Intellectual Property Law and Redressive Autonomy

Author(s):  
Shyamkrishna Balganesh

Intellectual property law remains a body of private law, but for reasons that transcend its reliance on ideas and concepts from the common law of property and tort. This essay argues that the connection between forms of intellectual property law and private law is rooted in a form of autonomy that characterizes private law regimes—known as “redressive autonomy.” It shows how a strong commitment to redressive autonomy undergirds the unique right–duty structure of intellectual property, informs intellectual property’s central doctrines, and injects an additional layer of normative complexity into its functioning.

2021 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 141-152
Author(s):  
Dilan Thampapillai ◽  
Sam Wall

Abstract There is undoubtedly a consensus within the international community that ‘vaccine nationalism’ is an undesirable state of affairs. However, states are self-interested actors and in the absence of constraints imposed by international economic law this pursuit of rational self-interest is likely to result in an outcome that is unjust on a global scale. The recent proposal by India and South Africa to suspend TRIPS obligations for the duration of the COVID-19 pandemic has been rejected within the WTO. This proposal constitutes a recognition of the inadequacies surrounding the TRIPS compulsory licensing scheme. Yet, the immersion of intellectual property law within international investment law together with the proliferation of free trade agreements containing TRIPS-plus obligations would likely have made such a proposal unworkable. We argue that the fundamental problem is that the TRIPS Agreement lacks a defined concept of conscience that governs both its operation and interpretation. Such a principle exists in the common law within the field of private law. The principle, in its various doctrinal iterations, navigates the tensions between different parties while serving an underlying purpose of justice within the common law. It has much to offer international intellectual property law.


2020 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Ali Mohammed Khalaf al-Fatlawi

Abstract Historically, Iraqi law has followed the Latin approach in the ambit of civil law, while English law is the creator of the ‘common law approach’. This has had an effect on the Iraqi doctrine for the protection of works in the field of intellectual property law. Therefore, Iraqi author rights have followed French law which grants authors many, in particular moral, rights on their works whilst English law restricts the rights of the author in kind of the moral rights. However, both laws grant authors important ‘paternity rights’ that prevent anyone from using a work without first receiving license from the author. Due to its importance in both laws, this article will try to explain paternity rights and its differences in Iraqi and English laws. This article will examine the scope paternity rights under both systems of law.


Author(s):  
Molly Shaffer Van Houweling

This chapter studies intellectual property (IP). A hallmark of the New Private Law (NPL) is attentiveness to and appreciation of legal concepts and categories, including the traditional categories of the common law. These categories can sometimes usefully be deployed outside of the traditional common law, to characterize, conceptualize, and critique other bodies of law. For scholars interested in IP, for example, common law categories can be used to describe patent, copyright, trademark, and other fields of IP as more or less “property-like” or “tort-like.” Thischapter investigates both the property- and tort-like features of IP to understand the circumstances under which one set of features tends to dominate and why. It surveys several doctrines within the law of copyright that demonstrate how courts move along the property/tort continuum depending on the nature of the copyrighted work at issue—including, in particular, how well the work’s protected contours are defined. This conceptual navigation is familiar, echoing how common law courts have moved along the property/tort continuum to address disputes over distinctive types of tangible resources.


property is form of property means that what you have learnt abut property law will be of some use in this area too. Property can be divided into several different categories. There is tangible property and there is intangible: there is real property (land) and there is personal property: and there are choses in possession and choses in action. Intellectual property is a species of chose in action. It is recoverable by the owner by action. It can be owned but not possessed. However, it can be stolen: the definition of property in the Theft Act 1968 is broad enough to embrace intellectual property, though the sort of act that amounts to an infringement lacks the actus reus of theft. In fact, patents are not strictly speaking choses in action. Section 30(1) and Schedule 2 of the Patents Act 1977 reverse the common law position (see Re Heath’s Patent (1912) 56 Sol Jo 538 and Edwards and Co v Picard [1909] 2 KB 903, 905 (CA), per Vaughan Williams LJ and, on future patent rights, see Printing and Numerical Registering Co v Sampson (1875) LR 19 Eq 462) and declare that patents are not choses in action. Sir Raymond Evershed, the then Master of the Rolls, stated in 1952: ‘An English patent is a species of English property of the nature of a chose in action and peculiar in character’, British Nylon Spinners Ltd v ICI Ltd [1953] Ch 19, 26 [1952] 2 All ER 780, 783, CA, cited in the substantive hearing of the same case [1955] Ch 37, 51, [1954] 3 All ER 88, 91. See also Beecham Group plc v Gist-Brocades NV [1986] 1 WLR 51, 59, HL, per Lord Diplock. Copyright has also been expressly stated by the courts to be a chose in action. See Chaplin v Leslie Frewin (Publishers) Ltd [1966] Ch 71, [1965] 3 All ER 764, CA; Patterson Zochonis and Co Ltd v Mefarkin Packaging Ltd [1986] 3 All ER 522 (CA); Cambell Connolly & Co Ltd v Noble [1963] 1 All ER 237, [1963] 1 WLR 252. And as a leading text of its era said:


2013 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 115-136
Author(s):  
Peter Jaffey

The theory of unjust enrichment – the theory supporting the recognition of a doctrinal category of unjust enrichment – has been accepted across much of the common law world. The recognition of a doctrinal category is not just a matter of presentation. It has a role in legal reasoning that reflects the fact that it is based on a particular principle or distinct justification for a claim. The theory of unjust enrichment is misguided because there is no principle or distinct justification common to the various claims that have been gathered together to form the new category. The theory has appeared attractive, it would seem, not because a plausible version of the principle of unjust enrichment has been identified, but because it has appeared impossible to explain these various claims in any other way, in particular as claims in property or contract. This difficulty has arisen, it is suggested, largely as a result of a mistaken analysis of primary and remedial rights. The article explores these issues with respect to contract law and property law.


2005 ◽  
Vol 22 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 723-784
Author(s):  
Denyse Guay-Archambault

The English origin of the law in the Common law jurisdictions in Canada makes it mandatory to study common law and English statutory law. It is through those that we can follow the development of a family property law in English Canada. Starting from an individualistic view of the spouses' property, we shall witness the emergence of the idea of « family assets » which has been « enshrined » in recent legislation. The law of Québec has evolved differently. Though of Trench origin, it has not kept as near its mother-country as its neighbour's has done with English law. Turthermore, due to its civilian character, its principles of private law are to be found in the Civil Code. This favours a different approach. That is why we will generally confine our study to those rules which are to be found in the Code civil du Bas-Canada and to the newly adopted Code civil du Québec. We will see what has become of the original community of property and compare the present law of Québec with recent legislation in English Canada.


Author(s):  
Mark J. Davison ◽  
Ann L. Monotti ◽  
Leanne Wiseman

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