scholarly journals EX POST VERSUS EX ANTE MEASURES OF THE USER COST OF CAPITAL

2007 ◽  
Vol 53 (2) ◽  
pp. 295-317 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicholas Oulton
Keyword(s):  
Ex Post ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Snow Han

PurposeThis study aims to provide new explanation of the new issue puzzle.Design/methodology/approachThis study uses market implied cost of capital (ICC), rather than ex post realized returns, as proxy for ex ante expected returns, and sheds new light on the question why initial public offering (IPO) firms underperform the market within a 3–5 years period after the offerings.FindingsUsing ICC, the author finds that the market expects to earn higher risk premium for new listing firms than similar firms, which is contradictory to the documented new issue puzzle. The higher expected returns come from higher idiosyncratic volatility for newly listed firms, which are young and have more growth opportunities. The author also reports that investors are negatively surprised by lower-than-expected performances of newly listed firms.Originality/valueThe author’s results provide new empirical evidence that the new issue puzzle does not exist. Previous results observed IPO firms' under-performance is attributable to that ex post realized returns are a noisy proxy for ex ante expected returns, especially for newly listed firms with limited information.


2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 85
Author(s):  
Renato Salvatore Camodeca ◽  
Christian Prinoth ◽  
Umberto Sagliaschi

The valuation of a company reflects the expected return or equivalently, the cost of capital that investors demand in exchange for the risk assumed. Despite the ex-ante nature of the problem, the majority of empirical analysis has focused on factors explaining expected returns from an ex-post perspective. In this paper, we take a different approach and try to identify which factors are ex-ante included in discount rates, with particular attention to the so-called size premium. Starting from observed market capitalisations and company fundamentals, we obtain the implied cost of capital from the reverse engineering of a carefully designed fundamental valuation model. Panel data regressions are used to investigate the existence of a relation between the implied cost of capital and the firm’s size, including other control variables representative of the most cited asset pricing “anomalies”. Our sample comprises European non-financial stocks listed on primary markets, with half-yearly observations starting from the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis. Contrary to common wisdom, we find that the firm’s size has no tangible impact to explain the implied cost of capital. 


2010 ◽  
Vol 85 (3) ◽  
pp. 817-848 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter O. Christensen ◽  
Leonidas E. de la Rosa ◽  
Gerald A. Feltham

ABSTRACT: Recent articles have demonstrated that increased public disclosure can decrease firms’ cost of capital. The focus has been on the impact of information on the cost of capital subsequent to the release of the information (the ex post cost of capital). We show that the reduction in the ex post cost of capital is offset by an equal increase in the cost of capital for the period leading up to the release of the information (the preposterior cost of capital). Thus, within the class of models framing the recent discussion, there is no impact on the ex ante cost of capital covering the full time span of the firm. The extent to which information is made publicly or privately available affects the timing of the resolution of uncertainty and when the information is reflected in equilibrium prices, but there is no impact on initial equilibrium prices. Within a noisy rational expectations equilibrium, rational investors may actually benefit from a higher ex post cost of capital.


CFA Digest ◽  
2003 ◽  
Vol 33 (3) ◽  
pp. 8-9
Author(s):  
Ann C. Logue
Keyword(s):  
Ex Post ◽  

1993 ◽  
Vol 108 (2) ◽  
pp. 135-138
Author(s):  
Pierre Malgrange ◽  
Silvia Mira d'Ercole
Keyword(s):  
Ex Post ◽  

Author(s):  
Richard Adelstein

This chapter elaborates the operation of criminal liability by closely considering efficient crimes and the law’s stance toward them, shows how its commitment to proportional punishment prevents the probability scaling that systemically efficient allocation requires, and discusses the procedures that determine the actual liability prices imposed on offenders. Efficient crimes are effectively encouraged by proportional punishment, and their nature and implications are examined. But proportional punishment precludes probability scaling, and induces far more than the systemically efficient number of crimes. Liability prices that match the specific costs imposed by the offender at bar are sought through a two-stage procedure of legislative determination of punishment ranges ex ante and judicial determination of exact prices ex post, which creates a dilemma: whether to price crimes accurately in the past or deter them accurately in the future. An illustrative Supreme Court case bringing all these themes together is discussed in conclusion.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document