Corporate Group Structures and the Limits of Personal Jurisdiction. us/European Comparative Remarks

2005 ◽  
Vol 70 (1) ◽  
pp. 169-174 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian Hayden

Prentiss et al. (2003) have argued for a relatively recent, short (1600–1100 B.P.), and noncontinuous occupation of large villages and large housepits on the British Columbian Plateau. They argue that these developments resulted from climatically induced resource impoverishment in the region. I maintain that their database is inadequate for such conclusions and that their interpretations are in conflict with dates that I obtained from large housepits as well as with the distribution of early point styles (dating from 1200–4800 B.P.) that concentrate in the rim middens of large and medium-sized housepits. These data indicate that large villages and housepits that emerged by 2600 B.P., or earlier, were continuously occupied and corresponded more to the development of collector-based technologies rather than any climatic deteriorations or the introduction of the bow and arrow.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lisa Benjamin

Abstract A string of corporate litigation cases in the United Kingdom highlights the role of corporate group structures in complicating efforts to impose liability on parent companies for the activities of their subsidiaries, particularly where those subsidiaries are located in the Global South. Corporate group structures serve to insulate parent companies against liability for actions of their subsidiaries. This is the case even where economic benefits accrue to parent companies, which are often incorporated in the Global North. These group structures cabin liability for environmental and climate harms within subsidiary companies through reliance on company law principles such as limited liability and separate legal personality. These company law principles allow parent companies to enjoy corporate profits from the activities of their subsidiaries but disavow liability for any environmental damage resulting from such activities. This dichotomy has obvious equity implications, which are exacerbated in the extractive industries and in the context of climate change. Negative climate impacts are and will be felt predominantly in the Global South. In addition, environmental damage removes avenues of climate adaptation for vulnerable populations. But company law principles are not impervious to these equity challenges. These principles have never been absolute and courts have consistently found exceptions to them, although those exceptions have fluctuated in effectiveness and frequency over the years. Recent decisions by the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court in the United Kingdom imposed duties on parent companies for environmental damage caused by their subsidiaries. Cases following the decision in Chandler v Cape Industries illustrate tension between company law as interpreted in the Global North, and climate and environmental justice as experienced in the Global South. Climate change forces a reconceptualization of company law, including transnational corporate liability. This paper argues that these reconsiderations are not only appropriate, but given the contested histories of many of these companies in the Global South, long overdue.


Author(s):  
Alan Dignam ◽  
John Lowry

Titles in the Core Text series take the reader straight to the heart of the subject, providing focused, concise, and reliable guides for students at all levels. This chapter discusses ‘lifting the veil’, a phrase that refers to situations where the judiciary or the legislature have decided that the separation of corporate personality from the members must not be maintained. In this case, the veil of incorporation is said to be lifted. ‘Lifting’ is also known as ‘peeping’, ‘penetrating’, ‘piercing’, or ‘parting’. The chapter presents statutory examples of veil lifting, many of which involve corporate group structures and others involve straightforward shareholder limitation of liability issues. It also considers cases of veil lifting by the courts as well as classical veil lifting during the periods of 1897 to 1966, 1966 to 1989, and 1989 to the present. Three cases are highlighted: Creasey v Breachwood Motors Ltd (1993), Ord v Belhaven Pubs Ltd (1998), and Trustor AB v Smallbone (No 2) (2001). The chapter also examines claims of tortious liability, the liability of a parent company for personal injury, and commercial tort. Finally, it looks at the costs and benefits of limited liability.


Author(s):  
Alan Dignam ◽  
John Lowry

Titles in the Core Text series take the reader straight to the heart of the subject, providing focused, concise, and reliable guides for students at all levels. This chapter discusses ‘lifting the veil’, a phrase that refers to situations where the judiciary or the legislature have decided that the separation of corporate personality from the members must not be maintained. In this case, the veil of incorporation is said to be lifted. ‘Lifting’ is also known as ‘peeping’, ‘penetrating’, ‘piercing’, or ‘parting’. The chapter presents statutory examples of veil lifting, many of which involve corporate group structures and others involve straightforward shareholder limitation of liability issues. It also considers cases of veil lifting by the courts as well as classical veil lifting during the periods of 1897 to 1966, 1966 to 1989, and 1989 to the present. Three cases are highlighted: Adams v Cape Industries (1990), Chandler v Cape Plc (2012), and Prest v Petrodel Industries Ltd (2013). The chapter also examines claims of tortious liability, the liability of a parent company for personal injury, and commercial tort. Finally, it looks at the costs and benefits of limited liability.


Author(s):  
Retselisitsoe Phooko

On 2 August 2002 South Africa signed the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Protocol on Tribunal and the Rules of Procedure Thereof, thus effectively recognising and accepting the jurisdiction of the SADC Tribunal. Among the cases received by the SADC Tribunal was a complaint involving allegations of human rights violations by the government of Zimbabwe. It ruled that the government of Zimbabwe had violated human rights. Consequently, Zimbabwe mounted a politico-legal challenge against the existence of the Tribunal. This resulted in the review of the role and functions of the Tribunal in 2011 which resulted in the Tribunal being barred from receiving new cases or proceeding with the cases that were already before it. Furthermore, on 18 August 2014, the SADC Summit adopted and signed the 2014 Protocol on the Tribunal in the SADC which disturbingly limits personal jurisdiction by denying individual access to the envisaged Tribunal, thus reducing it to an inter-state judicial forum. This article critically looks at the decision of 18 August 2014, specifically the legal implications of the Republic of South Africa’s signing of the 2014 Protocol outside the permissible procedure contained in article 37 of the SADC Protocol on the Tribunal. It proposes that South Africa should correct this democratic deficit by introducing public participation in treaty-making processes in order to prevent a future situation where the executive unilaterally withdraws from an international treaty that is meant to protect human rights at a regional level. To achieve this, this article makes a comparative study between South Africa and the Kingdom of Thailand to learn of any best practices from the latter.


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