The Political Economy of Institutional Corruption in Africa: The Case of the 1996–97 Tanzania Coffee Crisis

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-28
Author(s):  
Murrell L. Brooks
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Market Power ◽  
Political Influence ◽  
The Political ◽  
Price Bubble ◽  
Public Resources ◽  
Producer Prices ◽  
Coffee Crisis ◽  
Coffee Price

Abstract This article argues that institutional corruption is the central governance dilemma in Africa by examining the causes, outcome, and origins of the 1996–97 Tanzania coffee crisis. It shows how the growth and crash of a coffee price bubble became a harbinger for defining corruption as historically embedded institutional tendencies and advantages, instead of acts of individual malfeasance. Institutional corruption highlights political gains from the use of public resources in the form of political influence over producer prices, concentrated market power, and centralized policymaking for the wealthy and politically connected, as opposed to personal gains.

The Politics of the Judiciary

2020 ◽  
pp. 206-228
Author(s):  
Mike McConville ◽  
Luke Marsh
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Criminal Justice ◽  
Empirical Data ◽  
Political Influence ◽  
Judicial Independence ◽  
The Political ◽  
Criminal Cases ◽  
State Institutions ◽  
Political Character ◽  
Held Back

A foundational theme of this chapter is the refutation of the generalized claim that judges are ‘independent’ and free from political influence. In reconsidering the institutional realities of judicial independence, it contests the views and theories advanced by leading commentators whom have sought to show that judges are ‘political’, not least Professor J A G Griffith in his seminal, The Politics of the Judiciary. Other theorists considered include Alan Paterson, Robert Stevens, David Robertson, and Harry Annison. The chapter critically reviews the strengths and weaknesses of such theories and demonstrates instead how the ‘political’ character of judges may be explicated by empirical data drawn from internal governmental files rather than previously favoured methodologies. Contrary to these widely adopted accounts, this chapter posits that throughout the last century, a cadre of senior judges in criminal cases have been overtly political in a way previously not understood. Senior judges, it is argued, have had a dynamic involvement in building state institutions and state ideology: working in secret with the executive in formulating policing policies, initiating far-reaching change in the political economy of criminal justice, and setting the agenda for successive legislative interventions, underpinned by a state bias, having held back rights for suspects and defendants and commandeered the process of subjugating the Bar.

The Political Economy of Trade Policy

1989 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
pp. 119-135 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert E Baldwin
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
International Trade ◽  
Trade Policy ◽  
Machine Tools ◽  
Political Influence ◽  
The Other ◽  
The Political ◽  
Public Officials ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Social Concerns

International trade seems to be a subject where the advice of economists is routinely disregarded. Economists are nearly unanimous in their general opposition to protectionism, but the increase in U.S. protection in recent years in such sectors as automobiles, steel, textiles and apparel, machine tools, footwear and semiconductors demonstrates that economists lack political influence on trade policy. Two broad approaches have been developed to analyze the political economics of trade policy and the processes that generate protectionism. One approach emphasizes the economic self-interest of the political participants, while the other stresses the importance of the broad social concerns of voters and public officials. This paper outlines the nature of the two approaches, indicating how they can explain the above anomalies and other trade policy behavior, and concludes with observations about integrating the two frameworks, conducting further research, and making policy based on the analysis.

The Second Dominant Proprietary Class

2020 ◽  
pp. 137-156
Author(s):  
John Harriss
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
The Political ◽  
Agricultural Economy ◽  
Big Business ◽  
Public Resources ◽  
Political Economy Of Development ◽  
The Rich ◽  
Public Demonstrations

At around the time that The Political Economy of Development in India (PEDI) was first published in 1984 the rich farmers of India had begun exercising the power of their numbers in massive public demonstrations. A few years later the influence of rich farmers seemed to be on the wane. This chapter considers the trajectory of agrarian politics over the last thirty years. While a narrow alliance between state and big business increasingly appears to determine the pattern of Indian development, these dominant partners have still had to make compromises with rural interests for electoral reasons. Yet the capture of public resources by wealthy farmers comes at the expense of the agricultural economy as a whole.

From Sherry to Spanish White

Creating Wine ◽  
2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Simpson
Keyword(s):  
Nineteenth Century ◽  
Organizational Change ◽  
Market Power ◽  
Political Influence ◽  
International Markets ◽  
The Political ◽  
Rapid Drop

This chapter shows the nature and limits of organizational change in the production and sale of sherry over the nineteenth century. Despite an apparent flexibility in responding to increased demand in international markets, a decline in the reputation of sherry caused a rapid drop in sales, as merchants in Jerez and especially Britain sold adulterated and cheap imitation wines. Although there was much talk about protecting the name of sherry in Jerez, this proved difficult because of the diversity of interests within the producing region itself. The big export houses responded to weaker demand for their fine sherries by moving down-market to achieve volume. While the political influence of small growers in France allowed them to capture market power from the merchants by establishing regional appellations and cooperatives, this did not happen in Jerez.

The political economy of transport and travel

2019 ◽  
pp. 29-54
Author(s):  
Iain Docherty ◽  
Jon Shaw ◽  
David Waite
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
The Political ◽  
Policy Environment ◽  
Public Resources ◽  
Do So

In the chapter we focus on why we spend money on some things and not on others, and why this matters. Our point is that transport investment can create both winners and losers, and it is important to be open and honest about this, and fully aware of the consequences, before committing public resources. Failing to do so runs the risk of perpetuating existing inequalities in a policy environment where a) there is already plenty of inequality and b) public resources for investment are scarce.

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