International R&D partnerships: the role of government funding in reducing transaction costs and opportunistic behavior

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simone Corsi ◽  
Feranita Feranita ◽  
Alfredo De Massis
2010 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-21 ◽  
Author(s):  
CHRISTIAN CORDES ◽  
PETER RICHERSON ◽  
RICHARD MCELREATH ◽  
PONTUS STRIMLING

Abstract:This paper relates firm size and opportunism by showing that, given certain behavioural dispositions of humans, the size of a profit-maximizing firm can be determined by cognitive aspects underlying firm-internal cultural transmission processes. We argue that what firms do better than markets – besides economizing on transaction costs – is to establish a cooperative regime among its employees that keeps in check opportunism. A model depicts the outstanding role of the entrepreneur or business leader in firm-internal socialization processes and the evolution of corporate cultures. We show that high opportunism-related costs are a reason for keeping firms’ size small.


2021 ◽  
Vol 57 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
James Roumasset

As Ronald Coase and others have shown, deducing the appropriate role of the government in the economy requires a comparative institutions approach. Trying to generalize from oversimplified specifications regarding transaction costs, according to whether exclusion is possible or not, is a futile exercise. An alternative to the Ostrom matrix is to distinguish private, club, and collective consumption goods according to their technical characteristics, specifically their degree of congestabiilty. The other box of the Ostrom matrix, “common pool” resources, can also be usefully analyzed from a club perspective. Spillover goods are spatial clubs. Lastly, a version of the Coase theorem is offered, which provides the foundation of comparative institutional analysis.


2021 ◽  
Vol 57 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
James Roumasset

As Ronald Coase and others have shown, deducing the appropriate role of the government in the economy requires a comparative institutions approach. Trying to generalize from oversimplified specifications regarding transaction costs, according to whether exclusion is possible or not, is a futile exercise. An alternative to the Ostrom matrix is to distinguish private, club, and collective consumption goods according to their technical characteristics, specifically their degree of congestabiilty. The other box of the Ostrom matrix, “common pool” resources, can also be usefully analyzed from a club perspective. Spillover goods are spatial clubs. Lastly, a version of the Coase theorem is offered, which provides the foundation of comparative institutional analysis.


2007 ◽  
pp. 80-92
Author(s):  
A. Kireev

The paper studies the problem of raiders activity on the market for corporate control. This activity is considered as a product of coercive entrepreneurship evolution. Their similarities and sharp distinctions are shown. The article presents the classification of raiders activity, discribes its basic characteristics and tendencies, defines the role of government in the process of its transformation.


1990 ◽  
Author(s):  
Odin Knudsen ◽  
John Nash ◽  
James Bovard ◽  
Bruce Gardner ◽  
L. Alan Winters
Keyword(s):  

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