Parfit on Love and Partiality

2021 ◽  
pp. 151-166
Author(s):  
Roger Crisp
Keyword(s):  
Personal Identity ◽  
Derek Parfit ◽  
Concern For Others ◽  
Instrumental Reasons ◽  
What Matters

It is generally held that in his 1984 book Reasons and Persons Derek Parfit was advocating greater impartiality in ethics. In his later work, On What Matters, he seems more inclined to accept that we have partial reasons, for example, to give priority to those we love. This chapter raises some questions concerning Parfit’s arguments for partiality, including whether affection is too contingent to be valuable in itself, and whether partial concern for others, shared histories, or commitments can plausibly be said to ground non-instrumental reasons or value. The paper ends with a discussion of gratitude and an argument based on Parfit’s reductionist conception of personal identity.

Morality and the Distinction between Oneself and Others

2021 ◽  
pp. 31-66
Author(s):  
Ingmar Persson
Keyword(s):  
Personal Identity ◽  
Practical Reason ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Derek Parfit ◽  
Moral Reasons ◽  
The Future ◽  
What Matters

In On What Matters Derek Parfit adopts Henry Sidgwick’s idea of a duality of practical reason consisting in there being personal reasons to care about our own well-being as well as moral reasons to care about everyone else’s well-being. But this sits ill with his well-known claim in Reasons and Persons that personal identity is not what matters. For this implies that were we to divide into two individuals, we would have the same reasons to care about these individuals as ourselves, though they are distinct from us. It is suggested that this is because we empathize with them in the same way as with ourselves in the future, ‘from the inside’, and that considerations of justice do not apply to them because their wills are too dependent on our wills.

Why It Does Not Matter What Matters: Relation R, Personal Identity, and Moral Theory

2019 ◽  
Vol 70 (278) ◽  
pp. 178-198
Author(s):  
Bastian Steuwer
Keyword(s):  
Personal Identity ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Derek Parfit ◽  
The Future ◽  
Separateness Of Persons ◽  
What Matters

Abstract Derek Parfit famously argued that personal identity is not what matters for prudential concern about the future. Instead, he argues what matters is Relation R, a combination of psychological connectedness and continuity with any cause. This revisionary conclusion, Parfit argued, has profound implications for moral theory. It should lead us, among other things, to deny the importance of the separateness of persons as an important fact of morality. Instead, we should adopt impersonal consequentialism. In this paper, I argue that Parfit is mistaken about this last step. His revisionary arguments about personal identity and rationality have no implications for moral theory. We need not decide whether Relation R or personal identity contain what matters if we want to retain the importance of the separateness of persons.

On What Matters for African Americans: W. E. B. Du Bois’s “Double Consciousness” in the Light of Derek Parfit’s Reasons and Persons

Janus Head ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 109-131
Author(s):  
Michael Wainwright ◽  
Keyword(s):  
African American ◽  
African Americans ◽  
Personal Identity ◽  
Double Consciousness ◽  
Derek Parfit ◽  
Black Folk ◽  
Souls Of Black Folk ◽  
What Matters

In Reasons and Persons (1984), the greatest contribution to utilitarian philosophy since Henry Sidgwick’s The Methods of Ethics (1874), Derek Parfit supports his Reductionist contention “that personal identity is not what matters” by turning to the neurosurgical findings of Roger Wolcott Sperry. Parfit’s scientifically informed argument has important implications for W. E. B. Du Bois’s contentious hypothesis of African-American “double-consciousness,” which he initially advanced in “Strivings of the Negro People” (1897), before amending for inclusion in The Souls of Black Folk (1903). An analysis of “Of the Coming of John,” chapter 13 in The Souls of Black Folk, helps to trace these ramifications, resituating Du Bois’s notion from the pragmatist to the utilitarian tradition, and revealing how his concept effectively prefigured Parfit’s scientifically informed Reductionism.

Parfit on Act Consequentialism

2021 ◽  
pp. 233-246
Author(s):  
Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek ◽  
Peter Singer
Keyword(s):  
Derek Parfit ◽  
Rule Consequentialism ◽  
Limited Success ◽  
Act Consequentialism ◽  
Terror Bombing ◽  
What Matters

In the first two volumes of On What Matters, Derek Parfit argues that three major normative theories—Kantianism, Contractualism, and Consequentialism—are, in their most defensible forms, compatible, and can be reconciled as a ‘Triple Theory’. The form of Consequentialism that Parfit argues is compatible with Kantianism and Contractualism is Rule Consequentialism. This has led many to assume that Parfit does not believe that Act Consequentialism is a defensible form of Consequentialism. We draw on personal correspondence to show that this assumption is incorrect. We then consider how, in On What Matters, volume iii, which Parfit completed shortly before his death, he seeks to narrow the differences between Act Consequentialism and the Triple Theory. One of the ways in which he does this is to suggest that Impartial Rationality may be an external rival to Morality, in much the same way as egoism is an external rival to morality. We argue that this move undermines morality, as shown by Parfit’s own example of the judgements that we may make in the case of terror bombing. We conclude that Parfit’s attempts to bridge the gap between Act Consequentialism and Triple Theory meet with only limited success.

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