HOW REFORMED IS REFORMED EPISTEMOLOGY? ALVIN PLANTINGA AND CALVIN'S ‘SENSUS DIVINITATIS’

1997 ◽  
Vol 33 (4) ◽  
pp. 419-431 ◽  
Author(s):  
DEREK S. JEFFREYS

In his recent two volumes on epistemology, Alvin Plantinga surveys contemporary theories of knowledge thoroughly, and carefully defends an externalist epistemology. He promises that in a third volume, Warranted Christian Belief, he will present John Calvin's sensus divinitatis as an epistemic module akin to sense perception, a priori knowledge, induction, testimony and other epistemic modules. Plantinga defines the sensus divinitatis as a ‘many sided disposition to accept belief in God (or propositions that immediately and obviously entail the existence of God) in a variety of circumstances’. Like other epistemic modules, it produces beliefs in an appropriate cognitive environment, aims at the production of true beliefs, and generates beliefs which have a high statistical probability of being true.

2001 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 203-214 ◽  
Author(s):  
RICHARD SWINBURNE

Alvin PlantingaWarranted Christian Belief(New York NY: Oxford University Press, 2000).In the two previous volumes of his trilogy on ‘warrant’, Alvin Plantinga developed his general theory of warrant, defined as that characteristic enough of which terms a true belief into knowledge. A belief B has warrant if and only if: (1) it is produced by cognitive faculties functioning properly, (2) in a cognitive environment sufficiently similar to that for which the faculties were designed, (3) according to a design plan aimed at the production of true beliefs, when (4) there is a high statistical probability of such beliefs being true.Thus my belief that there is a table in front of me has warrant if in the first place, in producing it, my cognitive faculties were functioning properly, the way they were meant to function. Plantinga holds that just as our heart or liver may function properly or not, so may our cognitive faculties. And he also holds that if God made us, our faculties function properly if they function in the way God designed them to function; whereas if evolution (uncaused by God) made us, then our faculties function properly if they function in the way that (in some sense) evolution designed them to function.


Horizons ◽  
1988 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 262-282
Author(s):  
Anthony M. Matteo

AbstractAt least since the Enlightenment, religious thinkers in the West have sought to meet the “evidentialist” challenge, that is, to demonstrate that there is sufficient evidence to warrant a rational affirmation of the existence of God. Alvin Plantinga holds that this challenge is rooted in a foundationalist approach to epistemology which is now intellectually bankrupt. He argues that the current critique of foundationalism clears the way for a fruitful reappropriation of the Reformed (Calvinist) tradition's assertion of the “basic” nature of belief in God and its concomitant relegation of the arguments of natural theology to marginal status. After critically assessing Plantinga's proposal—especially its dependence on a nonfoundationalist theory of knowledge—this essay shifts to an analysis of the transcendental Thomist understanding of the rational underpinnings of the theist's affirmation of God's existence, with particular emphasis on the thought of Joseph Maréchal. It is argued that the latter position is better equipped to fend off possible nontheistic counterarguments—even in our current nonfoundationalist atmosphere—and, in fact, can serve as a necessary complement to Calvin's claim of a natural tendency in human beings to believe in God.


2015 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Valentin Teodorescu

AbstractThis article offers an evaluation of Climacus’ objections to the arguments for the existence of God. With one exception (the critique of the ontological argument, which seems to anticipate the contemporary logico-empiricist position), these objections are found wanting. In the first general objection, Climacus seems to jump illegitimately from the objective reality of God’s existence (or non-existence) to the subjective conviction about God’s existence (or nonexistence). In the second, one might find exceptions to Climacus’ assertion that one can never deduce the existence of persons from the facts of the palpable world. Next, the objection against the teleological argument is inconclusive, since, in my opinion, Climacus does not offer a clear structure to-or critique of-this argument. Lastly, the ethico-religious objection fails because God’s existence- even if one would accept the reality of a sensus divinitatis-is not yet transparently evident to us. Nonetheless, in Climacus’ treatment of all these objections we observe similarities with certain ideas of contemporary reformed epistemology: a skepticism with regard to natural theology, a belief in a sensus divinitatis, and a positive assessment of the role of faith as an epistemological presupposition.


2018 ◽  
Vol 55 (4) ◽  
pp. 537-557 ◽  
Author(s):  
BLAKE MCALLISTER ◽  
TRENT DOUGHERTY

AbstractAlvin Plantinga theorizes the existence of a sensus divinitatis – a special cognitive faulty or mechanism dedicated to the production and non-inferential justification of theistic belief. Following Chris Tucker, we offer an evidentialist-friendly model of the sensus divinitatis whereon it produces theistic seemings that non-inferentially justify theistic belief. We suggest that the sensus divinitatis produces these seemings by tacitly grasping support relations between the content of ordinary experiences (in conjunction with our background evidence) and propositions about God. Our model offers advantages such as eliminating the need for a sui generis religious faculty, harmonizing the sensus divinitatis with prominent theories in the cognitive science of religion, and providing a superior account of natural revelation.


2018 ◽  
Vol 61 (2) ◽  
pp. 135-152
Author(s):  
P. De Vries

This article analyzes and evaluates Alvin Plantinga view of the status and authority of the Bible. It shows the relevance of two or more kinds of Christian Biblical scholarship Plantinga develops in Warranted Christian Belief. Plantinga argues that we can speak of knowledge when there is a warrant.Cognitive faculties include a sense of experience, the sensus divinitatis, and the inner witness of the Holy Spirit. A properly functioning cognitive faculty produces knowledge. The Christian belief that the Bible is the Word of God is not just a conviction but knowledge, knowledge that leads one to glorify and enjoy God.


Author(s):  
Jorge Sierra Merchán

Calvino plantea, a través de la idea de sensus divinitatis (esto es, que hay un conocimiento implantado de Dios), una justificación a favor de la intolerancia religiosa y de la persecución y castigo a los herejes. Pero ¿es válida esta justificación de la intolerancia religiosa, como piensa Calvino? Según Hume, es posible desarrollar argumentos evolutivos desacreditadores en contra de la existencia del sensus divinitatis basados en la explicación naturalista de la creencia en Dios y en la diversidad religiosa. Y según Schellenberg, es posible plantear, además, un argumento basado en el problema del ocultamiento divino. Los argumentos evolutivos desacreditadores establecen que si una creencia es producida por mecanismos no fiables que no rastrean la verdad, entonces dicha creencia carece de justificación epistémica. El objetivo de este trabajo es analizar y evaluar los dos argumentos evolutivos desacreditadores de Hume y el argumento de Schellenberg, los cuales intentar socavar la epistemología reformada de Calvino y Plantinga, y su defensa externalista de la racionalidad del teísmo. Mostraré que los tres argumentos son válidos y logran demostrar la falsedad del teísmo externalista. Con ello, espero hacer evidente la importancia de la crítica a la racionalidad del teísmo reformado durante la Ilustración escocesa, pues para Hume, el papel crítico de la filosofía se constituye en un remedio contra el fanatismo religioso, a la vez que promueve la idea de una democracia basada en la tolerancia religiosa y la libertad de conciencia. Palabras clave: sensus divinitatis, epistemología reformada, Calvino, Plantinga, argumentos evolutivos desacreditadores, racionalidad, teísmo, Hume, Schellemberg, Reforma. **************************************************************************************** Can religious intolerance be justified? Sensus divinitatis, religious diversity and the divine occult Hume and Schellenberg against Calvino. AbstractCalvino presents, through the idea of sensus divinitatis (which means, that we have knowledge of God implanted in us), a justification for religious intolerance and persecution and punishment of heretics. But, is religious intolerance a valid justification as Calvino thinks? According to Hume, it is possible to develop evolutionary arguments against the existence of sensus divinitatis based on a natural belief in God and in religious diversification. Additionally, according to Schellenberg, it is possible to state an argument based on the problem of the divine occult. The discrediting evolutionary arguments state that if a believe is produced through unreliable mechanisms that don’t follow reality, then such a believe lacks an epistemic justification. The objective of this work is to analyze and evaluate Hume’s two discrediting evolutionary arguments as well as Schellenberg’s argument, all of which try to undermine the epistemology formulated by Calvino and Plantinga, and their externalist defense of a national theism. I will demonstrate that the three arguments are valid and show how this externalist theism is false. With this, I expect to show the importance of critiquing the theism reasoning as it was reformed during the Scottish Illustration, for Hume the critical role of philosophy constitutes the solution against religious fanaticism, while at the same time, promoting the idea of a democracy based on religious tolerance and freedom of conscience. Key words: Sensus Divinitatis, Reformed Epistemology, Calvino, Plantinga, Discrediting evolutionary Aarguments, reasoning, theism, Hume, Schellenberg, Reformation. **************************************************************************************** Pode a intolerancia religiosa se justificar? Sensus divinitatis, diversidade religiosa e ocultamento divino Hume e Schellenberg contra Calvino ResumoCalvino salienta com a idéia de Sensus Divinitatis, a justificação da intolerância religiosa e a perseguição e castigo dos hereges. Mas é realmente justificada esta ideia? Segundo Hume é possível desenvolver argumentos evolutivos desacreditadores contra a existência do Sensus Divinitatis baseados na explicação naturalista da crença em deus e a diversidade religiosa. Segundo Schellenberg também é possível argumentar o ocultamento divino. Segundo os argumentos evolutivos desacreditadores se uma crença é produzida por mecanismos não fiáveis, ela carece de justificação epistêmica. O objetivo do artigo é analisar e avaliar os argumentos evolutivos desacreditadores de Hume e Schellenberg que tentam detonar a epistemologia de Calvino e Plantinga, baseados na defesa da racionalidade do teísmo. Os três argumentos são validos e conseguem demostrar a falsidade do teísmo externalista, assim no artigo se mostra a importância da crítica à racionalidade do teísmo, pois segundo Hume constitui um remédio contra o fanatismo religioso e promove a ideia democrática da liberdade de consciência. Palavras chave: sensos divinitatis, epistemologia reformada, Calvino, Platinga, argumentos evolutivos desacreditadores, racionalidade, teísmo, Hume, Schellemberg, reforma.


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