property is form of property means that what you have learnt abut property law will be of some use in this area too. Property can be divided into several different categories. There is tangible property and there is intangible: there is real property (land) and there is personal property: and there are choses in possession and choses in action. Intellectual property is a species of chose in action. It is recoverable by the owner by action. It can be owned but not possessed. However, it can be stolen: the definition of property in the Theft Act 1968 is broad enough to embrace intellectual property, though the sort of act that amounts to an infringement lacks the actus reus of theft. In fact, patents are not strictly speaking choses in action. Section 30(1) and Schedule 2 of the Patents Act 1977 reverse the common law position (see Re Heath’s Patent (1912) 56 Sol Jo 538 and Edwards and Co v Picard [1909] 2 KB 903, 905 (CA), per Vaughan Williams LJ and, on future patent rights, see Printing and Numerical Registering Co v Sampson (1875) LR 19 Eq 462) and declare that patents are not choses in action. Sir Raymond Evershed, the then Master of the Rolls, stated in 1952: ‘An English patent is a species of English property of the nature of a chose in action and peculiar in character’, British Nylon Spinners Ltd v ICI Ltd [1953] Ch 19, 26 [1952] 2 All ER 780, 783, CA, cited in the substantive hearing of the same case [1955] Ch 37, 51, [1954] 3 All ER 88, 91. See also Beecham Group plc v Gist-Brocades NV [1986] 1 WLR 51, 59, HL, per Lord Diplock. Copyright has also been expressly stated by the courts to be a chose in action. See Chaplin v Leslie Frewin (Publishers) Ltd [1966] Ch 71, [1965] 3 All ER 764, CA; Patterson Zochonis and Co Ltd v Mefarkin Packaging Ltd [1986] 3 All ER 522 (CA); Cambell Connolly & Co Ltd v Noble [1963] 1 All ER 237, [1963] 1 WLR 252. And as a leading text of its era said:

1997 ◽  
pp. 57-57
Keyword(s):  
Intellectual Property ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Property Law ◽  
Real Property ◽  
Personal Property ◽  
Patent Rights ◽  
Actus Reus ◽  
The Common ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Vaughan Williams

Intellectual Property Law and Redressive Autonomy

2020 ◽  
pp. 161-186
Author(s):  
Shyamkrishna Balganesh
Keyword(s):  
Intellectual Property ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Property Law ◽  
Private Law ◽  
Intellectual Property Law ◽  
Additional Layer ◽  
The Common ◽  
Strong Commitment

Intellectual property law remains a body of private law, but for reasons that transcend its reliance on ideas and concepts from the common law of property and tort. This essay argues that the connection between forms of intellectual property law and private law is rooted in a form of autonomy that characterizes private law regimes—known as “redressive autonomy.” It shows how a strong commitment to redressive autonomy undergirds the unique right–duty structure of intellectual property, informs intellectual property’s central doctrines, and injects an additional layer of normative complexity into its functioning.

Mandatory Family Protection in the Common Law Tradition

2020 ◽  
pp. 707-739
Author(s):  
Kenneth G C Reid
Keyword(s):  
New Zealand ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Early Modern Period ◽  
The United States ◽  
Judicial Discretion ◽  
Real Property ◽  
Personal Property ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Republic ◽  
Close Family

In medieval English law, widows were entitled to dower and widowers to curtesy, both being life interests in the deceased’s real property. In addition, the personal property of the deceased was divided according to a tripartite system, with surviving spouse and children being entitled to one-third each and only the final third being available for disposal by will. The tripartite system was abandoned in the early modern period though it survives still in Scotland. But dower and curtesy remained and were exported to the British Empire. In the United States they had a rich future, developing into the fixed ‘elective share’ of the deceased’s estate which is available, in many states, for the surviving spouse. Elsewhere, dower and curtesy faded away during the nineteenth century giving rise to almost complete freedom of testation. This freedom was, however, short-lived. In 1900, New Zealand, having considered but rejected the tripartite system of fixed shares still used in Scotland, introduced a discretionary ‘family provision’ by which courts could make awards to close family members. The New Zealand model was soon copied throughout Australia, in the common law provinces of Canada, and, in 1938, in England and Wales itself. The chapter considers the reasons for the abandonment of freedom of testation, and examines the debate in New Zealand, England, and the Republic of Ireland as to whether family protection was best achieved by a system of fixed shares, as in Scotland, or by a system involving judicial discretion.

scholarly journals The Oregon Donation Act of 1850 and Nineteenth Century Federal Married Women's Property Law

1984 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 44-78
Author(s):  
Richard H. Chused
Keyword(s):  
Nineteenth Century ◽  
Public Service ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Property Law ◽  
Real Property ◽  
Personal Property ◽  
Family Economy ◽  
The Family ◽  
Education Of Women ◽  
Service Groups

Almost every state and territory adopted a married women's property act between 1835 and 1850. These acts generally exempted married women's property from attachment by creditors of their husbands, effecting a slight change in the battery of common-law coverture rules that gave husbands management of their wives' real property and ownership of their personal property. Alterations in the roles of women in the family, increases in education of women and growth in the importance of women's public service groups provided an environment sympathetic to initial reforms in married women's property law. In addition, economic panics and depressions affected the family economy, providing an incentive for adoption of rules exempting married women's property from the claims of their husbands' creditors.

The Heiress-at-Law: English Real Property Law from a New Point of View

1990 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 273-296 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eileen Spring
Keyword(s):  
Thirteenth Century ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Property Law ◽  
Main Subject ◽  
Real Property ◽  
Long Run ◽  
The Family ◽  
The Common

By the common law rules of inheritance women in English landed society fell into two classes. Some were altogether excluded from inheriting; others were entitled to succeed to the family estate. The woman thus entitled, the heiress-at-law, is clearly a figure due historical attention. Yet she has never been singled out for long-term consideration. Where she has been the main subject, discussion has always been chronologically limited, and her history has not been carried any distance through the course of legal changes that are relevant to it. Usually she has been discussed as but part of the family, and attention has been focussed largely on eldest sons and their relations with younger children, with younger sons or with daughters not heiresses, as the case may be. To focus on the heiress and to follow her history over the long run, from the thirteenth century to the eighteenth, is the purpose of this article.

Does International Law Need a Conscience? Evaluating the India–South Africa Proposal to Suspend TRIPS Obligations and the COVID-19 Vaccines

2021 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 141-152
Author(s):  
Dilan Thampapillai ◽  
Sam Wall
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
Intellectual Property ◽  
Fundamental Problem ◽  
Common Law ◽  
International Investment ◽  
Global Scale ◽  
Property Law ◽  
Intellectual Property Law ◽  
International Investment Law ◽  
The Common

Abstract There is undoubtedly a consensus within the international community that ‘vaccine nationalism’ is an undesirable state of affairs. However, states are self-interested actors and in the absence of constraints imposed by international economic law this pursuit of rational self-interest is likely to result in an outcome that is unjust on a global scale. The recent proposal by India and South Africa to suspend TRIPS obligations for the duration of the COVID-19 pandemic has been rejected within the WTO. This proposal constitutes a recognition of the inadequacies surrounding the TRIPS compulsory licensing scheme. Yet, the immersion of intellectual property law within international investment law together with the proliferation of free trade agreements containing TRIPS-plus obligations would likely have made such a proposal unworkable. We argue that the fundamental problem is that the TRIPS Agreement lacks a defined concept of conscience that governs both its operation and interpretation. Such a principle exists in the common law within the field of private law. The principle, in its various doctrinal iterations, navigates the tensions between different parties while serving an underlying purpose of justice within the common law. It has much to offer international intellectual property law.

Paternity Rights of Authors under Iraqi and English Law: A Comparative Study in the Field of Copyright and Author Rights

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Ali Mohammed Khalaf al-Fatlawi
Keyword(s):  
Intellectual Property ◽  
Comparative Study ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Civil Law ◽  
Moral Rights ◽  
Property Law ◽  
French Law ◽  
Intellectual Property Law ◽  
The Common ◽  
English Law

Abstract Historically, Iraqi law has followed the Latin approach in the ambit of civil law, while English law is the creator of the ‘common law approach’. This has had an effect on the Iraqi doctrine for the protection of works in the field of intellectual property law. Therefore, Iraqi author rights have followed French law which grants authors many, in particular moral, rights on their works whilst English law restricts the rights of the author in kind of the moral rights. However, both laws grant authors important ‘paternity rights’ that prevent anyone from using a work without first receiving license from the author. Due to its importance in both laws, this article will try to explain paternity rights and its differences in Iraqi and English laws. This article will examine the scope paternity rights under both systems of law.

The New Private Law and Intellectual Property

2020 ◽  
pp. 408-426
Author(s):  
Molly Shaffer Van Houweling
Keyword(s):  
Intellectual Property ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Private Law ◽  
Concepts And Categories ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law ◽  
Law Courts ◽  
Legal Concepts

This chapter studies intellectual property (IP). A hallmark of the New Private Law (NPL) is attentiveness to and appreciation of legal concepts and categories, including the traditional categories of the common law. These categories can sometimes usefully be deployed outside of the traditional common law, to characterize, conceptualize, and critique other bodies of law. For scholars interested in IP, for example, common law categories can be used to describe patent, copyright, trademark, and other fields of IP as more or less “property-like” or “tort-like.” Thischapter investigates both the property- and tort-like features of IP to understand the circumstances under which one set of features tends to dominate and why. It surveys several doctrines within the law of copyright that demonstrate how courts move along the property/tort continuum depending on the nature of the copyrighted work at issue—including, in particular, how well the work’s protected contours are defined. This conceptual navigation is familiar, echoing how common law courts have moved along the property/tort continuum to address disputes over distinctive types of tangible resources.

scholarly journals GOOD FAITH IN FRANCHISE CONTRACT

2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (19) ◽  
pp. 118-127
Author(s):  
Nurli Yaacob ◽  
Nasri Naiimi
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Good Faith ◽  
Relational Contracts ◽  
Law System ◽  
Freedom Of Contract ◽  
Term Contract ◽  
The Common ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
The Right

Good faith has been defined as justice, fairness, reasonableness, decency, taking no chances, and so on. The concept of good faith has long been rooted in contract law under the jurisdiction of Civil law, although the definition of it is still debated until today. However, the view of the Common Law tradition does not recognize the concept of good faith as long as the contract is entered into with the freedom of contract and both parties abide by the terms of the contract. Given that a franchise contract involves a long-term contract and always been developed, it is impossible to define both rights and responsibilities base on express terms only. As such, the franchise contract gives the franchisor the right to exercise its discretion in executing the contract. It is in this context that the element of good faith is very important to ensure that the franchisor does not take advantage of the franchisee and that the business continues to prosper. Therefore, the objective of this article is to discuss the concept of good faith in a franchise contract. The findings show that the common law system that initially rejected the application of the concept of good faith also changed its approach and began to recognize the concept of good faith as it is very important for relational contracts such as franchise contracts.

Introduction

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Wendell Bird
Keyword(s):  
First Amendment ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Freedom Of The Press ◽  
Bill Of Rights ◽  
James Madison ◽  
Broad Definition ◽  
The Press ◽  
Narrow Definition ◽  
The Common ◽  
Definition Of

The “father of the Bill of Rights,” James Madison, described the unqualified words protecting freedoms of speech and press as embodying a broad definition rather than a narrow definition of those liberties. Upon offering those provisions, he said that “freedom of the press and rights of conscience . . . are unguarded in the British constitution,” including the common law, and that “every government should be disarmed of powers which trench upon those particular rights.” In Madison’s draft and in the final First Amendment, each clause was worded to modify or to reject the English common law on point in order to provide for far greater protection of individual liberties; no clause was worded with the restrictions that the common law imposed. Was Madison right? Are freedoms of press and speech in the First Amendment broad or narrow protections?

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