TAYLORING REFORMED EPISTEMOLOGY: CHARLES TAYLOR, ALVIN PLANTINGA AND THE DE JURE CHALLENGE TO CHRISTIAN BELIEF by Deane-Peter Baker�THEOLOGY, PSYCHOANALYSIS AND TRAUMA by Marcus Pound

2008 ◽  
Vol 89 (1024) ◽  
pp. 744-747
Author(s):  
GRAEME RICHARDSON
1997 ◽  
Vol 33 (4) ◽  
pp. 419-431 ◽  
Author(s):  
DEREK S. JEFFREYS

In his recent two volumes on epistemology, Alvin Plantinga surveys contemporary theories of knowledge thoroughly, and carefully defends an externalist epistemology. He promises that in a third volume, Warranted Christian Belief, he will present John Calvin's sensus divinitatis as an epistemic module akin to sense perception, a priori knowledge, induction, testimony and other epistemic modules. Plantinga defines the sensus divinitatis as a ‘many sided disposition to accept belief in God (or propositions that immediately and obviously entail the existence of God) in a variety of circumstances’. Like other epistemic modules, it produces beliefs in an appropriate cognitive environment, aims at the production of true beliefs, and generates beliefs which have a high statistical probability of being true.


2001 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 203-214 ◽  
Author(s):  
RICHARD SWINBURNE

Alvin PlantingaWarranted Christian Belief(New York NY: Oxford University Press, 2000).In the two previous volumes of his trilogy on ‘warrant’, Alvin Plantinga developed his general theory of warrant, defined as that characteristic enough of which terms a true belief into knowledge. A belief B has warrant if and only if: (1) it is produced by cognitive faculties functioning properly, (2) in a cognitive environment sufficiently similar to that for which the faculties were designed, (3) according to a design plan aimed at the production of true beliefs, when (4) there is a high statistical probability of such beliefs being true.Thus my belief that there is a table in front of me has warrant if in the first place, in producing it, my cognitive faculties were functioning properly, the way they were meant to function. Plantinga holds that just as our heart or liver may function properly or not, so may our cognitive faculties. And he also holds that if God made us, our faculties function properly if they function in the way God designed them to function; whereas if evolution (uncaused by God) made us, then our faculties function properly if they function in the way that (in some sense) evolution designed them to function.


2012 ◽  
Vol 57 (2) ◽  
pp. 15
Author(s):  
Agnaldo Cuoco Portugal

o artigo pretende mostrar que a crítica que Alvin Plantinga faz contra o bayesianismo como descrição do que está envolvido na noção de racionalidade não se aplica a toda forma de bayesianismo. A abordagem de Swinburne, baseada em uma teoria lógica da probabilidade, é um exemplo de bayesianismo não atingido pela crítica de Plantinga. Além disso, o artigo defende que, em uma abordagem bayesiana, desaparece o problema da probabilidade decrescente, apontado por Plantinga em Warranted Christian Belief (2000). Assim, mesmo que não seja uma descrição suficiente da noção de racionalidade, o bayesianismo ajuda a entender importantes elementos presentes no raciocínio indutivo, especialmente os relativos aos argumentos cumulativos.


Philo ◽  
2002 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 103-118
Author(s):  
Tyler Wunder ◽  

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