Does International Law Need a Conscience? Evaluating the India–South Africa Proposal to Suspend TRIPS Obligations and the COVID-19 Vaccines

2021 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 141-152
Author(s):  
Dilan Thampapillai ◽  
Sam Wall

Abstract There is undoubtedly a consensus within the international community that ‘vaccine nationalism’ is an undesirable state of affairs. However, states are self-interested actors and in the absence of constraints imposed by international economic law this pursuit of rational self-interest is likely to result in an outcome that is unjust on a global scale. The recent proposal by India and South Africa to suspend TRIPS obligations for the duration of the COVID-19 pandemic has been rejected within the WTO. This proposal constitutes a recognition of the inadequacies surrounding the TRIPS compulsory licensing scheme. Yet, the immersion of intellectual property law within international investment law together with the proliferation of free trade agreements containing TRIPS-plus obligations would likely have made such a proposal unworkable. We argue that the fundamental problem is that the TRIPS Agreement lacks a defined concept of conscience that governs both its operation and interpretation. Such a principle exists in the common law within the field of private law. The principle, in its various doctrinal iterations, navigates the tensions between different parties while serving an underlying purpose of justice within the common law. It has much to offer international intellectual property law.

Author(s):  
Shyamkrishna Balganesh

Intellectual property law remains a body of private law, but for reasons that transcend its reliance on ideas and concepts from the common law of property and tort. This essay argues that the connection between forms of intellectual property law and private law is rooted in a form of autonomy that characterizes private law regimes—known as “redressive autonomy.” It shows how a strong commitment to redressive autonomy undergirds the unique right–duty structure of intellectual property, informs intellectual property’s central doctrines, and injects an additional layer of normative complexity into its functioning.


2020 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Ali Mohammed Khalaf al-Fatlawi

Abstract Historically, Iraqi law has followed the Latin approach in the ambit of civil law, while English law is the creator of the ‘common law approach’. This has had an effect on the Iraqi doctrine for the protection of works in the field of intellectual property law. Therefore, Iraqi author rights have followed French law which grants authors many, in particular moral, rights on their works whilst English law restricts the rights of the author in kind of the moral rights. However, both laws grant authors important ‘paternity rights’ that prevent anyone from using a work without first receiving license from the author. Due to its importance in both laws, this article will try to explain paternity rights and its differences in Iraqi and English laws. This article will examine the scope paternity rights under both systems of law.


property is form of property means that what you have learnt abut property law will be of some use in this area too. Property can be divided into several different categories. There is tangible property and there is intangible: there is real property (land) and there is personal property: and there are choses in possession and choses in action. Intellectual property is a species of chose in action. It is recoverable by the owner by action. It can be owned but not possessed. However, it can be stolen: the definition of property in the Theft Act 1968 is broad enough to embrace intellectual property, though the sort of act that amounts to an infringement lacks the actus reus of theft. In fact, patents are not strictly speaking choses in action. Section 30(1) and Schedule 2 of the Patents Act 1977 reverse the common law position (see Re Heath’s Patent (1912) 56 Sol Jo 538 and Edwards and Co v Picard [1909] 2 KB 903, 905 (CA), per Vaughan Williams LJ and, on future patent rights, see Printing and Numerical Registering Co v Sampson (1875) LR 19 Eq 462) and declare that patents are not choses in action. Sir Raymond Evershed, the then Master of the Rolls, stated in 1952: ‘An English patent is a species of English property of the nature of a chose in action and peculiar in character’, British Nylon Spinners Ltd v ICI Ltd [1953] Ch 19, 26 [1952] 2 All ER 780, 783, CA, cited in the substantive hearing of the same case [1955] Ch 37, 51, [1954] 3 All ER 88, 91. See also Beecham Group plc v Gist-Brocades NV [1986] 1 WLR 51, 59, HL, per Lord Diplock. Copyright has also been expressly stated by the courts to be a chose in action. See Chaplin v Leslie Frewin (Publishers) Ltd [1966] Ch 71, [1965] 3 All ER 764, CA; Patterson Zochonis and Co Ltd v Mefarkin Packaging Ltd [1986] 3 All ER 522 (CA); Cambell Connolly & Co Ltd v Noble [1963] 1 All ER 237, [1963] 1 WLR 252. And as a leading text of its era said:


Author(s):  
Mark J. Davison ◽  
Ann L. Monotti ◽  
Leanne Wiseman

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