The paper ends with a discussion of gratitude and an argument based on Parfit’s reductionist conception of personal identity.

scholarly journals What's the Matter? Review of Derek Parfit, On What Matters — ERRATUM

Utilitas ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 441-441
Author(s):  
GERALD LANG
Keyword(s):  
Derek Parfit ◽  
What Matters

Book Review: On What Matters, Volume 2, written by Derek Parfit

2014 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 241-244
Author(s):  
William Smith
Keyword(s):  
Derek Parfit ◽  
What Matters

Derek Parfit, On What Matters: Volume III (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), pp. xiv + 468.

Utilitas ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 488-492
Author(s):  
Rebecca Stangl
Keyword(s):  
Derek Parfit ◽  
Oxford University ◽  
What Matters ◽  
Oxford University Press

Parfit on Act Consequentialism

2021 ◽  
pp. 233-246
Author(s):  
Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek ◽  
Peter Singer
Keyword(s):  
Derek Parfit ◽  
Rule Consequentialism ◽  
Limited Success ◽  
Act Consequentialism ◽  
Terror Bombing ◽  
What Matters

In the first two volumes of On What Matters, Derek Parfit argues that three major normative theories—Kantianism, Contractualism, and Consequentialism—are, in their most defensible forms, compatible, and can be reconciled as a ‘Triple Theory’. The form of Consequentialism that Parfit argues is compatible with Kantianism and Contractualism is Rule Consequentialism. This has led many to assume that Parfit does not believe that Act Consequentialism is a defensible form of Consequentialism. We draw on personal correspondence to show that this assumption is incorrect. We then consider how, in On What Matters, volume iii, which Parfit completed shortly before his death, he seeks to narrow the differences between Act Consequentialism and the Triple Theory. One of the ways in which he does this is to suggest that Impartial Rationality may be an external rival to Morality, in much the same way as egoism is an external rival to morality. We argue that this move undermines morality, as shown by Parfit’s own example of the judgements that we may make in the case of terror bombing. We conclude that Parfit’s attempts to bridge the gap between Act Consequentialism and Triple Theory meet with only limited success.

On What Matters, Volume Three, by Derek Parfit and Does Anything Really Matter? Essays on Parfit on Objectivity, edited by Peter Singer

Mind ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 127 (506) ◽  
pp. 602-611
Author(s):  
John Skorupski
Keyword(s):  
Derek Parfit ◽  
Peter Singer ◽  
What Matters

Morality and the Distinction between Oneself and Others

2021 ◽  
pp. 31-66
Author(s):  
Ingmar Persson
Keyword(s):  
Personal Identity ◽  
Practical Reason ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Derek Parfit ◽  
Moral Reasons ◽  
The Future ◽  
What Matters

In On What Matters Derek Parfit adopts Henry Sidgwick’s idea of a duality of practical reason consisting in there being personal reasons to care about our own well-being as well as moral reasons to care about everyone else’s well-being. But this sits ill with his well-known claim in Reasons and Persons that personal identity is not what matters. For this implies that were we to divide into two individuals, we would have the same reasons to care about these individuals as ourselves, though they are distinct from us. It is suggested that this is because we empathize with them in the same way as with ourselves in the future, ‘from the inside’, and that considerations of justice do not apply to them because their wills are too dependent on our wills.

Parfit on Act Consequentialism

Utilitas ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 416-426
Author(s):  
Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek ◽  
Peter Singer
Keyword(s):  
Derek Parfit ◽  
The Third ◽  
Rule Consequentialism ◽  
Limited Success ◽  
Act Consequentialism ◽  
What Matters

AbstractIn the first two volumes of On What Matters, Derek Parfit argues that three major normative theories – Kantianism, Contractualism and Rule Consequentialism – are, in their most defensible forms, compatible, and can be reconciled in what he calls ‘Triple Theory’. This has led many to assume that Parfit does not believe that Act Consequentialism is a defensible form of Consequentialism. We draw on correspondence with Parfit to show that this assumption is incorrect. We then consider Parfit's efforts, in the third volume of On What Matters, to narrow the differences between Act Consequentialism and the triple theory, in part by treating impartial rationality as an external rival to morality, in much the same way that egoism is an external rival to morality. We argue that Parfit's attempts to bridge the gap between Act Consequentialism and Triple Theory meet with only limited success.

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