Metaphysical Necessity and Conceptual Truth

This chapter discusses the process of naming amongst the Daribi, Iqwaye, and Iatmul societies in Papua New Guinea. Amidst the discussion on the Daribi and the Iqwaye is a philosophical discussion of naming and necessity. The theoretical intention of the chapter is to suggest how the category of relationships can be conceptualised as a metaphysical necessity in ontological terms. It attempts to concretise this in terms of naming practices.

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The Unity of the Rational Mind

10.1093/oso/9780192845634.003.0007 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 123-142

Author(s):

Eric Marcus

Keyword(s):

Mental States ◽

Metaphysical Necessity ◽

The Subject ◽

Rational Mind ◽

The Individual

I argue that inference is a self-conscious act. The account appeals to the ‘being-in-mind-together’ of beliefs. Beliefs that are in mind together are subject to rationally grounded metaphysical necessity. Because one believes p, one can’t or must believe q. But what ultimately explains this sort of necessity? If it is impossible to hold a pair of mental states in mind at once and the impossibility has its source in our understanding of the necessary falsehood of a conjunction, then the subject has knowledge not just of the individual states they’re in but also of their combination. What, then, is the relation between the unity of our beliefs and consciousness of this unity? My answer: the unity of the rational mind consists in the subject’s consciousness of that unity.

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Newton’s Modal Metaphysics and Polemics with Spinozism in the “General Scholium”

Newton's Metaphysics ◽

10.1093/oso/9780197567692.003.0011 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 198-220

Author(s):

Eric Schliesser

Keyword(s):

Metaphysical Necessity ◽

Modal Metaphysics ◽

Suggestive Evidence ◽

Joseph Butler ◽

Formal Causation ◽

The Way

This chapter is devoted to explaining the nature and use of metaphysical necessity in Newton’s “General Scholium.” In particular, it focuses on Newton’s metaphysical commitments about (i) the nature of modality; (ii) the nature of formal causation; and (iii) God’s existence. In order to explain these, the chapter draws on Clarke and Clarke’s subsequent correspondence with Joseph Butler. In order to clarify some philosophical distinctions, I treat Toland’s Spinozism, in particular, as the target of some of Newton’s arguments. Along the way, I’ll provide suggestive evidence that Newton was in a decent position to distinguish the thought of Descartes from Spinozism

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Two Crises for the Proof Paradigm in the Enlightenment

10.1093/oso/9780197567654.003.0003 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 34-58

Author(s):

William J. Talbott

Keyword(s):

Immanuel Kant ◽

David Hume ◽

The State ◽

Epistemic Rationality ◽

Metaphysical Necessity ◽

Important Respect ◽

Naturalistic Epistemology ◽

The Enlightenment ◽

Causal Necessity

In Chapter 2, the author critically discusses the epistemologies of David Hume and Immanuel Kant. The author distinguishes the skeptical Hume from the naturalist Hume. The author presents the skeptical Hume’s philosophy as a response to what he calls Berkeley’s puzzle. He argues that Hume’s skeptical arguments are self-refuting and self-undermining and that Hume’s analysis of cause is an example of an explanation-impairing framework substitution. Hume’s solution to his skeptical arguments was a new kind of epistemology, a naturalistic epistemology. The author presents Kant’s epistemology as a response to the state of rationalist metaphysics at the time of Kant’s first Critique. Kant’s epistemology was similar to Hume’s in one important respect. Just as Hume had psychologized the idea of causal necessity, Kant psychologized the idea of metaphysical necessity. The author argues that both solutions were a form of relativism. This chapter primarily serves to motivate a search for a non-skeptical, non-relativist, non-Platonist theory of epistemic rationality.

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Relationships Between Law and Morality

Morality and the Nature of Law ◽

10.1093/oso/9780198723479.003.0002 ◽

2019 ◽

pp. 5-28

Author(s):

Kenneth Einar Himma

Keyword(s):

Legal System ◽

Conceptual Truth ◽

Legal Validity ◽

Law And Morality

This chapter distinguishes three types of inquiry about law. It articulates the two conceptual views about morality and the nature of law that comprise the focus of this volume. First, the chapter explains positivist and anti-positivist views with respect to whether it is a conceptual truth that the criteria of legal validity include moral constraints on the content of law. It then turns to the dispute between inclusive and exclusive positivists with respect to whether it is conceptually possible for a legal system to have content-based moral criteria of validity. Finally, this chapter argues that the claim that conceptual jurisprudence should not be done is either unclear or false.

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The Modal Status of Moral Principles

Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 16 ◽

10.1093/oso/9780192897466.003.0011 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 257-280

Author(s):

Gideon Rosen

Keyword(s):

Laws Of Nature ◽

Conventional Wisdom ◽

Metaphysical Necessity ◽

Moral Principles ◽

Moral Facts

Conventional wisdom holds that pure moral principles hold of metaphysical necessity, from which it follows that it is metaphysically impossible for the moral facts to vary independently of the descriptive facts. Moral contingentists deny this, holding that the moral laws are in some cases like the laws of nature: metaphysically contingent, but necessary in a weaker sense. The present chapter makes a preliminary case for moral contingentism and defends the view against recent objections due to Lange (2018) and Dreier (2019).

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