Knowledge and the Fall in American Neo-Calvinism: Toward a Van Til–Plantinga Synthesis

Cornelius Van Til and Alvin Plantinga represent two strands of American Protestant philosophical thought influenced by Dutch neo-Calvinism. This paper compares and synthetizes their models of knowledge in non-Christians given the noetic effects of sin and non-Christian worldview commitments. The paper argues that Van Til’s distinction between the partial realization of the antithesis in practice and its absolute nature in principle correlates with Plantinga’s insistence on prima facie–warranted common-sense beliefs and their ultimate defeasibility given certain metaphysical commitments. Van Til endorsed more radical claims than Plantinga on epistemic defeat in non-Christian worldviews, the status of the sensus divinitatis, and conceptual accuracy in knowledge of the world. Finally, an approach to the use of evidence in apologetics is developed based on the proposed synthesis. This approach seeks to make more room for evidence than is generally recognized in Van Tilianism, while remaining consistent with the founder’s principles.

Cognitive Regeneration and the Noetic Effects of Sin: Why Theology and Cognitive Science May not be Compatible

Justin Barrett and Kelly James Clark have suggested that cognitive science of religion supports the existence of a god-faculty akin to sensus divinitatis. They propose that God may have given rise to the god-faculty via guided evolution. This suggestion raises two theological worries. First, our natural cognition seems to favor false god-beliefs over true ones. Second, it also makes us prone to tribalism. If God hates idolatry and moral evil, why would he give rise to mind with such biases? A Plantingian response would point to the noetic effects of sin. Such a response, however, would have to assume that God is restoring the minds of believers. This paper considers empirical reasons to doubt that such a process is taking place.

Seventeenth-Century Calvinism and Early Enlightenment Thought

Analysing a number of interactions between Calvinists and Early Enlightenment philosophers—and the receptions of John Calvin in these—this chapter shows a complex and persistent presence of Calvin and Calvinists in philosophical debates during the early Enlightenment period. Among Calvinists, Descartes found both opponents and followers. Reformed Cartesians have occasionally appealed to Calvin (e.g. on accommodation and the sensus divinitatis), praised the Reformer (Heidanus, Burman), or neglected him (van Til). The philosopher Arnold Geulincx has been protected (Heidanus.) and published (van Til) by Calvinists, before they began to associate him with Spinoza (Tuinman, Andala, Driessen). Thomas Hobbes quoted Calvin incidentally, but Calvinists usually opposed his philosophy. Thus, the jurist Ulrik Huber used Calvin’s teachings on the testimonium Spiritus sancti against Hobbes—an appeal to Calvin that Huber repeated against another philosopher’s claim that reason alone was able to demonstrate the divinity of scripture. In order to refute Spinozists, Reformed minister Carolus Tuinman translated Calvin’s treatise against the libertines (1545). Responding to Huguenot Pierre Bayle, the Lutheran philosopher G. W. Leibniz wrote favourably about Calvin’s teachings on predestination and providence, as he had done also about Calvin’s views on the Eucharist.

Wolfhart Pannenberg, Openness to the World, and the Sensus Divinitatis

One of the foundational concepts for Wolfhart Pannenberg’s theological anthropology is his notion of ‘openness to the world.’ Openness to the world, according to Pannenberg, is essential to human identity in that one’s identity is established in their openness to the world, to the other, and, ultimately, to God. I aim to bring Pannenberg’s openness to the world into dialogue with the concept of the sensus divinitatis as articulated by John Calvin and further developed by Alvin Plantinga. The question driving this paper is whether or not Pannenberg’s openness to the world can rightly be understood as the sensus divinitatis, and, if so, what might be some benefits of it. I conclude that Pannenberg’s understanding of openness to the world is a fruitful way of understanding the sensus divinitatis and a fruitful way of arguing for and explaining humanity’s innate knowledge of God.

Further Thoughts on Natural Theology, Metaphysics, and Analogy

In this article, I respond to each of the three authors who have engaged my book God in Himself. Regarding Gray Sutanto’s response, I offer comments on his effort to integrate Schleiermacher and Calvin on the human “feeling of dependence” and the sensus divinitatis and to draw upon the insights of Bonaventure to frame our natural knowledge of God. Regarding Scott Swain’s response, I seek to build on his thoughts about the necessary use of metaphysical concepts by considering some additional biblical material and by clarifying the way in which metaphysical concepts might be treated as developments of ordinary, common human knowledge of reality. Finally, regarding Dolf te Velde’s response, I seek to clarify further why I think Scotus and Aquinas may not be too far apart on the nature of theological predication and why I think Aquinas’ view of analogy and divine simplicity is still sufficient for confirming the veracity of Christian speech about God.

CRENÇA CRISTÃ GARANTIDA

O objetivo deste artigo é analisar a objeção de jure formulada por Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) que alega que a crença teísta é irracional. Faremos isso através de uma comparação entre a proposta de Freud e a do filósofo americano Alvin Plantinga, que utiliza o conceito de garantia como a qualidade ou quantidade que distingue o conhecimento da mera crença verdadeira. Para Plantinga, uma crença é garantida quando é formada por faculdades cognitivas agindo em pleno funcionamento. Dessa forma, Plantinga elabora o modelo Aquino e Calvino que postula o sensus divinitatis como uma faculdade cognitiva que dá garantia a crença cristã. Por outro lado, Freud afirma que a crença em Deus resulta de uma disfunção cognitiva. Utilizamos do método bibliográfico, com uma abordagem dedutiva ao, sendo o objetivo de caráter exploratório. Concluímos que Freud alega que a crença teísta é irracional ao pressupor uma objeção de facto, isto é, ao partir do pressuposto que Deus não existe, quanto Plantinga mostra porque a alegação de Freud é injustificada.

Apophatic Language, the Aesthetic, and the Sensus Divinitatis

Across a variety of religious and philosophical traditions, it is common to think that it is possible that God defies all description. This presents a problem, however, as the claim that God defies all description itself appears to describe God. Drawing on multiple religious and philosophical traditions, this paper proposes an addition to the pragmatic stock of approaches to this problem. The proposal is that apophatic utterances are best interpreted—at least in the first instance—as invitations to engage the world aesthetically and creatively, as an act of faith. Their goal is principally to motivate us to act in ways that will allow us to appreciate the extraordinary or divine, rather than to, say, believe that some proposition regarding the extraordinary or divine is true (even if we might come to accept, and perhaps even believe, propositions as a result of our appreciative actions).

Solidarity in the Fall: An Essay on Self-Deception

This Article Aims To Explore The Notion And The Dynamics Of Self-deception As A Part Of What We Understand As The Noetic Effects Of Sin. Firstly, We Start With A Theological Analysis Of The Consciousness Because Of The Supratemporal Nature Of The Human Heart. Secondly, Through This Analysis, We Can See The Roots Of Self-deception In The Presupposition That The Ego Is Transparent To Itself. Thirdly, One Element Of The Dynamic Of Self-deception Is The Cognitive Parallax That Shows The Distance Between Theory And Reality. Fourthly, Self-deception Can Be Formalized In Theoretical Systems And Create A Legitimizing Discourse To Support Given Positions. Finally, We Try To Redeem Self-deception Through The Revelation That Enlightens The Human Mind. KEYWORDS: Self-deception, noetic effects of sin, Augustine, Herman Dooyeweerd, epistemology, the self, modern philosophy, sensus divinitatis, consciousness, revelation

Religion

This chapter critically examines key historical and contemporary justifications for religious literalism. Reasons to believe in the literal truth of certain religious texts are divided into historical and contemporary evidence of miracles, the sensus divinitatis (or sense of God), and cosmological and teleological “proofs” of the existence of God. It finds that literalist religious belief is the product of motivated cognition, and can only be sustained by rationalization and denial. It further investigates ideas about how religious ideology may have originated, as well as how religious literalism can persist in the face of scientific advancements and cosmopolitan knowledge of other cultures.

Sensus divinitatis jako koncepcja genezy przekonań teistycznych

W koncepcji Alvina Plantingi, sensus divinitatis („zmysł boskości”) jest ludzką władzą poznawczą, nakierowaną na tworzenie posiadających gwarancję (pozytywny status epistemiczny) przekonań o Bogu. Większość komentatorów myśli Plantingi koncentruje się na pytaniu, czy wprowadzenie tej koncepcji faktycznie pozwala obronić racjonalność przekonań teistycznych, pomijając przy tym zazwyczaj genetyczny aspekt funkcjonowania zmysłu boskości. Niniejszy artykuł ma na celu wypełnienie tej luki. Na podstawie Warranted Christian Belief Plantingi wyróżniam trzy możliwe interpretacje tego, jak sensus divinitatis tworzy przekonania teistyczne. Wskazuję także, w jaki sposób ludzki grzech wpływa na poprawne funkcjonowanie zmysłu w ramach każdej z tych interpretacji.