Quality Improvement of Agricultural Products Supply Chain under Social Preference and CSR by Big Data Analysis

Purpose- The aim of this study is to analyze the effect of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and social preference on quality improvement of the agricultural products supply chain composed of agricultural products producer and processor (A3P) and supermarket by theoretical analysis and empirical evidence. Methodology- This paper sets Stackelberg game model under A3P’s CSR by considering supermarket’s altruistic reciprocity and A3P’s fairness conern, respectively. By comparative analysis, we study the effect of CSR, altruistic reciprocity and fairness conern on the quality improvement of the agricultural products supply chain. Then, we adopt the empirical evidence to analyze the correlation between CSR, altruistic reciprocity (fairness concern) and quality improvement and the mediating effect of altruistic reciprocity (fairness concern) by investigating the agricultural enterprises.

Low carbon joint strategy and coordination for a dyadic supply chain with Nash bargaining fairness

<p style='text-indent:20px;'>In the paper, fairness concern criterion is utilized to explore the coordination of a dyadic supply chain with a fairness-concerned retailer (acting as a newsvendor), who is committed to low carbon efforts. Two models are developed for stochastic demand disturbances in the forms of multiplicative case and additive case, respectively. Firstly, the optimal joint decision of the retailer and the supply chain are proposed in two scenarios, i.e., decentralized decision and the centralized decision. Secondly, in order to realize channel coordination, the contract of revenue sharing combined with the mechanism of low-carbon cost sharing is designed. Moreover, the influences of the retailer's fairness concern and bargaining power on the joint decision and the contract parameters are also investigated. Finally, numerical examples are given to illustrate the theoretical results and some suggestions to supply chain management are also provided. The results show that the revenue sharing contract can make the supply chain achieved coordination with the cost sharing mechanism of low-carbon efforts. Furthermore, the optimal low-carbon effort level and ordering quantity decrease in terms of fairness-concerned parameter and Nash bargaining power parameter, which increases in unit cost. However, the optimal pricing makes the opposite change.</p>

The Effect of Fairness Concern on Carbon Emission Reduction and Revenue Distribution in Construction Supply Chain: Power Structure Perspective

This paper invested a two-echelon construction supply chain that consists of a general contractor and a subcontractor. This paper constructs the centralized model and the decentralized models, respectively, and studies the emission reduction and revenue distribution strategies of construction supply chain considering fairness concern and cap-and-trade. Numerical analysis is carried out to analyze the influence of cap-and-trade and fairness concern on the optimal decision and the maximum profit of construction supply chain. This paper shows that, under cap-and-trade policy, the centralized model has the best emission reduction effect and the highest supply chain profit without fairness concern, while the general contractor’s Stackelberg model has the best emission reduction effect and the highest supply chain profit with fairness concern. In the two scenarios, the Vertical Nash model is the most unfavorable to emission reduction, and it will also seriously damage the interests of enterprises. In practice, supply chain should choose the general contractor’s Stackelberg model and avoid the Vertical Nash model. Because fairness concern of the subcontractor will damage the supply chain profits and emission reduction performance, the general contractor shall try to select the subcontractor with lower fairness concern to avoid the loss of profit. Besides, enterprises should actively take measures to reduce fairness concern, such as enterprises signing the contract price confidentiality clause, which aims to reduce fairness concern of the subcontractor. The results of this paper can not only enrich the research content of construction supply chain management, but also provide references for the government to formulate emission reduction policies.

Research on retail channel decisions considering consumer’s fairness concern

Online retailing provides alternative shopping channels, where the retail platform can either let manufacturers directly sell to consumers or open a self-operated channel, or even both. Regardless of sales channels, consumers often pay attention to the income gap between themselves and enterprises (named consumer's fairness concern). In this work, we explore how consumers’ fairness concerns affect the optimal decisions of both manufacturer and retail platform under different retail channel modes (single-channel mode and mixed-channel mode). The results show that consumer’s fairness concern has a negative impact on the retail price under low production cost in single-channel mode, while the retail prices in mix-channel mode are jointly determined by consumer’s fairness concern and revenue sharing ratio. Besides, if the market channel mode has not yet formed, the retail platform can choose either a self-operated channel or manufacturer consignment channel, depending on the consumer’s fairness concern level and revenue sharing ratio. By contrast, if the market channel mode has already been formed, the retail platform should make effort to reduce consumer’s fairness concern if only the self-operated channel exists, while maintain consumer’s fairness concern and revenue sharing ratio at a moderate level if there exist mixed channels.

Quality Improvement Incentive Strategy in Agricultural Products Supply Chain under Social Preference

This paper sets Stackelberg model of bilateral quality efforts decision dominated by supermarket in the agricultural products supply chain by considering fairness concern and altruistic reciprocity. We use backward induction method to compute and prove that A3P’ fairness concern can play the role of profit distribution mechanism in agricultural products supply chain, and has no effect on the bilateral quality efforts decision, total profit of supply chain and objective efficiency, but can improve both the subjective and objective fairness degree. Meanwhile, supermarket’s altruistic reciprocity can improve the total quality efforts and total profit of supply chain, optimize the objective efficiency and subjective fairness of supply chain.

Counteracting store brand introduction by the strategic incorporating of fairness concern behavior

Purpose Responding to the store brand (SB) introduction by the retailer, the manufacturer may adopt the strategic choice of incorporating the fairness concern behavior of the retailer. This paper aims to examine how the manufacturer can counteract the retailer’s SB introduction by strategically choosing to or not to incorporating the retailer’s fairness concern. Design/methodology/approach This paper considers the SB introduction problem in a two-echelon supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer with fairness concern behavior. This paper resolves the pricing strategies under four strategic scenarios regarding fairness concern incorporation and SB introduction and examine the influences from the fairness concern on pricing strategies and profits. This paper further investigates the strategic choice equilibrium of the manufacturer and retailer on fairness concern and SB introduction decision. Findings The results show that the retailer can be better off by the introduction of the SB only when the acceptance degree of the SB is high enough. And whether the manufacturer should incorporate the retailer's fairness concern depends on the consumer's acceptance of the SB: Only when the consumer's acceptance is moderate, the manufacturer is able to counteract the SB by strategically not incorporating the retailer’s fairness concern behavior. Otherwise, the manufacturer cannot prevent the retailer from introducing the SB and can be better off by incorporating the retailer’s fairness concern behavior. Originality/value This paper contributes to the literature by examining whether the manufacturer can adopt the strategic incorporation of the retailer's fairness concern to counteract the retailer's SB introduction.