How Much Is Too Much: Are Merger Premiums Too High?

2008 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 268-287 ◽  
Author(s):  
Antonios Antoniou ◽  
Philippe Arbour ◽  
Huainan Zhao
Keyword(s):  
2006 ◽  
Author(s):  
Antonios Antoniou ◽  
Philippe Arbour ◽  
Huainan Zhao
Keyword(s):  

2007 ◽  
Vol 82 (2) ◽  
pp. 359-387 ◽  
Author(s):  
Merle M. Erickson ◽  
Shiing-wu Wang

Scholes et al. (2005) predict that S corporations, and other conduit entities such as partnerships and LLCs, can sell for a tax-driven purchase price premium relative to C corporations. We test this conjecture by comparing purchase price multiples in a sample of taxable stock acquisitions of S corporations to purchase price multiples for a matched set of taxable stock acquisitions of privately held C corporations. Consistent with Scholes et al.'s (2005) predictions, we find evidence that the organizational form of the target influences acquisition tax structure and acquisition price. Specifically, the evidence supports the conclusion that conduit entities (S corporations) fetch a taxbased purchase price premium relative to similar C corporations. Furthermore, our estimates indicate that average tax benefits in S corporation acquisitions are equal to approximately 12–17 percent of deal value.


1996 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 117-131 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hany A. Shawky ◽  
Tobias Kilb ◽  
Carsten F. W. Staas
Keyword(s):  

2012 ◽  
Vol 52 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-62 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeff Madura ◽  
Thanh Ngo ◽  
Ariel M. Viale
Keyword(s):  

1988 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 19-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
I. Keong Chew ◽  
Keith H. Johnson ◽  
M. Andrew Fields

1987 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 24-42 ◽  
Author(s):  
In-Mu Haw ◽  
Victor Pastena ◽  
Steven Lilien

This paper tests the association between firms' prior financial performance and the magnitude and timing of merger premiums. The basic finding is that both financially healthy firms and financially troubled firms, as classified by the Altman Z score, earn merger premiums of 25%. However, the troubled firms experience market price increases earlier than healthy firms. Further analysis indicates that the early market price recovery of the troubled firms is consistent with the notion that tax loss carryforwards make acquisition attractive. In fact, the troubled firms with tax loss carryforwards experience merger premiums of 33.7% as opposed to 19.6% for troubled firms without tax loss carryforwards. These results indicate that the availability of the tax loss carryforwards may have facilitated mergers for troubled firms.


1973 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 139 ◽  
Author(s):  
James F. Nielsen ◽  
Ronald W. Melicher

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