Defining Genocide

2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (1-4) ◽  
pp. 149-169
Author(s):  
Melanie O’Brien

This article traces the historical development of the term “genocide” and discusses how it evolved from a post-World War II concept into a key component of international criminal law. Dr. O’Brien outlines some of the legal challenges that attend several of the key terms in the generally accepted definition of genocide: ‘destroy’, ‘in part’, ‘groups’, ‘intent’, and so on. She then concludes with an important and politically nuanced point essential to understanding the politics and afterlife of the Rwanda genocide – the weight of the “g” word.

Author(s):  
Hanna Kuczyńska

This article deals with the model for prosecuting Nazi crimes committed in Poland in the light of the model presently used in international criminal law. It tries to answer the question: should the investigation of crimes of international law be handed over to transnational tribunals? Should they be hybrid tribunals involving a national factor, or completely supra-national tribunals like the International Criminal Court? Is it legitimate to transfer jurisdiction over these matters to national courts? The case of unpunished Nazi crimes in Poland may give a partial answer to this question. Certainly, various attempts made after World War II, including procedures brought before Polish courts, have contributed to understanding the function of international criminal law, and finding the answer to the question of the best model for prosecuting crimes of international law. At present, we also have the experience of international criminal tribunals, in particular the ICC, which is an efficient machine for prosecuting crimes of international law. Interesting conclusions can be drawn from its functioning that could improve the work of Institute of National Remembrance (IPN) prosecutors, and shed new light on the considerations regarding the prosecution of Nazi crimes in Poland after World War II.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-91
Author(s):  
Michael Lysander Fremuth

The establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 1998 constitutes a landmark in the development of International Criminal Law (ICL), which gained its first momentum after World War II through the foundation of International Military Tribunals in Nuremberg and Tokyo. ICL is, however, not confined to these most prominent courts or their statutes providing for definitions of international crimes under their respective jurisdiction; rather, ad hoc international, or internationalized and hybrid special tribunals and criminal chambers also contribute to the development and shape of ICL and reflect its diverse legal and institutional basis. Perceived as another tribunal of “international character,” on August 18, 2020, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) pronounced its judgment on the merits in the Ayyash case. The long-awaited verdict raises the question of the Tribunal's contribution to the further evolution of ICL.


2016 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 393-485 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ziv Bohrer

At the close of World War II (WWII), Winston Churchill suggested summarily executing the remaining Nazi leadership. Franklin Delano Roosevelt disagreed, insisting on prosecuting them in an international military tribunal. This is considered the “birth” of International Criminal Law (ICL), following a consensus that “[t]he Nazi atrocities gave rise to the idea that some crimes are so grave as to concern the international community as a whole.” A few earlier instances of penal action against violators of the laws of war are acknowledged, but they are dismissed as unrelated to current ICL, because (presumably) these cases are sporadic domestic legal actions that lack a common doctrine.


2015 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 485-516
Author(s):  
Carola Lingaas

The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court contains the term ‘racial’ in its provisions on the crime of genocide, persecution and apartheid. However, it fails to provide for a definition of this historically burdened term. International criminal law is guided by the principle of legality and legal norms should be as narrowly defined as possible. This article will therefore attempt to provide a contemporary legal definition of ‘racial’. The article contains an overview of the historical development, the treatment of the issue of ‘race’ by anthropology and human rights, before turning to international criminal law. Cases dealt with by the ictr and the icty on ‘racial groups’ with regard to the crime of genocide will be analysed and categorised. The article concludes with a suggestion to juxtapose racial groups with ethnical groups, based on the perception of the perpetrator or the self-perception of the victims (subjective approach).


2021 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 82-94
Author(s):  
Muyiwa Adigun

The principle of complementarity is one of the most important concepts in international criminal law as it defines the relationship between international criminal tribunals and domestic courts. Certain claims have been made in respect of this concept thus this study examines the correctness of the claims made. The study finds that the concept is claimed to have originated from the sciences and that its expression in international criminal law has taken a distinctive form different from that in the sciences, that it is traceable to the First World War and that there are at least about four categories of the concept. The study, however, argues that while the concept originated from the sciences, its expression in international criminal law is no different from that in the sciences, that it is traceable to the trial of Peter von Hagenbach in 1474 (the Breisach Trial) and that there are at least five categories of the concept. The study therefore concludes that the claims made are incorrect.


2015 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 953-975 ◽  
Author(s):  
ATHANASIOS CHOULIARAS

AbstractThe article focuses on one of the most intriguing and, at the same time, controversial issues of international criminal law: whether the state policy requirement should be considered as a constitutive element in core international crimes. Adopting a criminal policy perspective, my intention is to contribute to the ongoing discussion by offering a doctrinal and criminological corroboration of the position that answers in the affirmative. Nevertheless, I am not necessarily promoting a normative choice entailing the amendment of the definition of core international crimes, but I rather call for a policy choice of focusing on cases that presume a state policy component.


2019 ◽  

The volume contains nine case studies on the recent history of transnational criminal law, having emerged from current international research projects. The papers cover cross-border political crime and security threats, extradition and expulsion, police cooperation and international expert discussions on social crime and torture. The focus is less on event-historical phenomena, but on transnational legal-political interactions of different actors. The contributions thus analyze the historical development of transnational criminal law as a form of temporally, spatially and legally limited criminal law and security regimes. As a result, the volume shows that the investigated transnationalization of criminal law in the 19th and 20th centuries did not lead to a cohesive normative order, thus offering legal-historical interpretations of current problems of international criminal law.


2015 ◽  
Vol 84 (3) ◽  
pp. 482-514 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michelle Farrell

The prohibition on torture in international human rights law seems a fairly straightforward candidate for productive use in international criminal law. The Convention against Torture contains an elaborate definition of torture and human rights institutions have developed substantial jurisprudence on the prohibition and definition of torture. Indeed, the ad hoc Tribunals and the drafters of the Rome Statute have employed the human rights law approach to torture to varying degrees. But the conception of torture reached by human rights bodies is problematic and unsuitable for usage where individual criminal responsibility is sought. It is unsuitable because the human rights law understanding of torture is subjective and victim-derived. Human rights bodies do not scrutinize intent, purpose and perpetration, central aspects of international criminal legal reasoning. The communication on torture between these bodies of law to date shows that cross-fertilisation, without detailed reasoning, is inappropriate - because rights are different to crimes.


2007 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 841-849 ◽  
Author(s):  
ANTONIO CASSESE

The essay argues that the absence of an international treaty definition of aggression in international law should not preclude the prosecution of its perpetrators. Two legal regimes of responsibility, namely the prohibition against aggression as an international wrongful act and the crime of aggression have been entangled. Once one separates the criminal liability of individuals from state responsibility, a definition of the crime of aggression can be seen. According to the author, the contours of such a new definition contain the requisite degree of certainty for judicial approaches instead of merely political approaches. Consideration is also given as to whether conspiracy to wage a war of aggression may also be regarded as a separate crime within international criminal law.


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