Let's Play GOLF!

A central feature of the “free will defense” as developed by Alvin Plantinga is his response to the claim that God can create a world containing creatures with libertarian freedom that contains no moral evil. Plantinga’s response appeals to the notion of “morally significant freedom” according to which free creatures, in order to do moral good, must be capable of moral evil. In this paper, I argue, first, that morally significant freedom is not required for free creatures to do moral good and, second, that other recent attempts to necessitate a creaturely capability for evil likewise fail. The upshot of my paper is that the free will defense simply won’t work because it is possible and feasible for God to create a world containing libertarianly free creatures capable of moral good and yet containing no moral evil.

Thomist Advice to Christian Philosophers

In Advice to Christian philosophers (1984) Alvin Plantinga suggested that Christians who propose to be philosophers should not limit themselves to being philosophers who happen, incidentally, to be Christians. Instead, they should develop a Christian philosophy. From this, however, a problem followed, which is still seen as a reason to deny that a Christian philosophy is possible. It seems implausible that the outcome of the interaction between faith and philosophy is, really, philosophy and not merely theology. Plantinga did not deal with this problem. Unlike him, thinkers of various orientations, especially scholars of Thomas Aquinas, had discussed it during the French querelle in the 1930s. In this article, I argue that they did not solve this problem because they did not examine the relationship between faith and philosophy by considering what faith requires in order to relate to reason. Instead, this consideration was suggested by Plantinga’s Advice and, long before, it had been developed in detail by Thomas Aquinas. It is, therefore, time to propose Thomist Advice to Christian Philosophers.

Knowledge and the Fall in American Neo-Calvinism: Toward a Van Til–Plantinga Synthesis

Cornelius Van Til and Alvin Plantinga represent two strands of American Protestant philosophical thought influenced by Dutch neo-Calvinism. This paper compares and synthetizes their models of knowledge in non-Christians given the noetic effects of sin and non-Christian worldview commitments. The paper argues that Van Til’s distinction between the partial realization of the antithesis in practice and its absolute nature in principle correlates with Plantinga’s insistence on prima facie–warranted common-sense beliefs and their ultimate defeasibility given certain metaphysical commitments. Van Til endorsed more radical claims than Plantinga on epistemic defeat in non-Christian worldviews, the status of the sensus divinitatis, and conceptual accuracy in knowledge of the world. Finally, an approach to the use of evidence in apologetics is developed based on the proposed synthesis. This approach seeks to make more room for evidence than is generally recognized in Van Tilianism, while remaining consistent with the founder’s principles.

Wolfhart Pannenberg, Openness to the World, and the Sensus Divinitatis

One of the foundational concepts for Wolfhart Pannenberg’s theological anthropology is his notion of ‘openness to the world.’ Openness to the world, according to Pannenberg, is essential to human identity in that one’s identity is established in their openness to the world, to the other, and, ultimately, to God. I aim to bring Pannenberg’s openness to the world into dialogue with the concept of the sensus divinitatis as articulated by John Calvin and further developed by Alvin Plantinga. The question driving this paper is whether or not Pannenberg’s openness to the world can rightly be understood as the sensus divinitatis, and, if so, what might be some benefits of it. I conclude that Pannenberg’s understanding of openness to the world is a fruitful way of understanding the sensus divinitatis and a fruitful way of arguing for and explaining humanity’s innate knowledge of God.

Doing, Allowing, and Occasionalism

In ‘God, evil, and occasionalism’ Matthew Shea and C.P. Ragland appeal to the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing to argue against Alvin Plantinga that occasionalism is morally worse than conservationism. In this article I critically examine their argument and conclude that it fails because it contains an equivocation or is unwarranted. I also offer a case against their position by, first, arguing that on none of three prominent accounts of doing and allowing God merely allows suffering. Second, I develop the ‘Epistemological-Equivalence Argument’ in order to show that even if we grant such a distinction for God's acts, they would be morally on a par.

God and Suffering

This chapter launches a new investigation of the question of God’s existence, examining it against the reality of human suffering and bringing to the fore contentious presuppositions concerning agency and value at the core of the debate. When we survey the world, we observe an enormous amount of pain, including virtually unspeakable kinds of maltreatment and agony, many instances of which seem patently unfair, unearned, and pointless. This chapter initiates the book’s argument that, in light of these observations, it is reasonable to conclude that God does not exist. The chapter critically examines and extends the work of William Rowe, John Hick, and Alvin Plantinga, taking up apparently pointless instances of suffering and the proposed justifying goods of character-building and free will.

Default Agnosticism

Agnosticism has always had its fair amount of criticism. Religious believers often described the first agnostics as infidels and it is not uncommon to see them described as somewhat dull fence-sitters. Moreover, the undecided agnostic stance on belief in gods is often compared with being unsure about such obviously false statements as the existence of orbiting teapots, invisible dragons or even Santa Claus. In this paper, I maintain that agnosticism can properly be endorsed as a default stance. More precisely, I use a strategy presented by Alvin Plantinga and argue that it is rationally acceptable to be agnostic about the existence of God. I also anticipate and answer a number of objections. Finally, I offer my conclusion.

CRENÇA CRISTÃ GARANTIDA

O objetivo deste artigo é analisar a objeção de jure formulada por Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) que alega que a crença teísta é irracional. Faremos isso através de uma comparação entre a proposta de Freud e a do filósofo americano Alvin Plantinga, que utiliza o conceito de garantia como a qualidade ou quantidade que distingue o conhecimento da mera crença verdadeira. Para Plantinga, uma crença é garantida quando é formada por faculdades cognitivas agindo em pleno funcionamento. Dessa forma, Plantinga elabora o modelo Aquino e Calvino que postula o sensus divinitatis como uma faculdade cognitiva que dá garantia a crença cristã. Por outro lado, Freud afirma que a crença em Deus resulta de uma disfunção cognitiva. Utilizamos do método bibliográfico, com uma abordagem dedutiva ao, sendo o objetivo de caráter exploratório. Concluímos que Freud alega que a crença teísta é irracional ao pressupor uma objeção de facto, isto é, ao partir do pressuposto que Deus não existe, quanto Plantinga mostra porque a alegação de Freud é injustificada.

Alvin Plantinga’s Reformed Epistemology

"Alvin Plantinga’s Reformed Epistemology. Alvin Plantinga is a well-known defender of Reformed epistemology. The main thesis of the Reformed epistemology argues that faith in God is rational and justified without the aid of arguments or evidence. In this paper, we intend to describe Alvin Plantinga’s perspective, more precisely, the A / C model (Aquinas / Calvin) proposed by him, in which faith in God is innate and does not need arguments or evidence, and then to analyze the objections on this model, in order to determine whether faith in God can be considered basic. Keywords: epistemology, reformed, Alvin Plantinga, warrant, justification"

The Implausibility and Low Explanatory Power of the Resurrection Hypothesis—With a Rejoinder to Stephen T. Davis

We respond to Stephen T. Davis’ criticism of our earlier essay, “Assessing the Resurrection Hypothesis.” We argue that the Standard Model of physics is relevant and decisive in establishing the implausibility and low explanatory power of the Resurrection hypothesis. We also argue that the laws of physics have entailments regarding God and the supernatural and, against Alvin Plantinga, that these same laws lack the proviso “no agent supernaturally interferes.” Finally, we offer Bayesian arguments for the Legend hypothesis and against the Resurrection hypothesis.