scholarly journals CCA Secure Public Key Encryption against After-the-Fact Leakage without NIZK Proofs

2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-8
Author(s):  
Yi Zhao ◽  
Kaitai Liang ◽  
Bo Yang ◽  
Liqun Chen
Keyword(s):  
State Model ◽  
Encryption Algorithm ◽  
Public Key ◽  
Public Key Encryption ◽  
Split State ◽  
Leakage Resilient ◽  
Traditional Sense ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Lossy Trapdoor Functions ◽  
Chosen Ciphertext Attack

In leakage resilient cryptography, there is a seemingly inherent restraint on the ability of the adversary that it cannot get access to the leakage oracle after the challenge. Recently, a series of works made a breakthrough to consider a postchallenge leakage. They presented achievable public key encryption (PKE) schemes which are semantically secure against after-the-fact leakage in the split-state model. This model puts a more acceptable constraint on adversary’s ability that the adversary cannot query the leakage of secret states as a whole but the functions of several parts separately instead of prechallenge query only. To obtain security against chosen ciphertext attack (CCA) for PKE schemes against after-the-fact leakage attack (AFL), existing works followed the paradigm of “double encryption” which needs noninteractive zero knowledge (NIZK) proofs in the encryption algorithm. We present an alternative way to achieve AFL-CCA security via lossy trapdoor functions (LTFs) without NIZK proofs. First, we formalize the definition of LTFs secure against AFL (AFLR-LTFs) and all-but-one variants (ABO). Then, we show how to realize this primitive in the split-state model. This primitive can be used to construct AFLR-CCA secure PKE scheme in the same way as the method of “CCA from LTFs” in traditional sense.

Post-Challenge Leakage Resilient Public-Key Cryptosystem in Split State Model

2015 ◽  
Vol E98.A (3) ◽  
pp. 853-862 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eiichiro FUJISAKI ◽  
Akinori KAWACHI ◽  
Ryo NISHIMAKI ◽  
Keisuke TANAKA ◽  
Kenji YASUNAGA
Keyword(s):  
State Model ◽  
Public Key ◽  
Public Key Cryptosystem ◽  
Post Challenge ◽  
Split State ◽  
Leakage Resilient

Updatable Lossy Trapdoor Functions Under Consecutive Leakage

2019 ◽  
Vol 63 (4) ◽  
pp. 648-656
Author(s):  
Meijuan Huang ◽  
Bo Yang ◽  
Mingwu Zhang ◽  
Lina Zhang ◽  
Hongxia Hou
Keyword(s):  
Provable Security ◽  
Public Key ◽  
Encryption Scheme ◽  
Security Model ◽  
Public Key Encryption ◽  
Cryptographic Primitives ◽  
Trapdoor Functions ◽  
Leakage Resilient ◽  
Trapdoor Function ◽  
Lossy Trapdoor Functions

Abstract Lossy trapdoor functions (LTFs), introduced by Peikert and Waters (STOC’08), have already been found to be a very useful tool in constructing complex cryptographic primitives in a black-box manner, such as one-way trapdoor functions, deterministic public-key encryption, CCA-secure public-key encryption, etc. Due to the existence of the side-channel attack, the leakage of trapdoor information in lossy trapdoor function systems can lead to the impossibility of provable security. Recently, Zhang et al. introduced a model of consecutive and continual leakage-resilient and updatable lossy trapdoor functions (ULTFs) and provided a concrete construction to achieve the security. Meanwhile, they proposed a consecutive and continual leakage-resilient public-key encryption scheme. However, in this paper, we demonstrate that the correctness of injective function can not be satisfied. Furthermore, the attacker can easily distinguish the evaluation key of ULTFs generated by the challenger according to the security model. Finally, we show two new constructions based on the continual leakage-resilient public-key encryption scheme of Brakerski et al. (FOCS 2010) and demonstrate the security of our scheme in the consecutive and continual leakage model.

scholarly journals IIBE: An Improved Identity-Based Encryption Algorithm for WSN Security

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-8
Author(s):  
ChunHua Cao ◽  
YaNa Tang ◽  
DeYan Huang ◽  
WeiMin Gan ◽  
Chunjiong Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Encryption Algorithm ◽  
Public Key ◽  
Generation Process ◽  
Key Generation ◽  
Public Key Encryption ◽  
Computing Power ◽  
Identity Based Encryption ◽  
Communication Ability ◽  
Limited Power ◽  
Identity Based

Wireless sensor networks (WSN) have problems such as limited power, weak computing power, poor communication ability, and vulnerability to attack. However, the existing encryption methods cannot effectively solve the above problems when applied to WSN. To this end, according to WSN’s characteristics and based on the identity-based encryption idea, an improved identity-based encryption algorithm (IIBE) is proposed, which can effectively simplify the key generation process, reduce the network traffic, and improve the network security. The design idea of this algorithm lies between the traditional public key encryption and identity-based public tweezers’ encryption. Compared with the traditional public key encryption, the algorithm does not need a public key certificate and avoids the management of the certificate. Compared with identity-based public key encryption, the algorithm addresses the key escrow and key revocation problems. The results of the actual network distribution experiments demonstrate that IIBE has low energy consumption and high security, which are suitable for application in WSN with high requirements on security.

Continual Leakage-Resilient Dynamic Secret Sharing in the Split-State Model

2012 ◽  
pp. 119-130 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hao Xiong ◽  
Cong Zhang ◽  
Tsz Hon Yuen ◽  
Echo P. Zhang ◽  
Siu Ming Yiu ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Secret Sharing ◽  
State Model ◽  
Split State ◽  
Leakage Resilient

Securing Public Key Encryption Against Adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Attacks

2018 ◽  
pp. 134-144
Author(s):  
Kannan Balasubramanian
Keyword(s):  
Partial Information ◽  
Hash Functions ◽  
Public Key ◽  
Public Key Encryption ◽  
Public Key Cryptosystems ◽  
Active Attacks ◽  
Chosen Ciphertext Attack ◽  
Decryption Oracle

To deal with active attacks in public key encryptions, the notion of security against an adaptive chosen ciphertext attack has been defined by Researchers. If an adversary can inject messages into a network, these messages may be ciphertexts, and the adversary may be able to extract partial information about the corresponding cleartexts through its interaction with parties in the network. The Security against chosen ciphertext attack is defined using an “decryption oracle.” Given an encryption of a message the “ciphertext” we want to guarantee that the adversary cannot obtain any partial information about the message. A method of securing Public Key Cryptosystems using hash functions is described in this chapter.

Public-Key Encryption In The Standard Model Against Strong Leakage Adversary

2020 ◽  
Vol 63 (12) ◽  
pp. 1904-1914
Author(s):  
Janaka Alawatugoda
Keyword(s):  
Standard Model ◽  
Building Blocks ◽  
Public Key ◽  
Log P ◽  
Encryption Scheme ◽  
Public Key Encryption ◽  
Security Parameter ◽  
The Standard Model ◽  
Encryption Schemes ◽  
Leakage Resilient

Abstract Over the years, security against adaptively chosen-ciphertext attacks (CCA2) is considered as the strongest security definition for public-key encryption schemes. With the uprise of side-channel attacks, new security definitions are proposed, addressing leakage of secret keys together with the standard CCA2 definition. Among the new security definitions, security against continuous and after-the-fact leakage-resilient CCA2 can be considered as the strongest security definition, which is called as security against (continuous) adaptively chosen-ciphertext leakage attacks (continuous CCLA2). In this paper, we present a construction of a public-key encryption scheme, namely LR-PKE, which satisfies the aforementioned security definition. The security of our public-key encryption scheme is proven in the standard model, under decision BDH assumption. Thus, we emphasize that our public-key encryption scheme LR-PKE is (continuous) CCLA2-secure in the standard model. For our construction of LR-PKE, we have used a strong one-time signature scheme and a leakage-resilient refreshing protocol as underlying building blocks. The leakage bound is $0.15n\log p -1$ bits per leakage query, for a security parameter $k$ and a statistical security parameter $n$, such that $\log p \geq k$ and $n$ is a function of $k$. It is possible to see that LR-PKE is efficient enough to be used for real-world usage.

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