Meaning

In its most general form, the explanatory demand with regard to meaning addresses the question: what is it for representation or aboutness or meaning to be present? This question can focus on linguistic meaning in particular or on aboutness in general, including non-linguistic aboutness. Through a detailed analysis of leading theories—including those of Grice, Searle, Soames, Descombes, Horwich, Putnam, Kripke, Lewis, and Davidson—it is shown how the failure to meet the explanatory demand with regard to meaning is pervasive. A Bradleyan regress argument is then deployed to make a Parmenidean Ascent: there is no differentiated meaning, instead all is meaning. This ascent is intimated—perhaps unwittingly—in the classic arguments of Quine’s “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” and Davidson’s “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme.” The chapter closes with a Parmenidean Ascent with regard to truth that follows from the Parmenidean Ascent with regard to meaning.

Substance

This chapter identifies the source of the failure to satisfy the explanatory demand with regard to being or substance. The culprit is the presupposition that we are trying to understand what it is to be a relational substance, a substance that stands in relations. Chapter 3 argues that any attempt to meet the explanatory demand for a relational substance is embroiled in vicious explanatory regresses or circles. Potential objections to this argument are shown to be lacking, and a comparison between this argument against relational substance and Bradley’s famous regress argument against the reality of relations is offered. The only way to save the notion of substance is to affirm undifferentiated or non-relational substance. This is a Parmenidean Ascent with regard to being: there are no beings, not even one being, rather there is simply being. A comparison between this conception of being and Aquinas’ conception of God is offered.

Knowledge

Chapter 5 begins by showing how the explanatory demand with regard to knowledge—what is it in virtue of which a given state is a state of knowledge?—drives so much work in epistemology. As in the cases of the chapters on substance and action, this chapter argues that leading theories of knowledge all fail to meet this explanatory demand. Theories examined include contextualist and non-contextualist theories, as well as knowledge-first theories. Authors criticized include Goldman, Dretske, DeRose, Lewis, Stanley, and Williamson. With the help of another Bradleyan regress argument, the underlying problem in each case is revealed to be the presupposition that one is dealing with differentiated or relational knowledge. As before, the way out of these difficulties is to make a Parmenidean Ascent with regard to knowledge: all is knowledge and there is no differentiated knowledge.

Action

Chapter 4 argues that, as in the case of substance, prominent accounts of action rightly insist on—but fail to meet—the explanatory demand with regard to action: what is it in virtue of which an action is an action? This failure is observed both in the case of causal theories of action (represented by Davidson and his followers) and in the case of rival non-causal theories (represented by Anscombe and her followers). This chapter then appeals to a Bradleyan regress argument to show that—as in the case of substance—such a failure is inevitable as long as one assumes that one is dealing with differentiated or relational action. The only remedy is to make a Parmenidean Ascent with regard to action: there are no actions, not even one action, there is simply action, analogous to actus purus in Aquinas’ sense.

On the Regress Argument for Infinitism

This paper critically evaluates the regress argument for infinitism. The dialectic is essentially this. Peter Klein argues that only an infinitist can, without being dogmatic, enhance the credibility of a questioned non-evident proposition. In response, I demonstrate that a foundationalist can do this equally well. Furthermore, I explain how foundationalism can provide for infinite chains of justification. I conclude that the regress argument for infinitism should not convince us.

Completing the Rejection of Idealism

This chapter shows how Russell’s rejection of modality rounds out his criticism of Bradleyan idealism. Russell’s argument against internal relations by itself is not a fully satisfying criticism of Bradley’s idealism, because it doesn’t show what exactly is wrong with Bradley’s arguments against the reality of relations. I show that several of Bradley’s arguments, including not only his famous regress argument against the reality of relations, but also his rejection of psychological atomism and his account of the philosophical method that leads to idealism, rest on a tacit modal principle of sufficient reason. In 1905-7, Russell became aware of this unacknowledged ground of Bradley’s arguments. Bradley’s tacit principle of sufficient reason presupposes the coherence of a distinction between the actual and the merely possible, and collapses in face of Russell’s amodalism.

Locating Sovereignty in Systems of Divided and Limited Government

Thomas Hobbes famously mounted a regress argument intended to show that unless sovereignty is undivided and unlimited, stable and effective government is impossible. This chapter examines the implications of that argument for complex systems of government such as that of the United States and makes the case that such systems may evade the dilemma Hobbes poses if they are determinately rule-governed. The discussion covers such elements of Hobbes’s view as the sovereign as an artificial person, the puzzle of the sovereign assembly, Hobbes’s arguments against both divided sovereignty and limited sovereignty, and the location of sovereignty in complex systems. It also notes that enforcement power must follow the location of decision authority, and asks who bears moral responsibility for the sovereign’s actions in complex systems.