Computer simulations of voting systems

2000 ◽  
Vol 03 (01n04) ◽  
pp. 181-194 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dominique Lepelley ◽  
Ahmed Louichi ◽  
Fabrice Valognes

All voting procedures are susceptible to give rise, if not to paradoxes, at least to violations of some democratic principles. In this paper, we evaluate and compare the propensity of various voting rules -belonging to the class of scoring rules- to satisfy two versions of the majority principle. We consider the asymptotic case where the numbers of voters tends to infinity and, for each rule, we study with the help of Monte Carlo methods how this propensity varies as a function of the number of candidates.

2001 ◽  
Vol 73 (1) ◽  
pp. 18-32 ◽  
Author(s):  
DIETRICH STAUFFER ◽  
PAULO M.C. DE OLIVEIRA ◽  
SUZANA MOSS DE OLIVEIRA ◽  
THADEU J.P. PENNA ◽  
JORGE S. SÁ MARTINS

The sexual version of the Penna model of biological aging, simulated since 1996, is compared here with alternative forms of reproduction as well as with models not involving aging. In particular we want to check how sexual forms of life could have evolved and won over earlier asexual forms hundreds of million years ago. This computer model is based on the mutation-accumulation theory of aging, using bits-strings to represent the genome. Its population dynamics is studied by Monte Carlo methods.


2016 ◽  
Vol 57 ◽  
pp. 573-591 ◽  
Author(s):  
Omer Lev ◽  
Jeffrey S. Rosenschein

In multiagent systems, social choice functions can help aggregate the distinct preferences that agents have over alternatives, enabling them to settle on a single choice. Despite the basic manipulability of all reasonable voting systems, it would still be desirable to find ways to reach plausible outcomes, which are stable states, i.e., a situation where no agent would wish to change its vote. One possibility is an iterative process in which, after everyone initially votes, participants may change their votes, one voter at a time. This technique, explored in previous work, converges to a Nash equilibrium when Plurality voting is used, along with a tie-breaking rule that chooses a winner according to a linear order of preferences over candidates. In this paper, we both consider limitations of the iterative voting method, as well as expanding upon it. We demonstrate the significance of tie-breaking rules, showing that no iterative scoring rule converges for all tie-breaking. However, using a restricted tie-breaking rule (such as the linear order rule used in previous work) does not by itself ensure convergence. We prove that in addition to plurality, the veto voting rule converges as well using a linear order tie-breaking rule. However, we show that these two voting rules are the only scoring rules that converge, regardless of tie-breaking mechanism.


2014 ◽  
Vol 114 (19) ◽  
pp. 1257-1286 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erika J. Palin ◽  
Martin T. Dove ◽  
Simon A. T. Redfern ◽  
Joaquín Ortega-Castro ◽  
Claro Ignacio Sainz-Díaz ◽  
...  

1998 ◽  
Vol 527 ◽  
Author(s):  
L.C. Wei ◽  
E. Lang ◽  
M. Ghaly ◽  
P. Bellon ◽  
R. S. Averback

ABSTRACTThe temperature dependence of disordering of Cu3Au during ion irradiation has been investigated by computer simulations using MONTE CARLO methods. The investigation was motivated by peculiar experimental observations that the initial disordering rate begins to decrease above ~300 K, which can be explained by vacancies just becoming mobile at that temperature, but then at ~ 475 K, it reaches a minimum and then increases rapidly as the temperature is further increased, up to the order-disorder temperature. The present simulation shows that this behavior can be understood in terms of temperatures dependencies in both atomic mixing in the cascade and the efficiency of vacancy annealing of disorder as the vacancies diffuse out of the cascade.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document