A Troublesome Case of Backward Causation for Lewis’s Counterfactual Theory

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
George Seli
Keyword(s):  
Counterfactual Theory ◽  
Backward Causation

Causal Paradoxes

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ryan Wasserman
Keyword(s):  
Life Cycle ◽  
Time Travel ◽  
Causal Loop ◽  
Ex Nihilo ◽  
Backward Causation

Chapter 5 surveys the various causal paradoxes of time travel. Section 1 introduces the concept of a causal loop and reviews some of the standard arguments against backward causation. Sections 2 focuses on the bootstrapping paradox, and the question of whether or not time travel allows for self-caused events. Section 3 addresses the ex nihilo paradox, and the question of whether or not time travel allows for uncaused events. Section 4 looks at the restoration paradox, and the question of how to understand the life cycle of an object in a causal loop. Section 5 considers D. H. Mellor’s frequency-based argument against causal loops. Section 6 discusses Michael Tooley’s counterfactual-based argument against backward causation.

Possible Worlds Counterfactual Theories of Causation

1980 ◽  
Vol 6 ◽  
pp. 119-138
Author(s):  
Richard Adler
Keyword(s):  
Alternative Treatment ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Great Length ◽  
Current Interest ◽  
Possible Worlds Semantics ◽  
Causal Relations ◽  
Its Analysis ◽  
Counterfactual Theory ◽  
Causal Theories ◽  
Counterfactual Approach

The numerous difficulties facing the traditional Humean regularity approach to the problem of causation have been discussed in the literature at great length. In view of the current interest in possible worlds semantics, it is not surprising that the only serious alternative treatment of causation presently available, the counterfactual approach, has been explored recently as a means of circumventing the apparently unresolvable difficulties facing regularity causal theories. It is the purpose of this paper to suggest that such a strategy holds little promise. Specifically, I will argue that, in addition to giving rise to problems directly analogous to those facing regularity accounts, the counterfactual approach fails in principle to reflect important properties of causal relations as we understand them intuitively. David Lewis's possible worlds account, the most comprehensive counterfactual theory to date, is further criticized for implicit problems with natural lawhood even more serious than those typically raised for regularity accounts, for additional inadequacies in its analysis of causal relations, and for its failure to satisfy basic empiricist epistemological standards.

Humean Supervenience and Possible Worlds

2020 ◽  
pp. 492-528
Author(s):  
Paul Noordhof
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Phenomenal Consciousness ◽  
Humean Supervenience ◽  
Counterfactual Theory ◽  
Reductive Account

The position defended is compatible with a coherent development of a reductive account of modality. It is less significant for the principle of recombination than previously thought and the principle of recombination is unlikely to play successfully its role as a principle of plenitude in any event. The distinct existences principle is defended against an argument that it is necessarily false. In fact, by comparison, we have more reason to believe in the possibility of worlds in which Humean supervenience is true and there is causation, than in physicalism about phenomenal consciousness. The counterfactual theory of causation, and surrounding framework, explains why this is the appropriate verdict at which to arrive. Some aspects of the variety of causation may be understood as a determinate-determinable relation but the different vertically fundamental bases are better understood as partial realizations. Causation is one horizontally fundamental metaphysical category but there may be others.

A Counterfactual Approach to Explanation in Mathematics

2019 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-34 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sam Baron ◽  
Mark Colyvan ◽  
David Ripley
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Explanation ◽  
Mathematical Explanation ◽  
Test Case ◽  
Mathematical Explanations ◽  
Counterfactual Theory ◽  
Explanatory Structure ◽  
Counterfactual Approach

ABSTRACT Our goal in this paper is to extend counterfactual accounts of scientific explanation to mathematics. Our focus, in particular, is on intra-mathematical explanations: explanations of one mathematical fact in terms of another. We offer a basic counterfactual theory of intra-mathematical explanations, before modelling the explanatory structure of a test case using counterfactual machinery. We finish by considering the application of counterpossibles to mathematical explanation, and explore a second test case along these lines.

Backward Causation in Defence of Free Will

Mind ◽  
1985 ◽  
Vol XCIV (374) ◽  
pp. 210-217 ◽  
Author(s):  
PETER FORREST
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Backward Causation

scholarly journals Counterfactual Scheming

Mind ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 129 (514) ◽  
pp. 535-562
Author(s):  
Sam Baron
Keyword(s):  
Mathematical Explanation ◽  
Explanatory Role ◽  
Unification Theory ◽  
Mathematical Explanations ◽  
Counterfactual Theory ◽  
Counterfactual Approach

Abstract Mathematics appears to play a genuine explanatory role in science. But how do mathematical explanations work? Recently, a counterfactual approach to mathematical explanation has been suggested. I argue that such a view fails to differentiate the explanatory uses of mathematics within science from the non-explanatory uses. I go on to offer a solution to this problem by combining elements of the counterfactual theory of explanation with elements of a unification theory of explanation. The result is a theory according to which a counterfactual is explanatory when it is an instance of a generalized counterfactual scheme.

Backward causation and the Stalnaker-Lewis approach to counterfactuals

Analysis ◽  
2002 ◽  
Vol 62 (3) ◽  
pp. 191-197 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. Tooley
Keyword(s):  
Backward Causation
Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document