scholarly journals A Theory of Farsightedness in Committee Games

Game Theory ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Alphonse Fodouop Fotso ◽  
Joseph Armel Momo Kenfack ◽  
Bertrand Tchantcho
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Decision Making Process ◽  
Solution Concepts ◽  
Bargaining Set ◽  
Committee Decision ◽  
Committee Decision Making ◽  
The One ◽  
Better Than

We study the committee decision making process using game theory. A committee here refers to any group of people who have to select one option from a given set of alternatives under a specified rule. Shenoy (1980) introduced two solution concepts, namely, the one-core and a version of bargaining set for committee games. Shortcomings of these solutions concepts are raised and discussed in this paper. These shortcomings are resolved by introducing two new solutions concepts: the farsighted one-core and the bargaining set revised, inspired by an idea of farsightedness initially defined by Rubinstein (1980). It is shown that the farsighted one-core is always non-empty and is better than the one-core. In a well-specified sense, the bargaining set revised is also better than the bargaining set as defined by Shenoy (1980) and it is always non-empty for simple committee games with linear preferences. Other attractive properties are also proved.

All is Not Fair

2000 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 328-354
Author(s):  
R. BRUCE ANDERSON
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Party Membership ◽  
Committee Decision ◽  
Time Period ◽  
Minority Party ◽  
Committee Decision Making

This article addresses the problem of the causes of party conflict in former one-party legislatures. Some argue that as the minority party gains ground in the legislature, partisan floor conflict will rise. Yet, literature on committees and the changing status of the committee system seems to suggest that conflict is lowered in chambers where the minority party participates in committee decision making. This study is based on tests of data from a 10-year time period. The author reports that the proportion of minority party membership on committees has a direct dampening effect on the level of conflict on the floor. This analysis also finds that the effect is variable by bill type and that the overall effect on conflict is greater than the effect of chamber share in determining the level of party conflict in the chamber.

scholarly journals Transparency in IHR emergency committee decision making: the case for reform

2019 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. e001618 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Eccleston-Turner ◽  
Adam Kamradt-Scott
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Committee Decision ◽  
Committee Decision Making
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