scholarly journals Pricing Strategies in Dual-Channel Supply Chain with a Fair Caring Retailer

Complexity ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lufeng Dai ◽  
Xifu Wang ◽  
Xiaoguang Liu ◽  
Lai Wei

Manufacturers add online direct channels that inevitably engage in channel competition with offline retail channels. Since price is an important factor in consumers' choice of purchasing channel, pricing strategy has become a popular topic for research on dual-channel competition and coordination. In contrast to previous research on pricing strategies based on the full rationality of members, we focus on the impact of retailers' fairness concerns on pricing strategies. In this study, the hybrid dual-channel supply chain consists of one manufacturer with a direct channel who acts as the leader and a retailer who acts as the follower. First, we use the Stackelberg game approach to determine the equilibrium pricing strategy for a fair caring retailer. Simultaneously, we consider a centralized dual-channel supply chain as the benchmark for a comparative analysis of the efficiency of a decentralized supply chain. Furthermore, we study pricing strategies when the retailer has fairness concerns and determine the complete equilibrium solutions for different ranges of the parameters representing cross-price sensitivity and fairness. Finally, through numerical experiments, the pricing strategies, the profit and utility of the manufacturer and retailer, and the channel efficiency of the supply chain are compared and analysed for two scenarios. We find that fairness concerns reduce the manufacturer's profits, while for the most part, the retailers’ profit can be improved; however, the supply chain cannot achieve complete coordination.

2013 ◽  
Vol 2013 ◽  
pp. 1-13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qi Xu ◽  
Zheng Liu ◽  
Bin Shen

Recently, price comparison service (PCS) websites are more and more popular due to its features in facilitating transparent price and promoting rational purchase decision. Motivated by the industrial practices, in this study, we examine the pricing strategies of retailers and supplier in a dual-channel supply chain influenced by the signals of PCS. We categorize and discuss three situations according to the signal availability of PCS, under which the optimal pricing strategies are derived. Finally, we conduct a numerical study and find that in fact the retailers and supplier are all more willing to avoid the existence of PCS with the objective of profit maximization. When both of retailers are affected by the PCS, the supplier is more willing to reduce the availability of price information. Important managerial insights are discussed.


2021 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cheng Che ◽  
Yi Chen ◽  
Xiaoguang Zhang ◽  
Liangyan Zhao ◽  
Peng Guo ◽  
...  

As a weapon for economic development, green finance plays an important supporting and promoting role in the economic recovery and transformation of enterprises in the post-epidemic era. By constructing a dual-channel supply chain model, this paper considers two situations in which manufacturers participate in carbon trading and green finance loans, and uses Stackelberg game to study the impact of different situations on participants’ profits and emission reduction decisions. The results show that: under the carbon trading mechanism, the carbon emission reduction level of the manufacturer is inversely proportional to the relevant price, and the demand and profit of the two channels increase with the increase in emission reduction; when carbon trading and green financial loans are carried out at the same time, participants have lower profits, but with the increase in emission reductions, it is still a growing trend.


2019 ◽  
Vol 36 (02) ◽  
pp. 1940004 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaohong Yu ◽  
Sujuan Wang ◽  
Xindong Zhang

We introduce reference dependence to describe the fairness utility functions of channel members and model a dual-channel supply chain (one manufacturer and one retailer) in three scenarios: only the manufacturer is concerned with fairness, only the retailer is concerned with fairness, and both parties are concerned with fairness. The ordering decisions and coordination of a dual-channel supply chain under the online-to-offline (O2O) business model are studied. Nash equilibrium solutions exist for the channel order quantities in all three scenarios, and the inventory transshipment strategy can be used to coordinate the dual-channel supply chain under the O2O business model. Numerical examples are used to analyze the effectiveness and feasibility of coordination. The inventory transshipment strategy can be used to directly coordinate the dual-channel supply chain when only the manufacturer is concerned with fairness. The retailer feels unfair in the other two scenarios, which affects cooperation. To maintain cooperation with the retailer and achieve optimal supply chain efficiency and channel coordination, the manufacturer must compensate the retailer or choose one with fewer expectations regarding its channel status or fewer fairness concerns.


2018 ◽  
Vol 35 (02) ◽  
pp. 1840004 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zheng Liu ◽  
Qi Xu ◽  
Kun Yang

Dual-channel supply chain system, channel optimization is influenced by channel attitude toward risk, in which risk is classified as general risk and interruption risk. To consider lead time may bring out supply conflicts, substitution effect of online channel and ratio of promotional cost are introduced and an independent model is developed. Based on that, the impact of interruption risk under risk-aversion attitude on both channels is further studied. Finally, it is proved how the risk attitude influences pricing and profit strategy.


Author(s):  
Ue-Pyng Wen ◽  
Yun-Chu Chen ◽  
Kam-Hong Cheung

In this article, equal pricing strategies are studied in a dual channel supply chain where a manufacturer sells to a retailer as well as to consumers through a direct channel according to the assumption that the manufacturer commits setting the same retail price as the traditional channel to reduce the channel’s conflict. The authors first analyze the effect of different pricing strategies on the retail price, wholesale price and profits. The cooperative strategy is also studied to see how it benefits both parties in the dual channel supply chain. Finally, through a numerical example, it is demonstrated that providing convenience of the direct channel is important for the manufacturer and service is a distinctive advantage for the retailer. Furthermore, the paper shows that if the service quality has a significant effect on the direct channel, then the manufacturer tends to abandon commitment of equal pricing strategy.


2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xueping Zhen ◽  
Dan Shi ◽  
Sang-Bing Tsai ◽  
Wei Wang

With the rapid development of the Internet, many traditional retailers have built their online channels. The fairness concern may play an important role in a dual-channel supply chain with a multichannel retailer. This paper establishes a Stackelberg game model in which a manufacturer produces and sells products through direct online channel and a retailer sells directly to consumers through online and offline channels. The manufacturer’s fairness concern (advantageous inequity) and the retailer’s fairness concern (disadvantageous inequity) are considered. Four scenarios are investigated: no fairness concern (NF), the retailer fairness concern (RF), the manufacturer fairness concern (MF), and both the manufacturer and the retailer fairness concern (MRF). The theoretical analysis shows that if the manufacturer’s advantageous inequity concern is low, the profit of the whole supply chain in the MRF scenario is the greatest. Otherwise, the supply chain profit in the NF or RF scenario is the greatest. That is, the manufacturer’s and the retailer’s fairness concern may increase the profit of the supply chain. This study also finds that the manufacturer’s advantageous inequity concern can increase the social welfare. The retailer should not concern about fairness if the manufacturer has high fairness concern. Besides, this paper shows that the manufacturer’s selling price cannot be affected by the fairness concern. Adjusting the wholesale price is the only thing that the manufacturer can do to reduce disadvantageous or advantageous inequity. In the RF scenario, the role of the retailer’s disadvantageous inequity concern is to reallocate the supply chain profit. Our findings provide some managerial insights on the pricing decision when the multichannel retailer and the manufacturer consider the fairness.


Author(s):  
Ue-Pyng Wen ◽  
Yun-Chu Chen ◽  
Kam-Hong Cheung

In this article, equal pricing strategies are studied in a dual channel supply chain where a manufacturer sells to a retailer as well as to consumers through a direct channel according to the assumption that the manufacturer commits setting the same retail price as the traditional channel to reduce the channel’s conflict. The authors first analyze the effect of different pricing strategies on the retail price, wholesale price and profits. The cooperative strategy is also studied to see how it benefits both parties in the dual channel supply chain. Finally, through a numerical example, it is demonstrated that providing convenience of the direct channel is important for the manufacturer and service is a distinctive advantage for the retailer. Furthermore, the paper shows that if the service quality has a significant effect on the direct channel, then the manufacturer tends to abandon commitment of equal pricing strategy.


2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Yan-Fei Zhao ◽  
Yong Wang ◽  
Guo-Qiang Shi

With the rapid development of e-commerce, online retailing has become an important part of the market. In order to improve market competitiveness and increase market share, more and more retailers have opened both regular offline channel and online e-tail channel to sell products. Then how to price becomes an urgent problem for upstream manufacturers and dual-channel retailers when there is price competition between regular channel and e-tail channel, especially when consumers have peer-induced fairness concerns. However, linking consumers’ behavioral factors such as fairness concerns to pricing decisions of mixed retail and e-tail channels draws little attention in the literature on supply chain management. This paper incorporates “consumers’ peer-induced fairness concerns” (CPFC) into pricing decisions in a dyadic supply chain, where dual-channel retailer obtains products from manufacturers and then sells products to consumers through both regular channel and e-tail channel. We use game-theoretic models to analyze the equilibrium pricing strategies under the setting with “symmetry consumers’ peer-induced fairness concerns” (SCPFC) and with “asymmetry consumers’ peer-induced fairness concerns” (ACPFC), respectively. Detailed comparisons and numerical analysis are further conducted to examine the impacts of different types of CPFC on equilibrium pricing strategies and profits.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Xuemei Zhang ◽  
Chenhao Ma ◽  
Haoran Chen ◽  
Guohu Qi

This paper investigates a dual-channel supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, where the retailer exhibits vertical and horizontal fairness concerns. The manufacturer or the retailer direct selling and e-commerce platform agency selling modes are employed to characterize the impact of retailer’s fairness concerns on the online channel mode strategy. Results show that the retailer’s fairness concerns only affect the wholesale price and online channel mode strategy. Without the retailer’s fairness concerns, the manufacturer direct selling mode is the best strategy for the manufacturer, which harms the retailer’s utility. With the retailer’s fairness concerns, the manufacturer may choose the manufacturer direct selling or e-commerce platform agency selling mode. When the fairness concern parameters meet a certain range, the e-commerce platform agency selling mode strategy is better for the supply chain members, which can solve the interest conflict between supply chain members. These research findings help dual-channel supply chain members understand how to choose the channel structure strategy to balance the supply chain members’ interests by considering fairness concerns.


Author(s):  
Xue-Mei Zhang ◽  
Ying-Ying Li ◽  
Zhi Liu ◽  
Qian-Wen Li

To study the impact of advertising cooperation on the decisions of dual-channel supply chain, a dual-channel supply chain system consisting of a single manufacturer and a single retailer is considered. The manufacturer can sell products to customers either through a direct marketing channel or through a traditional retail channel. This paper analyses the level of advertising investment and supply chain profits of centralized and decentralized dual-channel supply chains based on a Stackelberg game. Then, the decision models of dual-channel supply chain under different contracts are constructed, and how manufacturers can optimize the profits of both sides through an effective coordination mechanism is analyzed. The research results show that the improved advertising costs and revenue sharing contract can perfectly coordinate the dual-channel supply chain system. Numerical experiments illustrate the impacts of parameters on the optimal decision results.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document