6 Conclusion: Confucius, the Analects, and Early Chinese Thought

2017 ◽  
pp. 314-319
Keyword(s):  
T oung Pao ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 100 (1-3) ◽  
pp. 33-79 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Hunter

This article questions the widely held assumption that the received Mengzi (Mencius) was composed by an author or authors familiar with the Lunyu (Analects). After reviewing the history of the association between Kongzi (Confucius) and Mengzi and between the Lunyu and Mengzi, it summarizes the case against the traditional dating of the Lunyu to argue for a reevaluation of the “Lunyu→Mengzi nexus.” It then analyzes Lunyu parallels in the Mengzi to show that those parallels do not establish the Mengzi authors’ familiarity with a Lunyu text. The next section on the dating of the Mengzi examines early Mengzi quotations to suggest that the text may not have been fixed until the Eastern Han period, in which case some Lunyu parallels in the Mengzi might reflect a Han milieu. A final section considers the implications of a Mengzi→Lunyu nexus for the study of early Chinese thought.
Cet article met en question l’opinion extrêmement répandue selon laquelle le texte reçu du Mengzi (Mencius) aurait été composé par un ou plusieurs auteurs familiers du Lunyu (Analectes). Après avoir passé en revue l’histoire de l’association entre Kongzi (Con­fu­cius) et Mengzi et entre le Lunyu et le Mengzi, l’auteur récapitule les arguments allant à ­l’encontre de la datation traditionnelle du Lunyu et argumente en faveur d’une réévaluation de la “connexion Lunyu→Mengzi”. Il analyse ensuite les parallèles avec le Lunyu dans le Mengzi et montre que ceux-ci ne prouvent pas que les auteurs du Mengzi aient été au fait d’une quelconque version du Lunyu. La section suivante, sur la datation du Mengzi, s’intéresse aux citations anciennes du Mengzi et suggère que le texte n’a pu être fixé avant la période des Han Orientaux, auquel cas certains parallèles avec le Lunyu dans le Mengzi pourraient refléter un contexte Han. La section finale examine les implications de la connexion Lunyu→Mengzi pour l’étude de la pensée chinoise ancienne.



2018 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 259-267
Author(s):  
Paul J. D'Ambrosio

This review article defends Brook Ziporyn against the charge, quite common in graduate classroom discussions, if not in print, that his readings of early Chinese philosophy are ‘overly Buddhist’. These readings are found in his three most recent books: Ironies of Oneness and Difference: Coherence in Early Chinese Thought, Beyond Oneness and Difference: Li and Coherence in Chinese Buddhist Thought and Its Antecedents, and Emptiness and Omnipresence: An Essential Introduction to Tiantai Buddhism. His readings are clearly Buddhist-influenced, but this is not in and of itself problematic. The core issue is rather to what degree these ‘Buddhist elements’ are actually already existent in, and have subsequently been carried over from, early Chinese thought in the development of Chinese Buddhism. Indeed, some scholars of Chinese Buddhism have pointed out that much of the vocabulary, concepts, and logic used in schools such as Tiantai may owe more to Daoist influences than to Buddhist ones. Accordingly, Ziporyn’s ‘overly Buddhist’ approach might simply be an avenue of interpretation that is actually quite in line with the thinking in the early texts themselves, albeit one that is less familiar (i.e. an early Chinese Buddhist or Ziporyn’s approach). The article also aims to show how Ziporyn’s theory concerning the importance of ‘coherence’ in early and later Chinese philosophy is also quite important in his above work on Tiantai Buddhism, Emptiness and Omnipresence. While in this work Ziporyn almost entirely abstains from using the language of coherence, much of it actually rests on a strong coherence-based foundation, thereby demonstrating not Ziporyn’s own prejudice, but rather the thoroughgoing importance and versatility of his arguments on coherence. Indeed, understanding the importance of coherence in his readings of Tiantai Buddhism (despite the fact that he does not explicitly use coherence-related vocabulary) only bolsters the defense against the claims that he makes ‘overly Buddhist’ readings of early Chinese philosophy.


Author(s):  
Leigh K. Jenco

This chapter argues that the ongoing debate about the “legitimacy of Chinese philosophy” (Zhongguo zhexue hefaxing) raises issues relevant to the globalization of knowledge. On its surface, the debate concerns whether Chinese thought can be meaningfully understood as “philosophy”; more generally, it asks how, in the very process of enabling their translation into presumably more “modern” languages of intellectual expression, the terms of a specific academic discipline shape and constrain the development of particular forms of knowledge. The debate reveals the power inequalities that underlie attempts to include culturally marginalized bodies of thought within established disciplines and suggests the range of alternatives that are silenced or forgotten when this “inclusion” takes place. Even contemporary invocations of “Chinese philosophy” are often unable to comprehend the stakes of the debate for many of its Chinese participants, who link the debate to enduring questions about the capacity of indigenous Chinese academic terms to compete successfully with Euro-American ones. These debates may illuminate questions currently motivating comparative political theory.


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