scholarly journals The Expressive Function of Constitutional Amendment Rules

Author(s):  
Richard Albert
2000 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-109 ◽  
Author(s):  
N. Scott Arnold

In 1992, the city of Boulder, Colorado, passed an ordinance forbidding discrimination against homosexuals in employment and housing. Two years later, voters in the state of Colorado passed a constitutional amendment forbidding the passage of local ordinances prohibiting this form of discrimination. The constitutional amendment did not mandate discrimination against homosexuals; it merely nullified ordinances such as Boulder's. The amendment was later struck down by the U.S. Supreme Court as unconstitutional.


2014 ◽  
Vol 59 (2) ◽  
pp. 225-281 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Albert

The current scholarly focus on informal constitutional amendment has obscured the continuing relevance of formal amendment rules. In this article, I return our attention to formal amendment in order to show that formal amendment rules—not formal amendments but formal amendment rules themselves—perform an underappreciated function: to express constitutional values. Drawing from national constitutions, in particular the Canadian, South African, German, and United States constitutions, I illustrate how constitutional designers may deploy formal amendment rules to create a formal constitutional hierarchy that reflects special political commitments. That formal amendment rules may express constitutional values is both a clarifying and a complicating contribution to their study. This thesis clarifies the study of formal amendment rules by showing that such rules may serve a function that scholars have yet to attribute to them; yet it complicates this study by indicating that the constitutional text alone cannot prove whether the constitutional values expressed in formal amendment rules represent authentic or inauthentic political commitments.


2019 ◽  
pp. 175-228
Author(s):  
Richard Albert

Constitutional amendment rules were once very simple in their design. A constitution codified a one-size-fits-all procedure for amendments to any part of the constitution, and that was it. Today, amendment rules are considerably more complex in their design and in the possibilities they offer constitutional designers for structuring their rules of constitutional change. This chapter examines the architecture of constitutional amendment, specifically the options available to constitutional designers to build their own rules of change. This chapter also weighs the strengths and weaknesses of these options and offers some guidance on when one choice may be better than another. This chapter compares single-track and multi-track pathways in constitutional amendment, single-subject and omnibus amendment bills, and procedures for amendment and dismemberment. This chapter also explains why codified unamendability is problematic for democracy and suggests an alternative design that can achieve the expressive function of unamendability while not denying the fundamental right of amendment. This chapter moreover examines the important relationship between time and change, namely how constitutional designers can use and manipulate time in their design of amendment rules. Finally, this chapter explores judicial review of constitutional amendments, beginning first by explaining eight strategies a court can use to invalidate an amendment and then elaborating several alternatives to the judicial invalidation of constitutional amendments. What results is a deep dive into the design of amendment rules. This chapter considers constitutions from around the globe.


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