Game Theory Approch on The Decision Making Process for Defining Obtainable Prices At Generator Side in A Deregulated Environment

2018 ◽  
Vol 6 (12) ◽  
pp. 54-56
Author(s):  
A.I. Modi ◽  
T.V. RABARI
Author(s):  
Zheng Tang

Abstract This article utilizes the game theory to assess the feasibility and weaknesses of different methods to promote international judicial cooperation. It starts by justifying the game theory as a proper model to understand the pattern of interaction between states. It then applies typical games to analyse states’ decision-making process. It suggests that states should not update their domestic laws to unilaterally offer judicial cooperation to other countries even if reciprocity is adopted to urge other states to cooperate. The only effective means is through an international judicial cooperation treaty, which encounters relatively small compliance and enforcement problems. The first-mover disadvantage at the ratification stage is not a fundamental barrier and may disappear over time. The battle-of-the-sexes game at the negotiation stage can be mitigated through the facilitation of a reputable institute, increasing cooperation interests and needs and reducing cooperation standards.


2012 ◽  
Vol 217-219 ◽  
pp. 1561-1566
Author(s):  
Catalin Cioaca ◽  
Ionică Cîrciu ◽  
Eduard Ciudatu

This paper concentrates on the practical applications of game theory in the field of aviation security system. The purpose of this analysis is to demonstrate the use of mathematical device in an interactive decision-making environment in order to analyze real-world problems: terrorism threats. Making the link between game theory and linear programming effectively supports the decision making process in resolving conflict situations that may arise between the attacker aviation system, situations which are characterized by low probability of occurrence and serious consequences. Modeling such phenomena as a result has a systematic and effective risk assessment of such attacks. To demonstrate this approach, two simple examples of a terrorist attack against an airport infrastructure are modeled and analyzed.


2019 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 250-289
Author(s):  
Scott Rosen ◽  
Kelly Horinek ◽  
Alexander Odeh ◽  
Les Servi ◽  
Andreas Tolk

This article evaluates the applicability of game theory within the government acquisition community to provide strategies that move potential vendors into a preferred negotiation point and expedite the decision-making process in acquisition. The research focuses on the application of utility models in support of a game theoretic foundation to provide a means to illuminate better contracting tradeoffs for the government.


Author(s):  
AYELEY P. TCHANGANI

This paper considers the evaluation step in a decision-making process that follows decision-making goals setting, feasible alternatives and attributes or criteria that characterize them determination steps. Evaluation step must establish a model or algorithm to evaluate alternatives taking into account their performances with regard to criteria as well as decision makers or stakeholders preferences. Though this problem is rather a classic one, researches related to evaluation model construction continue to be active to find models that cope with more realities or that fit well how human beings behave in group and proceed when facing the problem of choosing, ranking or sorting alternatives or options. The purpose of this paper is to construct an evaluation model that integrate the performances of alternatives with regard to attributes or criteria and decision makers or agents opinions with regard to the importance to assign to each criterion in order to obtain a value function. As any decision problem is almost always a matter of tradeoff, among attributes characterizing alternatives there will be those acting toward the achievement of decision makers goal (benefit) and those that decision makers would like to reduce as much as possible (cost); we will designate the first ones as positive attributes and the later ones as negative attributes. The process of dividing attributes into positive attributes and negative attributes is beyond the scope of this paper and this partition will be considered as a part of the problem specification. The model is constructed in two steps: firstly, satisfiability (selectability and rejectability) measures or functions are obtained for each alternative using attributes values (positive attributes will contribute to selectability measure whereas negative ones are used in the derivation of rejectability measure) and agents opinions in the framework of satisficing game theory and secondly a value function is built on that measures. Agents opinions with regard to attributes will be expressed locally by weighting them by category (positive/negative).


2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 583-589
Author(s):  
Gholamreza Askari ◽  
Madjid Eshaghi Gordji

In this paper, we provide an interpretation of the rationality in game theory in which player consider the profit or loss of the opponent in addition to personal profit at the game.‎ ‎‎The goal of a game analysis with two hyper-rationality players is to provide insight into real-world situations that are often more complex than a game with two rational players where the choices of strategy are only based on individual preferences. The hyper-rationality does not mean perfect rationality but an insight toward how human decision-makers behave in interactive decisions. ‎‎The findings of this research can help to enlarge our understanding of the psychological aspects of strategy choices in games and also provide an analysis of the decision-making process with cognitive economics approach at the same time.‎ ‎‎‎


Author(s):  
Quentin Commine ◽  
Jérémie Aboiron

The role of the manager, defined by innumerable scientific publications, is only rarely seen through the prism of game theory and its notions of equilibrium allowing decision-makers to optimize situations. The role of the middle-manager, mindful of the human factor and respectful toward his mission shall lead to a virtuous balance, can be defined in game theory as a correlated equilibrium in the sense of the game theorist Robert Aumann. Indeed, this kind of equilibrium goes further than the Nash equilibrium by introducing the notion of a common game and an intermediary embedded in the decision-making process and getting the strategy from his superiors to translate it to his subordinated staff. We use two military historical illustrations to illustrate this concept: the case of the Auftragstaktik refers to Sherman's "march to the sea" while the study of Lee's defeat at Gettysburg refers to the necessity of having capable subordinated staff to maximize an outcome. Throughout this study, we show and formalize the essential role of the middle-manager in the elaboration of effective decisions and processes.


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