scholarly journals Sharing Knowledge to an Entrant for Production Investment Confronting COVID‐19: Incentive Alignment and Lose–Lose Dilemma

Risk Analysis ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Baozhuang Niu ◽  
Zhipeng Dai ◽  
Qiyang Li
Keyword(s):  
Incentive Alignment

Family CEOs vs. Nonfamily CEOs in the Family-Controlled Firm: An Examination of the Level and Sensitivity of Pay to Performance

2000 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 121-131 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel L. McConaughy
Keyword(s):  
Firm Value ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Family Firms ◽  
Multivariate Analyses ◽  
Incentive Alignment ◽  
Founding Family ◽  
The Family

This study examines CEO compensation in 82 founding-family-controlled firms; 47 CEOs are members of the founding family and 35 are not. It tests the family incentive alignment hypothesis, which predicts that family CEOs have superior incentives for maximizing firm value and, therefore, need fewer compensation-based incentives. Univariate and multivariate analyses show that family CEOs' compensation levels are lower and that they receive less incentive-based pay—confirming the family incentive alignment hypothesis and suggesting the possible need for family firms to increase CEO compensation when they replace a founding family CEO with a nonfamily-member CEO.

scholarly journals Hedge Fund Franchises

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
William Fung ◽  
David Hsieh ◽  
Narayan Naik ◽  
Melvyn Teo
Keyword(s):  
Business Model ◽  
Hedge Fund ◽  
Spillover Effects ◽  
Growth Strategy ◽  
Growth Strategies ◽  
Single Product ◽  
Incentive Alignment ◽  
Performance Fees ◽  
Multiple Product ◽  
Fund Industry

We investigate the growth strategies of hedge fund firms. We find that firms with successful first funds are able to launch follow-on funds that charge higher performance fees, set more onerous redemption terms, and attract greater inflows. Motivated by the aforementioned spillover effects, first funds outperform follow-on funds, after adjusting for risk. Consistent with the agency view, greater incentive alignment moderates the performance differential between first and follow-on funds. Moreover, multiple-product firms underperform single-product firms but harvest greater fee revenues, thereby hurting investors while benefitting firm partners. Investors respond to this growth strategy by redeeming from first funds of firms with follow-on funds that do poorly. Empirically, the multiple-product firm has become the dominant business model for the hedge fund industry. This paper was accepted by Tyler Shumway, finance.

Model-Theoretic Knowledge Accumulation: The Case of Agency Theory and Incentive Alignment

2013 ◽  
Vol 38 (3) ◽  
pp. 442-454 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jared D. Harris ◽  
Scott G. Johnson ◽  
David Souder
Keyword(s):  
Agency Theory ◽  
Incentive Alignment ◽  
Knowledge Accumulation

Top manager ownership levels and incentive alignment in inventively active firms

2011 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 116-135 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edward Levitas ◽  
Vincent L. Barker ◽  
Mujtaba Ahsan
Keyword(s):  
Incentive Alignment ◽  
Top Manager
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