Chakrabarti, Kisor Kumar, Classical Indian Philosophy of Mind. The Nyāaya Dualist Tradition

2002 ◽  
Vol 45 (3) ◽  
pp. 271-273
Author(s):  
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Indian Philosophy ◽  
Classical Indian Philosophy

AbstractNo Abstract

scholarly journals Dreamless Sleep, the Embodied Mind, and Consciousness: The Relevance of a Classical Indian Debate to Cognitive Science

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Evan Thompson
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Neuroscience ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Indian Philosophy ◽  
The Body ◽  
Contemporary Philosophy ◽  
Advaita Vedānta ◽  
Advaita Vedanta ◽  
Classical Indian Philosophy ◽  
Mind Training ◽  
Dreamless Sleep

One of the major debates in classical Indian philosophy concerned whether consciousness is present or absent in dreamless sleep. The philosophical schools of Advaita Vedānta and Yoga maintained that consciousness is present in dreamless sleep, whereas the Nyāya school maintained that it is absent. Consideration of this debate, especially the reasoning used by Advaita Vedānta to rebut the Nyāya view, calls into question the standard neuroscientific way of operationally defining consciousness as “that which disappears in dreamless sleep and reappears when we wake up or dream.” The Indian debate also offers new resources for contemporary philosophy of mind. At the same time, findings from cognitive neuroscience have important implications for Indian debates about cognition during sleep, as well as for Indian and Western philosophical discussions of the self and its relationship to the body. Finally, considerations about sleep drawn from the Indianmaterials suggest that we need a more refined taxonomy of sleep states than that which sleep science currently employs, and that contemplative methods of mind training are relevant for advancing the neurophenomenology of sleep and consciousness.

How Things Are

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Siderits
Keyword(s):  
Prior Knowledge ◽  
Indian Philosophy ◽  
Causal Relation ◽  
Abstract Objects ◽  
Buddhist Tradition ◽  
Common Strategy ◽  
Classical Indian Philosophy ◽  
Recent Debate ◽  
Specialist Knowledge ◽  
The Common

This work is designed to introduce some of the more important fruits of Indian Buddhist metaphysical theorizing to philosophers with little or no prior knowledge of classical Indian philosophy. It is widely known among non-specialists that Buddhists deny the existence of a self. Less widely appreciated among philosophers currently working in metaphysics is the fact that the Indian Buddhist tradition contains a wealth of material on a broad assortment of other issues that have also been foci of recent debate. Indian Buddhist philosophers have argued for a variety of interesting claims about the nature of the causal relation, about persistence, about abstract objects, about the consequences of presentism, about the prospects for a viable ontological emergentism. They engaged in a spirited debate over illusionism in the philosophy of consciousness. Some espoused global anti-realism while others called its coherence into question. And so on. This work is meant to introduce the views of such major Buddhist philosophers as Vasubandhu, Dharmakīrti, and Nāgārjuna on these and other issues. And it presents their arguments and analyses in a manner meant to make them accessible to students of philosophy who lack specialist knowledge of the Indian tradition. Analytic metaphysicians who are interested in moving beyond the common strategy of appealing to the intuitions of “the folk” should find much of interest here.

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