Knowing-How and Knowing-That

2008 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 451-470 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeremy Fantl
Keyword(s):  
2014 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 553-565 ◽  
Author(s):  
Per Norström
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Stina Bäckström ◽  
Martin Gustafsson

In this paper, we aim to show that a study of Gilbert Ryle’s work has much to contribute to the current debate between intellectualism and anti-intellectualism with respect to skill and know-how. According to Ryle, knowing how and skill are distinctive from and do not reduce to knowing that. What is often overlooked is that for Ryle this point is connected to the idea that the distinction between skill and mere habit is a category distinction, or a distinction in form. Criticizing the reading of Ryle presented by Jason Stanley, we argue that once the formal nature of Ryle’s investigation is recognized it becomes clear that his dispositional account is not an instance of reductionist behaviorism, and that his regress argument has a broader target than Stanley appears to recognize.


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