The Dialectic of Civil and Uncivil Society—Fragility, Fault Lines, and Countervailing Forces

In light of the experience of the past three decades—1989 to 2020—the civil society appears as a fragile institution that seems capable of giving rise to the overthrow of dictators as well as to their ready installation; to engender movements of solidarity and inclusion as well as of hatred and violence. To understand what allows these different tendencies to arise from within the civil society requires that we move past a pre-occupation with the structural and socio-economic dimension of the civil society and recover a conception of the civil society as an inherently moral institution. In this regard, the tradition of social analysis pioneered by Alexis de Tocqueville remains singularly instructive. The cultivation of civility, we can learn, is not an automatic by-product of tamed markets, limited government, and vibrant associational life—necessary and important though these are. The dispositions needed to maintain the civil society do not arise with causal necessity even where associations flourish, markets are tamed, and institutions are well-designed. By facing more squarely the deep moral fault-lines of the civil society we can develop a keener sense of the countervailing forces needed to keep the project of the civil society on track.

Two Crises for the Proof Paradigm in the Enlightenment

In Chapter 2, the author critically discusses the epistemologies of David Hume and Immanuel Kant. The author distinguishes the skeptical Hume from the naturalist Hume. The author presents the skeptical Hume’s philosophy as a response to what he calls Berkeley’s puzzle. He argues that Hume’s skeptical arguments are self-refuting and self-undermining and that Hume’s analysis of cause is an example of an explanation-impairing framework substitution. Hume’s solution to his skeptical arguments was a new kind of epistemology, a naturalistic epistemology. The author presents Kant’s epistemology as a response to the state of rationalist metaphysics at the time of Kant’s first Critique. Kant’s epistemology was similar to Hume’s in one important respect. Just as Hume had psychologized the idea of causal necessity, Kant psychologized the idea of metaphysical necessity. The author argues that both solutions were a form of relativism. This chapter primarily serves to motivate a search for a non-skeptical, non-relativist, non-Platonist theory of epistemic rationality.

Progress in Entropy Principle, as Disclosed by Nine Schools of Thermodynamics, and Its Ecological Implication

The entropy principle has been commonly considered to be a selection principle. A history/philosophy-of-science analysis of development in thermodynamic thought was carried out based on a historical account of contributions to thermodynamics of nine Schools of thermodynamics plus that of Mayer/Joule (the Mayer-Joule principle), publication of A Treatise of Heat and Energy, development in maximum entropy production principle (MEPP), and process ecology formulated by Ulanowicz. The analysis discloses the dual nature in the entropy principle, as selection principle and causal principle, and that as well in thermodynamics: as equilibrium thermodynamics (Gibbsian thermodynamics) and as “engineering” thermodynamics in a general sense. Entropy-growth-potential (EGP) as the causal agent and the theory of engineering thermodynamics entail the concept of causal necessity, as suggested by Poincare. Recent development of the entropy principle into maximum entropy production principle (MEPP) is then critically analyzed. Special attention is paid to MEPP’s explanatory power of biological orders vs. that of process ecology: whereas MEPP asserts universal approach to physics and biology based on physical necessity and efficient causation, the case for “EGP as the causal agent and process ecology” allows biology to be different from physics by allowing the additional presupposition of causal necessity and efficacious causation.

Logistics in the system of total knowledge

In the monograph, logistics is presented in an unusual form - as an element of a system of general, aggregate knowledge. This allowed the authors to reach new levels of knowledge and solve a number of complex problems. The scientific theory of logistics is presented as a system of laws, categories and principles ordered according to internal causal necessity and explaining the nature of economic flows. The scientific substantiation of the complete logistics system as a set of complexes of activities and resistances is given. Using the example of the functioning of logistics flows, the effect of the law of selection and the law of measure is shown in the form of a struggle of forms, in which more perfect forms survive, and less perfect forms are destroyed. A strict scientific approach, the richness of the text with information are combined with an accessible way of presentation, which allows the book to be addressed to a wide range of readers.

Al-Ghazali And Hume On Natural Causal Necessity And Miracles

This paper argues that Al-Ghazali and Hume arrived at same conclusion i.e.both reject natural causality as a logical necessity however they provide very different premises for this conclusion. Moreover, Hume’s rejection of the natural causal necessity leads him to religious skepticism whereas, Al-Ghazali’s rejection of natural causal necessity leads him to have a strong faith in God and Miracles. The paper discusses the problem of causation in their philosophies focusing on the issues such as: causation as habit; uniformity in the natural order; causation is a mere sequence of observed things; whether causal relation is ontological or epistemological; issues related to miracles and diverse possibilities. Furthermore, the paper also focuses on the issue of Occasionalism and free will with special reference to Al-Ghazali and Hume.

The Modality of Causation

Hume said that necessity was part of the popular concept of cause but not legitimately so. Necessity could be found in no experience of causation so should be expelled from the concept. To this extent, Hume was right but it leaves us with a problem of inductive scepticism. Nevertheless, many of his critics overreacted in defending the necessity of causation. Additive interference shows that there is no causal necessity. Both Hume’s thesis and its antithesis seem flawed; but there are prospects of a synthesis. The idea of tendency can give us an intermediate, third modality between necessity and pure contingency, and this seems to be the correct modality of causation.

Believers in The Land of Glory

We employ words like “cause” both to structure an investigative architecture and to register concrete physical data in light of that strategic background. As a result, “cause”’s referential significance becomes very complicated as the word progressively enters fresh patches of application. Jim Woodward’s studies have demonstrated the central role that considerations of manipulative control play in mapping out the contours of these strategic specializations. In contrast, analytic metaphysicians have attempted to carve out an a priori pre-science of causal necessity that falters through ignoring these developmental considerations. All in all, this essay presents a critique of necessitarian thinking not unlike that offered by Quine in his well-known “Two Dogmas of Empiricism.”