Victim or Villain: Exploring the Possible Bases of a Defence in the Ongwen Case at the International Criminal Court

2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 186-207 ◽  
Author(s):  
Windell Nortje

The reality of child soldiers who join rebel forces once they reach adulthood presents complex legal questions in the face of contemporary international criminal law principles which, on the one hand, afford protection to all children, and on the other, unequivocally call for the prosecution and punishment of those who are guilty of committing serious crimes. Currently, the case of Dominic Ongwen before the icc raises contentious issues, including whether or not international criminal law permits the consideration of factors, such as the impact of the experiences as a child soldier on future conduct, when he is prosecuted for allegedly committing crimes during adulthood. This article specifically examines whether Ongwen’s experiences as a child soldier could serve as a possible defence and/or as a mitigating factor.

Author(s):  
Raphaël van Steenberghe

This chapter analyses the specific features which characterize the sources of international humanitarian law (IHL) and international criminal law (ICL). It first examines those which are claimed to characterize IHL and ICL sources in relation to the secondary norms regulating the classical sources of international law. The chapter then looks at the specific features of some IHL and ICL sources in relation to the others of the same field. Attention is given particularly to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and the impact of its features on other ICL sources, as well as to the commitments made by armed groups, whose characteristics make them difficult to classify under any of the classical sources of international law. In general, this chapter shows how all those specific features derive from the specific fundamental principles and evolving concerns of these two fields of international law.


2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 475-504
Author(s):  
Renée Nicole Souris

In this article, I contribute to the debate between two philosophical traditions—the Kantian and the Aristotelian—on the requirements of criminal responsibility and the grounds for excuse by taking this debate to a new context: international criminal law. After laying out broadly Kantian and Aristotelian conceptions of criminal responsibility, I defend a quasi-Aristotelian conception, which affords a central role to moral development, and especially to the development of moral perception, for international criminal law. I show than an implication of this view is that persons who are substantially and non-culpably limited in their capacity for ordinary moral perception warrant an excuse for engaging in unlawful conduct. I identify a particular set of conditions that trigger this excuse, and then I systematically examine it as applied to the controversial case of former-child-soldier-turned leader of the Lord’s Resistance Army, Dominic Ongwen, who is currently at trial at the International Criminal Court.


2015 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 227-253
Author(s):  
RUPERT ELDERKIN

AbstractInternational criminal law (ICL) developed in large part from international humanitarian law during the mid-to-late twentieth century. The International Criminal Court (ICC), a permanent institution to investigate and prosecute ICL cases finally was established in 2002. Although widely supported, certain states feared that the ICC would diminish national sovereignty. Yet, in formal legal terms, ICL and the ICC’s Rome Statute are just like other branches of public international law in terms of their relationship with national constitutional arrangements. ICL does not challenge states’ primary executive and judicial powers; it does not introduce any general rights for citizens or particularly onerous obligations for states that are already subject to the rule of law; and its intrusion on national sovereignty is only in evidence when a state’s leaders either are responsible for atrocities or are incapable of protecting their citizens from such atrocities. ICL thus is very different from international human rights law (IHRL), which directly impacts national constitutional arrangements. When ICL does come into play, however, arguably it may perform quasi-constitutional functions, in particular offering the only means under public international law to remove state officials from office when they are believed responsible for the most harmful abuses of power.


AJIL Unbound ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 110 ◽  
pp. 234-239
Author(s):  
Kenneth A. Rodman

The International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR) established a number of precedents in international criminal law, as detailed by Darryl Robinson and Gillian MacNeil.1 They also set the template for the International Criminal Court (ICC) and other tribunals as to how politics can both empower and constrain international prosecution and determine its potential contribution to peace.The lesson of the ICTY is that international criminal law can assist peace processes in an ongoing way if powerful states and international institutions complement it with coercive political strategies to weaken regimes or militias led by criminal spoilers to the point where their cooperation is not needed tonegotiate and maintain a peace settlement.The lesson of the ICTR is that the impact of international criminal law on consolidating peace is dependent upon the political agenda of the state on whose territory the crimes oc-curred and whose cooperation is needed for effective prosecution.Therefore, the contribution of prosecution to peace depends on whether the law is embedded in national and international political com-mitments that go beyond compliance with formal legal obligations and over which a tribunal has limited influence.


Author(s):  
Hanna Kuczyńska

This article deals with the model for prosecuting Nazi crimes committed in Poland in the light of the model presently used in international criminal law. It tries to answer the question: should the investigation of crimes of international law be handed over to transnational tribunals? Should they be hybrid tribunals involving a national factor, or completely supra-national tribunals like the International Criminal Court? Is it legitimate to transfer jurisdiction over these matters to national courts? The case of unpunished Nazi crimes in Poland may give a partial answer to this question. Certainly, various attempts made after World War II, including procedures brought before Polish courts, have contributed to understanding the function of international criminal law, and finding the answer to the question of the best model for prosecuting crimes of international law. At present, we also have the experience of international criminal tribunals, in particular the ICC, which is an efficient machine for prosecuting crimes of international law. Interesting conclusions can be drawn from its functioning that could improve the work of Institute of National Remembrance (IPN) prosecutors, and shed new light on the considerations regarding the prosecution of Nazi crimes in Poland after World War II.


Author(s):  
Rahma Yanti

Terrorism is one of transnational crime base on international conventions. One of national crime which consists of transnational aspects. Transnational crime convention only manage about how to run cooperation to eliminate national crime which across country borders. Terrorism hasn’t consider as International crime because there’s no unification about its definition. Terrorism still consider as a sensitive issue in each country related with rass, etnis, culture, religion, and geographical aspects. Terrorism law enforcement proses is each country positive law jurisdiction and not as International Criminal Court jurisdiction based on Rome Statuta.Keywords: Crime, Terrorism, International Criminal Law


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